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This thesis aims to look at various possible ways in which temporality is concerned 
in visual arts. I consider that time exceeds being an object of perception and leads to an 
emergence of a fragmented notion of ‘otherness’, which interrupts constitution of a 
projective difference between the subject and the object. I chose my examples from the 
contemporary art practices – since the early sixties – which have been critical of the ways 
in which art was understood as an object of a single thought or belief. My examples may 
look as if they were analysed according to a specific history. However, they are critical of 
conceptualisation of things according to a single order that introduces an illusionary belief 
of space and time as if they were concrete things. Rather, I consider an emergence of 
multiple temporalities communicating with its viewer significant since such an 
understanding introduces a sense of becoming replaced by being not only in art but also in 
everything. Fragmentation is considered not as a distorted version of unity but as that 
which introduces the divisibility of a conception of unity.  
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Görsel sanatlarda birbirinden farklı bir takım işler çoğul zaman algılarına yol açabilir. 
Zamanın kendisi algılanabilirliğin ötesine geçebilir ve bu da ‘öteki’ nin nesne ve obje 
ilişkisi içerisinde algılanmasına müdahale eder. Tezde belirtilen sanat işleri 60’lar sonrası 
sanatına yöneliktir. Örnekler, her ne kadar dönemsel bir çerçevede ele alınıyor görünseler 
de, bu işler zaman ve mekanın sabit ve tek bir yapıya yönelik algılanmasına eleştirel bir 
nitelik taşırlar. Tek bir zamansal ve mekansal doğru yerine, iş ve ‘bakan’ arasındaki 
iletişimde sözkonusu olan zamanın çoğulluğudur; süreç ‘varlık’ ın yerini alabilir. Tezde 
belirtilen ‘ayrışma’ nın rolü bütünün parçalanması değil, bütünün oluşumunda ‘ayrışma’ 
nın önemini göstermektir.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The second half of the century, having witnessed two big Wars, opened a broader and a rapid changing conception of the 
world. People started to accept that there is a possibility of an emergence of more than one truth, which also introduced the possibility of 
incomprehension rather than the conception of a knowing subject. Therefore, varieties rather than singularities, sameness rather than 
differences emerged. The belief in modernism, which had promoted a break with historical bounds that aimed to bring a significance of a 
sense of authenticity in everything, became irrelevant. A desire for the authentic and the original in modernism, which depended on the 
idea of ‘change’ which would not have a relation with past. However, such an attempt for the new was again a rationalised and a 
preconditioned argument in the conception of change. Contrary to modernist belief that situated a place for itself every time it declared 
the new, the criticism of modernity came up with elimination of the new or an entirely centreless universe. The failure of the modernist 
claim could be said to be that the modernist reaction against the previous had chosen the same way, which the previous claimed to 
follow and modernists opposed. Cornelius Castoriadis states that  “the term modern is very infelicitous, and its inadequacy is bound to 
appear with the passage of time.”  He finds the problem of the modern in its claim of centerlessness and he argues that “the term modern 
expresses a deeply self-centered attitude.” The problem is the proclamation of “we are moderns”. In this sense, Castoriadis’ argument 
takes us to the problem of naming in modernism.1 The self-conscious attitude is also seen in modern art, which claims to come up with 
the new and the authentic for the scene of art. It can be said that modernism fails in its trying to announce the new and rationalise it by 
making it acceptable in a universal sphere.  
 
In ‘The Time of the King’2 Derrida argues that time is not a thing. It is not an 
object but is objectified and is considered in the economy of giving and taking. Time is not 
the property of someone or something, while it is not also possible to get a sense of time 
without considering time as that which gives a sense of temporality of the substances. It is 
neither inside nor outside.  
 
In this sense, time may be considered to have an aspect of  “parergonality”. Parergon is the 
term Derrida introduces in The Truth in Painting. 3  Derrida refers to the frame of a painting and 
issue of framing in art as parergon. He is critical of the notion of frame as a limit. The “parergon” 
says Derrida stands outside “both from the ergon (the work) and the from the milieu, it stands out 
first of all like a figure on a ground.” (Derrida: 1987, 61) In “Parergon” he argues that frame 
stands neither inside nor outside. It is not a property of frame that makes it both inside and outside 
but a notion of outside and inside itself. The conception of an inside and outside is the abstraction. 
Derrida is against interpretation and he is critical of “thinking art according to the terms of 
inside/outside” since it makes art something intelligible. “Trying to understand what art means is to 
take it into a very determined regime of interpretation.” (Derrida: 1987, 22) The way to free art 
from such logic of regime is to deconstruct the binary oppositions and the search for a meaning in 
art. Frame is not a limit of painting, nor it is a limitless thing. Thus, such aspect of frame is not 
something that could be considered with reference to the presence or absence of frame as the limit 
of something outside itself. Instead, the boundaries of frame are drawn in their ability to go beyond 
frame as the representation of a teleology of something else.   
What could be the relationship between time and frame? Time neither includes nor 
excludes things. In its parergonality, standing both outside and inside, it does not indicate a sense of 
presence that could be grasped in its immediacy. It is not intelligible. Non-presence of time does not 
negate time as absence, but it introduces an unfixed notion of time, which is not marked by space.  
                                                           
1 Castoriadis, Cornelius, World in fragments: writings on politics, society, psychoanalysis, and the 
imagination ed. and trans., Ames Curtis, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997) 33.  
2 Derrida, Jacques,  ‘The Time of the King’, Given Time, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
 
3 Derrida, Jacques, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, Chicago: Uni. of 
Chicago Press, 1987. 
 vii
            The issue of presence is not only a matter of time. Rather such concern of presence 
and absence conveys the history and criticism of modernity. Modernity has privileged 
presence over absence and space over time. The modernist belief in dichotomies, dualities 
have taken a lot from the implication of presence and absence as the manifestation of 
space. Such concern with presence, which is derived from Enlightenment ideas, is reflected 
in many areas from arts to science, the everyday life, concerning subjective and objective 
field of being. The modernist concern with presence has been carried into debates after the 
second half of the twentieth century in the emergence of a criticism of modernity. Sight, 
vision and the look were very important issues in modernity, which was regarded as the 
manifestation of presence. Donald Lowe in ‘History of Bourgeois Perception’ has given a 
brief explanation of the interaction between the change in the visual culture and history, by 
dividing the historical change into five main periods in the context of visual understanding.
   
 
In the first period, which is the Middle Ages, hearing and touching were the 
privileged senses over vision. The Renaissance witnessed the emergence of linear 
perspective and the sight gained importance. The third phase belongs to a period of 
representation, and the fourth is the age of space and time as an effect of bourgeois society. 
Lowe describes the twentieth century as “corporate capitalism”.4 The Western “look” 
depended on the perspectivalist notion that centred the eye in the structure of the subject, 
which referred to a “knowing body.” To “know”, epistemologically, is related to “see”. 
The roots of the former is “eidenei” and the latter is “idein.”5 In ‘Scopic Regimes of 
Modernity’ Martin Jay states that Cartesian perspectivalism depends on the representation 
of reality in mind as ‘idea’ and declares such notion as the understanding of  “modern 
scopic regime.” 6 The emergence of the perspectival structure considers the look as static, 
singular, unblinking and fixated which “followed the logic of gaze rather than glance.” The 
fixing ability of the gaze, regarded as the property of the subject, conveys a notion of 
control over the object. Jay argues about the problematic of the subject position in a 
Cartesian perspective as articulated below. According to Cartesian perspectivalism:  
 
                                                           
4 Mirzoeff, Nicholas, ‘What is Visual Culture?’, The visual culture reader, ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff,  (London: 
Routledge, 1998)  20. 
5 Simon Goldhill ‘Refracting Classical  Vision   Changing  Cultures of Viewing’, Vision in Context,   ed. Teresa 
Brennan 
 and Martin Jay ,  (New York: Routledge,  1996)  40.  
6 Jay, Martin, Downcast Eyes, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. 
 viii
                       The monocular eye at the apex of the beholder’s pyramid could be construed  
           as transcendental and universal - that is exactly the same for any human viewer occupying 
           the same point in time and space - solely dependent on the particular, individual vision of 
                                distinct beholders, with their own concrete relations to the scene in front of them. 
                                (Jay: 1994, 70)  
             
In this sense, the fixed and direct gaze gains a function of ‘establishing’ a hierarchical 
relationship with the object of the gaze. Thus, the knowing subject emerges as the power 
mechanism. The fixed gaze has so many implications along with any kind of gaze, which 
could also be the look that glances. The importance given to the ocular is the importance 
given to presence that introduces things in a spatial order. In the absolute understanding of 
space, time is produced as an absolute material. This is the conception of time, which 
conveys as an absolute mode of thought the reality of which is bound to space. In this 
sense, Descartes considered body and mind as different from each other and seen a causal 
relation between time and space. Descartes also brought the dualism between time and 
duration. He regarded time as “the abstract mode of thought which measured the duration 
of created substances.” 7 As Descartes separated time between the physical and the 
intelligible, Newton distinguished between the ‘absolute time’, which is mathematical and 
true time, and the relative time that is separate “from its sensible measures.” Newton’s 
dualism depended on the conception of absolute time, which was exterior to the movement 
of things, matter and motion. Relative time as the internal time as the measure of duration 
“by means of motion.” (Turetzky: 1998, 74) Relative time, according to Newton, depended 
on the relationship between time and the “sensible objects.” The concerns with the 
sensible, which could be considered as a reference to intelligible things and the 
unintelligible brings the notion of “true time” as the ideal time. Newton also considered 
real time as the time of God, and God as time, arguing that “time is uncreated that is 
caused by the emanation from God’s existence.” (Turetzky: 1998, 72) In this sense, 
Newton introduced a transcendental notion of time outside the world, which was the 
manifestation of things in the world.  The existence of time was bound to the existence of 
God as time was understood to be  “arising from the fact of God’s existence and God has 
the property of temporal location.” (Turetzky: 1998, 72-73) Thus, it was considered that 
time was a transcendental signified which was unreachable like God. In this sense, time 
was conceived as a property of God and what was left in this world was the abstracted and 
ideal time. As the aim was to reach the ideal, it was not possible to get a sense of true time 
                                                           
7 Turetzky, Philip, Time, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) 71.  
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in this world. Modernity and the conception of vision in modernity has developed under 
the influence of theories of Cartesian metaphysics (1595-1650), Galileo’s (1564-1642) 
conception of the world through a geometrical point of view and Newtonian (1642-1727) 
principle of the absolute. In this sense, the truth of modernity could be said to be the truth 
of an absolute scientific truth that privileged the stable and the unchanging. A trust in the 
scientific knowledge introduces a single way of understanding for everything in the world. 
This ‘single truth’ calls for everything to line up in a linear existence and brings a notion of 
destiny. An understanding of time according to space empowers this relation, which 
declares existence as a dialectics of non-existence that is dependent on a beginning and an 
end.  
 Henri Bergon (1859-1941) who has asserted his theories of time as dureé, has 
brought the notion of time which “cannot be captured by the traditional concepts of unity 
and multiplicity.” (Turetzky: 1998, 194) In this sense, Bergson’s attempt was on the side of 
elimination of a unified approach, which was a criticism of privileging of spatial dialectics 
over time. Bergson did not deal with a difference between the ideal and the real. His 
theories could eliminate the hierarchy of absolute time over worldly time conceived as 
“duration” in Newton. Rather dureé brings a fluid conception of the virtual and the actual 
and the measured and the unmeasured. He introduces two kinds of multiplicities, the 
quantitative and the qualitative. The quantitative is dependent on the measurement of 
things in absolute space, which means a coherent understanding of things. This is the 
measurement of space and things in space, which are distinguished from each other 
according to numerical differences.  On the other hand, the qualitative is able to introduce 
infinite divisions in space differing in kind by its not being abstracted through a system of 
measurement. In Bergson, the notion of dureé as divisible replaces an understanding of an 
exterior and unique time.  Dureé as a difference in kind is not the actual thing since it 
differs virtually. Bergson’s notion of time as dureé does not consider reality as the 
manifestation of being in differentiating between the virtual and the actual. Instead, the 
virtual does not differ from the actual by being less real than the actual. The difference 
between the virtual and the actual is more than a differentiation in degree by a measure of 
amount. So reality is not considered as external to being and it is not built upon a stable 
and “pre-existing element”. The difference between the virtual and the actual are 
considered as a passage from pure memory to memory-images. In this sense, he does not 
leave memory in the virtual, but considers an alteration of memory in the actual, which 
turns into memory-image. “We actualise memory by detaching ourselves from the present 
 x
leaping into the past.” (Turetzky: 1998, 203) In this sense, Bergson gives an account of 
memory that is activated in the actual, which does not allow past to be left in the past, but 
introduces past that coexists with the present. Bergson’s conception of dureé seems to 
eliminate the dualism between the imaginary and the real as well as the sensible and the 
imaginable.  
 Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) has taken from Bergson’s notion of dureé concerning 
the relationship between the virtual and the actual a notion of difference in kind. Deleuze 
argues that time could be considered according to the first, second and the third synthesis 
of time. “The first synthesis of time produces the living present, by connecting successive 
instants as past and future.” (Turetzky: 1998, 212) However, according to Deleuze, these 
instants are not constituted as the abstracted and isolated pieces of time taken from past 
and future but they fuse into past and the future. In this sense, it has the function of both 
connecting and distinguishing past, present and future. The second synthesis is the pure 
and passive one, which is a “transcendental synthesis.” However, time is neither the first 
nor the second synthesis, since it is neither the virtual nor the actual. At this point, Deleuze 
introduces the third synthesis of time, which is the crystallisation of time that both has the 
aspect of the virtual and the actual. Crystallisation of time occurs in the multiplication of 
the present. This is constituted as the cyclical and continuous emergence of the actual and 
the virtual. They both displace and occur in each other as the possibility of differing 
tendency. The crystallisation of time is important since it is what distinguishes Deleuze’s 
conception of duration from Bergsonian ‘dureé’. The third synthesis of time introduces 
time as perceptible in the crystal-image. It is the emergence of a transcendental 
understanding of temporality, which is heterogenous and is in a becoming that is not 
conceived in a unique sense of present, past or future. In the conception of the third 
synthesis of time, the ideal is not abstracted but the ideal conveys an ideal reality.  
            
  
The Problem With “Presence” and Beyond  
 
Rosalind Krauss states that modernist visuality wants nothing more than to be the 
display of reason, of the rationalised, the coded, the abstracted and the law. 8 The scopic 
field is examined according to modernist discourse as the manifestation of truth in this 
                                                           
8 Krauss, Rosalind, The Optical Unconscious, Cambridge: Masacchusetts Inst. of Technology, 1993.  
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way. The privilege given to the precision of the visible in modernity emerges as the way to 
reach knowledge. The seeing subject becomes the knowing subject and seeing becomes the 
conscious act. Modernist conception of vision has divided the spatial and the temporal 
according to the rules of outside and inside. In the arts, there is also a conception of the 
outside and inside that introduces time as the tool of space. The emphasis on space is a 
consequence of the modernist desire for presence, the immediate, the rational and the 
concrete rather than a fluid and continuous notion of the world. In modern art, there is also 
a strong emphasis on this preserved space, which distinguishes between the sensible and 
the intelligible. Modernist approach considers a binary opposition between inside and 
outside and situates the temporal as an outside effect of space. Spatial understanding 
allows for the conception of a “form” and figuration. The implication of form brings a 
concrete aspect to space. In modern art, form contradicts the formless - informe - and time 
is regarded as the formless thing. Space gives an ideal form to time, in a way space 
idealises time. On the other hand, the elimination of binaries allow the formless  - informe - 
to be understood as “what form itself creates, as logic acting logically to act against itself” 
and form produces a “heterologic.” (Krauss: 1993, 167)  Formless is form deprived of a 
concrete and unchanging self-identity. Nevertheless, formless is not outside a notion of 
identity. Rather it does not refer to a notion of a stable, self-identity and it is able to divide 
in itself. It may be thought as the way in which a conception of time is freed from any 
figuration outside itself. Space in this sense may not be the negation of time. Rather it may 
be part of a temporal alteration in a continuous becoming rather than a figure. Continuity 
of time in modernism is ‘observed’ in the shaped space of the visual and the observable. 
Therefore, it only exists as long as it is perceivable by a subject. Such a conception 
introduces time as reified and internalised by the looking subject and gives time’s 
existence as a matter of consciousness.  Modernist painting calls for a fixed look, which is 
determined according to geometrical coordinates of the picture plane.  Motion becomes an 
outside effect contributing to space. Krauss states that such an understanding of the 
“temporal as necessarily outside the visual” is an  “idea of the separation of the senses on 
which modernism’s logic is built.” (Krauss: 1993, 217)  
Deleuze introduces the problematic of immanence and a conception of a 
temporality through intuition. According to Deleuze time is not exterior to space. In 
 xii
Bergsonism 9 Deleuze asserts “intuition as the method” of getting a sense of duration rather 
than a concrete time. In this sense, the privileging of perception, which introduces time as 
the immediate form of space is questioned. A sense of scepticism about perception is 
because Deleuze does not leave room for the immediacy and the implication of “now” as 
the point in space. Rather duration is regarded as a process of  “becoming”, which is the 
succession of repetition that does not stop repeating. Such a conception does not exclude 
perception from getting a sense of temporality of things, but does not constitute perception 
as the condition of time. This is because memory and recollection contribute to the 
actualisation of perception. In this sense, the concrete act of immediate perception is 
replaced by unfolding of things in time. Deleuze states that:  
 
 
Perception merges with the object from which it has abstracted only that which did not 
interest us. It is not a difference in kind, rather a difference in degree between the faculty 
of the brain and the function of the core, between the perception of the matter and the  
matter itself. (Deleuze: 1988, 25)  
 
Such a relation between perception and memory eliminates the division between the domains of 
perception as consciousness and memory as unconsciousness. The body is not that which needs  
‘realisation’ according to geometrical proportions, but it is in affection with its environment in a temporal 
unfolding. Deleuze’s conception of “recollection of memory” activates memory in consciousness and 
links the instants to each other interpolating the past in the present. In this sense, Deleuze rejects being on 
the side of the ones who argue for a spatial reserve for perception and memory. His opposition to 
Freudian psychoanalysis is also because of Freud’s constitution of perception in the topographies of the 
subject. The Freudian subject contradicts the Deleuzian subject in the sense that the Deleuzian subject is 
not constituted upon spatial determinants, which might be an implication of an “erect” position of being. 
Rather, the subject has no place and the formation of the subject is due to an alteration, a repetition that 
repeats itself by differentiating in itself. Deleuze’s notion of a temporal body allows memory to contribute 
to the constitution of the subject and allows for a temporal unfolding of the body free from an 
instantaneous understanding of space. Deleuze does not consider a specific place for such a conception of 
                                                           
9 Deleuze, Gilles, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Zone Books, 
1988. 
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the body. In this sense, the body is introduced as that which does not have to give a sense of totality. 
Accordingly, there is not a concern for the ego and the formation of a self in the relationship with the 
other.  
The notion of self-identity has been an important issue in modernist discourse. Self-identity is the rigid 
structure, the knowing subject and the seeing subject at the centre of the universe. Self-identity is formed 
according to linear history and the historicisation of being. This is also the way in which the space 
functions as a shaping and forming principle of history of human being. On the other hand, duration is 
concerned with a cyclical unfolding between the virtual and the actual and in difference in kind. It does 
not allow something concrete to emerge as the manifestation of truth. It is that which is left to continuous 
division and becoming and gains a nomadic character. In this sense, such conception of time as flow 
neither includes nor excludes a sense of being in itself. It does not have a structure and does not indicate a 
linear time-line. Therefore, it does not constitute a space for individual historicisation of being which is 
determined according to the position of the individual in a teleological structure.  
 In The Consequences of Modernity 10Anthony Giddens argues that the modern condition is 
based on narrative. There is a sense of “binding” between space and time that is based on the social 
systems of modernity. These systems are the constitution of a law indicating where and how the 
subject should stand in the social system. “Self-identity” says Giddens is a way of self-evidential 
being that implies space in modernity and time is bound to that space as it abstracted as a 
calculable and measurable thing. Giddens states that the conception of self-identity in modernity is 
the result of the problematic of presence, which introduces the issues of evidentiality, biography, 
narrative and individual historicisation. Individual historicisation is “fragile and it keeps one 
history specific to this self-identity.” Giddens’ reading of the relationship between self-identity and 
modernity seems to have a sense of keeping the record of time that anchors the subject to a 
narrative space of historicisation.  Such a notion brings anticipation of future in the present. 
However, it excludes the possibility of regarding present time as a mode of alteration. A sense 
historicisation of the subject is “the problem of identity” which is concerned with the question of 
how to express the self to the other. Simarly, Kellner in ‘Postmodern Identities’ 11 asserts that 
identity is as a problematic of “constitution, perception, interpretation, and presentation of our self 
to ourselves and to others.” (Kellner: 1998, 125) Kellner also argues that identity in modernity is 
social and ‘Other’ related. Identity has been regarded a mutual recognition in modernity, 
dependent on the other which implies self-consciousness. Modernity increases a mechanism of 
‘Other’ directedness.  
The problematic of the other depends on the spatial and temporal separations 
between the other and the self in modernity. Language is one of the significant aspects in 
the formation of the other which introduces the specular subject of modernity as “I”. In this 
                                                           
 
10 Giddens,  Anthony, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990.  
 
11 Kellner, Douglas,  ‘Postmodern Identities’, Modernity and Identity, ed. Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman,   
Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1998.  
 
 xiv
sense, the self is determined in its relation to the other. In Modernity and Self-identity12 
Giddens refers to linguistic differentiation of I/me/you which he sees as the “anchoring 
discursive feature” of self-identity. He states that the I/me relation is one internal to 
language.   
 
‘I’ is a linguistic shifter, which gets its meaning from the networks of the terms  
whereby a discursive system of subjectivity is acquired. The ability to use 'I’,  
and other associated terns of subjectivity, is a condition for the emergence of  
self-awareness.  (Giddens: 1991, 53)  
 
The constitution of self-identity, which requires recognition by the other brings a state of 
anxiety. Giddens states that anxiety is the emergence of  “being against non-being” which 
is, in Freud, related to the “fear of the loss of the other, and is connected to the early 
mastery of absence.” (Giddens: 1991, 49) The construction of self-identity as motivated by 
a sense of loss, which causes anxiety in the ‘modern subject’ is because of the anticipation 
of the future event in the present. Thus, the individual historicisation is guaranteed. On the 
other hand, a conception of a temporality of the subject that is not constituted on beginning 
and ending is not concerned with an idea of ‘the loss’. The loss is the loss of the other, 
which is regarded as the site on which the subjective desires are anchored. In a way, the 
loss of the other, is the loss of the object of desire. The separation is built on a structure of 
loss that is regarded as the cause of desire. The body is the agent of desire and one’s 
desires are reflected in the other’s body and the other’s desire. There is a precise 
foundation for desire, which is found in the organs. Oedipus was blamed for that, for 
desiring his mother, and being unaware of his ‘direction’ of his desires. The desire was the 
desire for copulating with the mother to return to a condition of  being whole,  which once 
was there in the ‘beginning.’ The Mother’s desire was also directed to what she could ‘not 
have’ and this is the penis as the power of masculinity. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Anti-
Oedipus’13 breaks the myth on which desire is suspended. “Anti-Oedipus” rejects the 
tragedy of Oedipus, who is blamed for desiring his mother. Deleuze and Guattari are 
critical of the division between production and the product. They argue that production and 
the product are in the same body, and this body is “without organs.” Deleuze mentions that 
desiring machines are also the productions, which produce desires that are mechanised. 
There is a consumption, which Deleuze also mentions, that takes place in the cycle of 
production. Then the products of these bodies are “immediately consumed” that leads to a 
repetition in the production of desire. “Desire causes the current to flow, it constantly 
couples continuous flows and partial objects that are by nature fragmentary and 
fragmented.” (Deleuze &Guattari: 1997, 405) One flows to incorporate with the other, 
desiring for the other. Deleuze and Guattari see the psyche as a machine and regard a 
conception of  psychiatric materiality, which addresses desire as a mechanism. The 
desiring machines produce desire, stem from desire, and they produce “psychic reality.” 
The desire and its objects are one and the same thing; as machine. The body both as the 
product and the production at the same time turns into an apparatus which does not desire 
another object outside itself. Krauss states that “the production of flows by the same 
machine, the breast, say, provide the continuum into which next machine, the mouth, can 
                                                           
12 Giddens, Anthony, Modernity and Self-identity, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991. 
13Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix,  ‘Anti-Oedipus’, From Modernism to Postmodernism, ed. Lawrence E. 
Cahoone,  (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 401-21.  
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cut, thereby setting up the precondition of the mechanical, which is to articulate matter.” 
(Krauss: 1993, 316) Repetition is the motive of this machine. An important aspect of ‘Anti-
Oedipus’ is the introduction of the Klenian “part-object” which conveys “non-productive 
and formless” aspect of body. This body is  “without organs” and it leads to the “decoding 
of the flow of desire at the same time setting up the illusion that they themselves are the 
agents of production.” (Krauss:1993, 316)  
 ‘Anti-Oedipus’ could be regarded as a criticism of self-identity in modernity. The 
subject it introduces is not subjectified by the existence of the other located as the focal 
point of desire. The subject is not constituted through differentiating its object from itself – 
in differing in degree. The subject also becomes the object of desire. It is also not a self-
seeing entity, who knows the other by situating it in the limit of vision. The subject is the 
site of self-destruction, which does not refer to a finishing point. Rather it differentiates in 
a repetitive mode, which is not located in a place. It is open to process that goes between 
the virtual and the actual.  
  
 
Différance as a Question About Presence  
 
Derrida’s notion of différance does not work a binary opposition between two 
things. He is critical of the “metaphysics of presence” on which Western philosophy 
depends. He is against the logocentric notion of western philosophy, which is based on 
thought, truth, reason and logic.  Deconstruction of difference is the deconstruction of the 
relationship between the self and the other, which western metaphysics articulated 
according to the rules of presence and absence. Derrida takes difference away from the 
linguistic boundaries of difference and introduces “différance”. Différance does not have a 
single and equivocal meaning which  corresponds a phonetic or lingustic understanding of 
difference. Différance does not belong to present or any “being-present.” Différance is not 
originated from a ‘being’ before itself and is itself not original. It stands out by rejecting a 
conception of “essence” and “existence” as well as a word or a concept. Différance has a 
reference to the Latin word differer, one of the meanings of which is “the action of putting 
off until later.” In this sense, differer is temporization itself:14  
 
Differer is to take recourse, consciously or unconsciously in the temporal and temporizing 
mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment of fulfilment of “desire”  
or “will.” This temporization is also temporalisation and spacing, the becoming-time of 
space and the becoming-spaceof time, “the originary constitution” of time and space… 
the use of language that here  is criticized and displaced. (Derrida: 1982, 8)  
 
 
In his constitution of différance, Derrida is critical of western metaphysics, which 
privileges presence over absence, instance over continuity, speech over writing since there 
is a conception of hierarchical oppositions between activity and passivity. In that sense he 
is also critical of the way in which psychoanalytic practices is concerned with the opening 
and closing of the unconscious for the constitution of the subject. In Freudian 
psychoanalysis consciousness has the privileged position as the manifestation of self-
presence. Derrida argues that  “the privilege granted to consciousness is the privilege 
granted to the present”. Accordingly, the subject in psychoanalysis is constituted on the 
notion of the real and the unreal as well as dividing the psychical from the physical, the 
conscious and the unconscious in different spatial positions. In this sense, Derrida is 
                                                           
14 Derrida, Jacques, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.  
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critical about Freud’s conception of “difference”, which directly refers to the ‘concepts’ 
based on spacing. Freud conceptualises difference while he refers to differing, which is 
accompanied by separation between two forces where mind is privileged over the intuition 
and the body. To defer on the other hand addresses temporization, which introduces 
“breaching” rather than closure, “trace” rather than instance and self-presence. Différance 
is the temporalisation of space and spatialisation of time.  
             Derrida seems to argue that Freud’s theorisation of psyche is based on différance, 
whereas Freud is not aware of that.  Freud was never able to give a clear explanation of his 
theories. At the base of Freud’s ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, there is différance since 
replacement of pleasures by realities is regarded as an outcome of the deferred action.  
However, Freud does not allow a space for the unconscious to have a role in consciousness 
by tending to treat the unconscious as passified, set away from consciousness. Freud 
misses difference and sees the unconscious as passive, in so far as it is repressed, while 
retaining tied to “evidence” of presence, absence and loss. Différance is delayed in itself, 
which “exceeds presence and absence.” Derrida says that a constitution of différance is not 
based on desires, needs or demands. It is rather open for breaching, then it does not desire 
the other to reach the ultimate presence and wholeness. Derrida asks, what if difference is 
divided in itself?  
Derrida’s approach to the unconscious then, does not exclude the unconscious in an 
isolated, unreachable space, which would thus regard it as “masked consciousness”. The 
temporal mode of the unconscious then, is not timeless, but is “past that has never been 
present, never will be, whose future to come will never be a production or a reproduction 
in the form of presence.” (Derrida: 1982, 20)  As long as there is movement and alterity 
there cannot be presence in the conception of difference. Therefore, Derrida brings the 
conception of différance instead of difference, which is also an interruption to the 
“historical and ontological unfolding of being.” (Derrida: 1982, 22) Relationship of trace to 
presence can be towards a  “simulacrum of presence” which is the constitution of 
“dislocation and displacement” of trace in itself. Nevertheless, presence can only be the 
trace of presence that passes, defers and differentiates from itself.  
 
 
Changing Times in Contemporary Art 
 
 In this section I will be considering the ways in which similar objects reveal 
different senses of temporalities. Some of the works differ from each other in the sense that 
there is a similar understanding in the process of their making but the technique is different 
in each works.  I consider spatial factors as significant in changing the way in which the 
temporality of the objects are revealed. However, the spatial understanding also differs in 
these works from that of the conventional formation of space which modern art claims. 
Most of the art practices since the second half of the twentieth century introduce different 
relations between the work and the viewer. It could be said that art after modernism has 
been critical of modernist discourse, which is reflected in modernist art practices. Within 
the contemporary art practices, contrary to what the modernist works claim, the 
conventional linear narrative form is distorted by destroying the elements of a narrative 
structure such as the unity of time, space and action. There is no longer a concern for the 
ideal work of art but art becomes what it is. For this reason, most of the people dealing 
with contemporary art practices have contributed to the art scene with a claim of revealing 
the importance or “thingness” of the object itself. They were against the comprehension of 
the things in a relation of representation by means of their resemblances and samenesses 
with the real. In this sense, such a claim introduces the use of the media not as the medium, 
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as an agent to express something, but as the work itself. Therefore, the works, most of the 
time, achieves going beyond a narrative position.  
 In referring to different works, I aim to chose the objects that give a sense of 
temporality which could be considered away from being a representation of space. Such an 
understanding of temporality could sometimes be seen as duration having taken the place 
of time. Accordingly, the conception of time in the modernist work of art as a fact that is 
revealed in the immediacy of perception is distorted by duration. I will be considering the 
ways in which the modernist factuality of space is replaced by actuality of duration. It is 
also not the only concern with time and a different understanding of temporality as 
duration that causes the shift from a modernist work of art into contemporary art. Rather, I 
will be arguing that the conception of duration changes the way in which the object and the 
subject of art is understood. In addition to this, it is important to note that, these objects do 
not only give an account of duration that is only relevant and specific in the condition of 
art. On the contrary, these works aim to introduce a conception of temporality that is 
fragmented and unbound from space as long as time is argued to be exterior to space.  
Rather than being considered as the mimetic representation of reality, these objects have 
their own realities. These objects sometimes go beyond a sense of the real that is 
considered as that which is outside art by interrupting, sometimes disturbing an awareness 
of self-presence on the side of the viewer. Such aspects could be regarded as the common 
traits of the objects I chose, which might also create differences.  
The first chapter is concerned with the temporal and spatial aspects of minimal 
objects. In this chapter some of the characteristics which are considered specific to the 
relationship between the viewer and the minimal objects are discussed. The characteristics 
that distinguish minimal objects from modernist painting and sculpture is considered to be 
that these objects do not claim to be the included in a specific genre or movement. The 
minimal objects differ from modernist painting or sculpture by emphasising duration rather 
than instance, scale rather than size, an individualising and particularisation of relationship 
with the viewer. The process of their making is also important in the sense that the use of 
industrial materials introduce an altered relationship between the work and the viewer. In 
the elimination of an expressive traits observable in the surface of a painting, the traces 
refer to a machinic process which cannot be referred back to the autographic material. 
There is no longer a surface of a painting that carries expressive traits of its author. In that 
sense, there is also a consideration of a process, which allows a process to occur between 
the viewer and these objects. There is an emphasis on the viewer’s perception and bodily 
involvement in process in the gallery space. However, minimal objects reject having a 
sense of representation and the space they occupy does not convey a sense of narration. 
The emphasis on a literal character of these objects, which introduce an individual 
experience, is criticised by the defenders of modern art such as Clement Greenberg and 
Michael Fried. I take Fried’s criticism about the theatricality of these objects to be 
important since it is ambiguous to consider an aspect of theatricality on the side of minimal 
art. I consider Fried’s notion of theatricality inconsistent since he tries to exclude art from 
what he considers literal as theatrical. Fried is on the side of modern art since it looks as if 
he considers art as an object of consciousness and that which is able to constitute a truth in 
life. In addition to that, the dependence on a notion of perception is questioned according 
to how perception is conceived. Does the emphasis of perception address a sense of 
consciousness about the work, space and temporality on the side of the viewer? Or could 
people who claimed the importance of perception in minimal art have meant something 
else other than a state of consciousness?  
 There is an important point, which is common in all of the chapters, although 
presented through some various kinds of examples: time is not a matter of consciousness 
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and movement is not an outer effect of time. It does not have to be visible and implied 
through the spatial dialectics. Although there is not a visible ‘action’ on the side of the 
minimal objects, we can talk about a movement in a temporal mode, which introduces 
delay. The operation of delay rather than instance is present in the works, which also 
brings a sense of fragmentation to the relationship between the viewer and the work. In this 
sense, delay interrupts a stable position and a conception of a fixed notion of the viewer as 
the subject and the minimal object as the object under the control of the gaze. The unclarity 
of positions is not only between the object and its viewer, but also is revealed in the 
making of the minimal objects. In that sense, Robert Smithson’s Non-site (1968) and 
Robert Morris’ Mirrorred Cubes (1965) are referred to as having such characteristics. 
They introduce mobilisation of space, an impossibility of constituting an identity either on 
the side of the viewer or the object, a delayed notion of temporality, and a fragmented 
relationship between the space and the viewer. 
 In the second part of the chapter Bruce Nauman’s corridor installation, The 
Live/Taped Video Corridor (1968) is introduced. The concern in this installation is similar 
to the notion of delay and inability to constitute a stable relationship between the subject 
and object. The corridor is important since the way the video monitors are installed in the 
corridor interrupts a notion of presence and it makes delay visible by not representing a 
single possible appearance of one walking in the corridor.  
The way it differs from the temporality of minimal objects and most other 
installations is that it cuts the relationship with the gallery space, which is able to take the 
participant into another realm out of gallery space. Although this work is often announced 
as installation, it interrupts an understanding of a relationship which installation space 
communicates with its viewer. This space is not a specific place: it is not marked by an 
unchanging territory that is enclosed inside the borders. There is a common point in these 
works and in corridor installation and that is the way in which space is divided and 
mobilised by the possibility of different temporalities operating ‘at the same time.’ In this 
chapter the temporal characteristics of the gallery space and as the space of installation as 
well as the objects relation to the viewer are considered.   
 In the second chapter, the movement-image and the time-image are introduced. These terms belong 
to Deleuze who is concerned with the representation of movement and its relation to duration in cinema. 
Deleuze argues that the movement-image introduces an indirect representation of the image in cinema, 
while the time-image is a direct representation. The time-image rejects a notion of a coherent narrative 
film that is based on a plot. Rather, there are irrational cuts, which creates the time-image. The time 
image is not a mental image that is produced by the cut. The time-image does not allow sensory motor 
links to develop on the side of the spectator of the film. The time-image introduces a temporal rather than 
a spatial cinematic experience, which does not constitute events following a sequential temporal order. I 
consider Andy Warhol’s films Empire, Eat (1963) and Sleep(1963)  according to the time-image. These 
films interrupt a conventional mode of participation of the spectator in the film. The time-image in this 
sense, changes one’s relation with cinematic space as well as the notion of identification in cinema. In this 
chapter some of the video performances, Slo-Mo films and other films by Bruce Nauman are also 
considered as some examples of “moving image” which also stand out by means of the use of film as a 
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temporal material.  It can be said about the films in this chapter that the notion of the “moving image” is 
an illusion and the time-image is at some point able to break this illusion in cinema. In addition to this the 
examples of moving images in this chapter have a concern similar to the minimalist’s use of the materials 
not as part of the narrative structure but as that which become entity.  In Warhol’s use of long shots as 
well Nauman’s films, there is a tendency to use the normal duration of film material without a 
manipulation to the event through cuts or other effects or changing the position of the camera. We see that 
the film material, the film stock as well and the subject of the film do not constitute a narrative form and 
the manipulation of these techniques differ from their usual usage. In this sense, the media become 
present not only as the agent to tell the story but as ‘itself’ which does not make a story but become a 
story. 
  
In the third chapter, there is a description of a short film by Kerstin Cmelka. She is a contemporary artist 
who makes experimental films. The film I analyse is With Me. In this film there is a depiction of two 
women copulating with each other. However, these two women appear to be the same women. With Me is 
not performed by two different women. Cmelka achieves this by making a double exposure on the same 
film stock, by performing two of the women in different times and displaying the film as if the women are 
there simultaneously. In this sense, I argue that such a film interrupts a sense of identification on the side 
of the spectator which psychoanalytic film theory does not help to explain. In the copulation scene, the 
subject and the object are unclear since they are both the same and two separate persons at the same time. 
The Lacanian theory of identification, which treats the relation to the screen by analogy to the relation 
with the mirror in the mirror stage. commonly used with reference to the relation of screen as the mirror 
in the mirror stage does not coincide with the fragmented notion of the subject and the object in this film. 
With Me disrupts a unique understanding of space, time and action which introduces an oscillation 
between the real and the phantasmatic. The film also reveals a fragmented notion of space and time. Time 
does not extend in a spatial dimension but it multiplies into different temporalities that meet in a single 
duration of the film. The film lasts three minutes. However, these three minutes do not explain the 
operation of delay that enables us to see different takes at different times in a single duration. With Me 
represents the particular and the singular at the same time while it gives a sense of detachment from and 
attachment to the temporal unfolding, to the image and to the screen.  
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The examples from the minimal objects, the films and the video installations meet in the sense that they 
interrupt a stable sense of perception on the side of the spectator. What these objects introduce is not an 
unreal or illusionary side of perception. Rather these objects contribute to an understanding of perception 
by being critical about the ‘nature’ of perception, which is conceived as immediate and as a work of 
mind. In this sense, these objects could change the conventional attitude of perception, which is 
associated with a conception of consciousness in psychoanalysis. These works do not deny the 
importance of perception and consciousness but they do try to tell that perception and consciousness, the 
intelligible and the comprehensible are not the prior conditions for communicating between each other. In 
this sense, time does not become an external element of space. Unlike a modernist attitude, which seeks 
for the stable, the unified and the whole and privileges spatial concerns as the manifestation of this belief, 
the contemporary articulation of space has shifted from a singular understanding of space into plural one. 
Such a conception breaks the rules of self-identity, subjectivity, directionality and teleology as the truth of 
being. The conception of the notion of differentiation no longer considers a central position for difference 
to emerge. In this sense, the other is conceived as that which is eliminated from being understood from 
the position of the self. Modernist art promoted a sense of the importance of space as the concrete and a 
single dimension to ‘understand’ the work of art. Contrary to such a belief, contemporary art brings a 
mobile sense of space that unfolds in a temporal alteration rather than space as a container of things. An 
understanding that goes beyond a conception of concrete space as being is the way in which temporality 
and duration are conceived as becoming. Such shift from the spatial into a temporal understanding 
changes the understanding of the real, which modernity depicted as the negation of the unreal. Rather, 
reality is not the major concern of being. Time is no longer the abstraction of space and space is not the 
manifestation of reality. In this sense, they both become distinct and together within the space-time, 
which Cornelius Castoriadis regards as the opening of several scales and compares space-time to foam. 
“This ‘foam’ of space-time introduces at one and the same time both discontinuities and perpetual 
changes in its very topology.” (Castoriadis: 1997, 365)  
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                                                     NO-THING TO LOOK AT  
 
34 years ago, in ‘Art and Objecthood’15 Michael Fried declared a war going on 
between theatre and modernist painting, “between theatrical and pictorial art”. This 
declaration has received a lot of attention by the art critics of the period. Fried stated in 
‘Art and Objectood’ that the success of “modernist art” was that it had been able to defeat 
theatre. He stated that theatricality distorted modernist painting and sculpture. Fried’s 
statement seems to depend on a transcendental notion of art that escapes a literal of the 
work of art, since he regards theatre as weakening the power of art. Fried’s argument was 
an attack on what he called minimal art as “literalist art” for its being theatrical and literal. 
In this sense Fried attacked the group of people who were dealing with minimal art. Robert 
Morris and Donald Judd were among the group of people Fried was against. When Fried 
called the works of Judd and Morris theatrical in ‘Art and Objecthood’ these artists who 
were dealing with Minimalism had not made a claim about their art to be considered as 
theatrical or not. Donald Judd’s statement that minimal art was “neither painting nor 
sculpture” might be considered as an aspect of what these artists claimed to do in their 
works. Donald Judd and other people included in minimal art were critical of the previous 
discourses since they argued that their works had to be considered away from the discourse 
of modernist painting or sculpture. In ‘Complaints: Part I’16 (1969) Donald Judd states that 
he does not have a specific preference for any “kind of art” and he adds, “I prefer art that is 
not associated with anything.” (Judd: 1965, 245) Although there are some points that 
distinguish minimal art from the previous movements, it is not clear whether minimal art 
could go beyond some discourses.   
Accordingly, minimal art became the subject of the critics who considered minimal 
art as ‘ABC art’ by Barbara Rose and Lucy Lippard’s ‘The Silent Art’. At the same time, it 
was also artists who were dealing with Minimalism who have brought different kinds of 
unspecific classifications for their works such as Donald Judd’s ‘Specific Objects’, Morris’ 
‘Anti-form’.17 Such classifications also referred to the process of the making of these 
objects.  
 
The relationship between the space these “objects” were installed and the outcome 
of this relationship as a process, which was open to the viewer of these objects, were the 
critical points which minimal art brought. In ‘Specific Objects’ Judd states that the 
minimal objects revealed a sense of singleness. Such an aspect of the minimal object “has a 
duration, but it is only beginning and has a better future outside of painting.” (Judd: 1965, 
207) However, an emphasis on the significance of spatial factors in minimal art was not an 
elaboration of space. Rather it is not the function of space to present minimal objects in a 
different way from what modernist painting or sculpture did. The difference is the way in 
which these objects introduce different relations as an outcome of a communicative 
process with the viewer. One of the important aspects that change the relation between the 
viewer and the work is related to the process of the making of these objects. The concern 
with the industrial, mass-produced and ‘untouched’ process of the making of minimal 
objects also changed the notion of the space these works were installed. For example, 
modernist painting was regarded to have an internal relation of space between the value of 
                                                           
15 Fried, Michael, ‘Art and Objecthood’, Art and Objecthood , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1998. 
16 Judd, Donald, ‘Specific Objects’,  Minimalism, ed. James Meyer, (London: Phaidon, 2000)  207-10.   
17 Morris, Robert, ‘Anti-Form’, Minimalism, ed. James Meyer,  (London: Phaidon, 2000) 243-4.   
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colours on the picture place or a kind of balance between the elements of painting. Again 
in ‘Specific Objects’ Judd states that “the problem with painting is that it is a rectangular 
plane faced against the wall.” In this sense, the characteristics of rectangle as a shape itself 
becomes “overpowered” (Judd: 2000, 207) by painting while rectangle is made the limit of 
painting. However, minimal objects free the shape from being a limit to painting. Thus, the 
shape as itself becomes important in art. Accordingly, Judd distinguishes ‘Specific 
Objects’ from paintings since he states that “almost all paintings are spatial.” He gives a 
chance to Yves Klein’s blue paintings to be considered as “unspatial” as well as Stella’s 
works. However, the fact that these paintings have a surface does not allow these paintings 
to be considered away from spatial concerns.  
The artists dealing with Minimalism claimed that the work had to introduce the 
spatial factors of the place in which they were installed. In this sense, the internal and 
enclosed relational character of the modernist work of art claimed to be replaced by 
contribution of space to the process of the making of the work. Since there is an aspect of 
construction in these objects, which is concerned with an architectural structure, the gallery 
space is not the protective, preserving body that keeps these objects within it. Thus the 
relation of these objects within the gallery space is not a conforming one but they 
communicate a sense of contention with the space. In this sense, the foundation of the 
minimal objects in the gallery space is a matter of conflict with the idea of a gallery and the 
architectural structure of gallery. The scale, the process of their making, the way they 
speak for the viewer and the characteristics of place minimal objects occupy can be 
regarded as some of the aspects that contradict the modernist approach to the notion of 
museum.  It can be said that minimal objects achieve going beyond the notion of 
protective, indicative and representational space, which modernist works convey in gallery 
spaces. As a consequence of such relation, the massive objects bring hierarchal structure of 
the gallery space over the work of art into question. Such a shift also influences the way 
the work communicates to its viewer as well as changing the position of the viewer which 
modernist tradition used to provide as the beholder of the work of art. In this sense, 
minimal objects activate space and reveal a temporal dimension, which used to be 
repressed by the represented space and be regarded as exterior to the space of installation. 
Thus, the emphasis of a comprehensible work in a totality of space is replaced by the 
fragmentation of space through the multiplication of different temporalities. Such 
activation interrupts the relationship between the work of art and the “beholder” as well as 
a formation of a coherent meaning enclosed in the gallery space.  
The activation of the communication between the work and the beholder, which 
emphasises process and performance rather than a notion of a complete being is what 
Michael Fried is critical. This is because he associates “minimalist tendency” in art with 
the “literalist sensibility” in theatre.  He sees theatre as a threat to the “identity” of modern 
art. Fried regards an aspect of literalness on the side of minimal art as a consequence of its 
resemblance to the ways in which a theatrical work sets a relationship with its audience. In 
‘Art and Objecthood’ Fried says “literalist sensibility is theatrical because, to begin with, it 
is concerned with the actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters literalist 
work.” The “actual circumstances” according to Fried, causes the disappearance of the 
aesthetic distance between the work and the beholder. In this sense, theatre becomes 
threatening for the modernist painting and sculpture. Performances are also concerned with 
the closure of an imaginary or physical distance between the work and the beholder.  Most 
of the time, a performance does not indicate an intelligible linear narrative structure to be 
understood by the viewer. Rather, interpretation is replaced by the active participation of 
the viewer to the process. Fried seems anxious about minimal art that communicates with 
its viewer and he states that like theatre:  
 xxiv
 
literalist art possesses an audience, though a somewhat special one: that the beholder  
is confronted by literalist work within a situation that he experiences as his means that  
there is an important sense in which the work in question exists for him alone, even if he 
is not actually alone with the work at the time. (Fried: 1998, 83)   
 
In this sense, a minimalist object reveals a space particular to its viewer and provides the 
temporal and spatial elements, which communicate between the viewer and the work. Such 
an aspect of communication that emphasises the duration of space could be said to have an 
aspect of theatricality. However, Fried’s approach to minimal art as theatre has a 
reductionist intention since he is concerned with theatre as if it interrupts the formation of a 
conventional and true relationship between the work and the beholder.  In a discussion 
with Fried and Buchloch concerning Fried’s essay ‘Art and Objecthood’, Krauss states that 
Fried’s notion of situating “theatre between the arts” is an articulation of “gap and void” on 
the side of theatre.18 Krauss also criticises Fried for being logocentric because of his 
conception of “good” art, which is considered according to an ethical basis since there are 
dualities concerning good and bad, true and false, outside and inside. Similarly Jon 
Thomson in ‘New times, new thoughts, new sculpture’19 argues that the aspect of 
theatricality which Fried is concerned is a notion of  “theatricalisation” of space. The 
relation of work to the viewer is rendered unclear which brings the moral concerns into the 
scene of art. Thomson adds that Minimalism “can no longer lay claim to being a model of 
rightness and so continue to speak on behalf of good art.” (Thomson: 1993, 17) Thomson 
also differentiates between two temporal modes, which he regards significant in bringing 
up ethical concerns. Referring to Kantian notion of time that searches for a transcendental 
moment in art, which Fried is also interested in, Thomson argues that:  
 
There is normal time which means the unreflected upon passage of time in which we  
exist and experience everyday events- the illusory version of which is the proper 
condition of theatre – and “present time” experienced as a compression  
rather than continuum. (Thomson: 1993, 18) 
 
Kant’s argument about time is also what Fried is concerned in the sense that Fried follows 
the way in which Kant privileges the transcendental time over the phenomenological time. 
Kant constitutes the phenomenal world as that which exactly appears to us, as apprehended 
in our experience. The noumenal world is “the world and its objects as they exist 
“independently of our minds grasp” that requires knowledge for intuitions to be structured. 
(Thomson: 1993, 19) Such an argumentation also sees dualities and moral sense of 
aesthetic experience as a privileged notion in art. Fried is critical of what he considers to be 
theatrical since it turns the experience of minimal art into a performance. Such an 
experience brings a conception of process taking the place of the instantaneous and 
analytical experience of a modernist work of art. 
 
 
Site in Motion  
 
 
                                                           
18 Buchloch, Benjamin; Fried, Michael;  Krauss, Rosalind, ‘Theories of art after Minimalism and Pop: 
1967/87 Geneologies of art and theory’, Discussions in Contemporary Culture,  ed. Hal Foster,  (Seattle: Bay 
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19 Thomson, Jon, ‘New times, new thoughts, new sculpture’, Gravity and Grace: The changing condition of 
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The better new work takes relationship out of the work and makes them a function of  
space, light and the viewer’s field of vision. The object is but one of the terms in the  
newer aesthetics. It is some way more reflexive because one’s awareness of oneself  
existing in the same space as the work is stronger than the previous work with  
its many internal relationships.   
       Robert Morris, ‘Notes on 
Sculpture’  
 
In  ‘Notes on Sculpture’20 Robert Morris is critical about the way in which modern 
art causes allusion by means of setting an internal relation between the properties of color, 
light and texture. Morris is against the way in which modern sculpture communicates with 
its viewer. In this sense, his argument about the modern sculpture is that it cuts the unity of 
perception since it takes the attention to the internal relations.  He refers to sculptural 
objects, which convey internal comparison depending on the compositional proportions of 
these objects. These objects are dependent on a specific size enclosing a relation of space 
specific to the objects. On the other hand the interest in scale, which can be found in 
monumental characteristics is a way in which communication is possible between the work 
and the viewer. An “awareness of scale” Morris states is “a function of the comparison 
made between one’s body size and the object.” In this sense, the encounter between the 
viewer and the object gains a sense of literalness since scale gains in importance as well as 
space that stands outside a notion of composition. Morris says that scale becomes an 
element itself rather than a property of matter. Accordingly, there could not be a difference 
between the size and the scale as separate entities. Rather, the size of the modernist 
sculpture is questioned because of its obedience to the traditional compositional structure 
and the ideal proportions. The problematic of the size of modernist sculpture introduces a 
care for the relation of the parts of the sculpture to have a proper measurement to fit 
between the sides. The scale does not consider such a compositional relation between the 
sides. Thus, the relation between the work and the viewer is not only a function of eye and 
mind but also the body of the viewer, which participates in the work that develops in time. 
The body gets a sensation of scale in the course of time since it has to go around the object 
and experience it rather than look at it. In this sense, the encounter gains a performative 
aspect with its emphasis on duration. There is also a sense of proximity to the object as if 
the object could also participate to the bodily involvement of the viewer.  
Happenings can be said to be the early examples of art where process and the 
participation of the beholder in this process are emphasised. Nevertheless, the beholder 
does not only remain the beholder, who just sees and examines the work, but also the one 
who participates in a process of becoming. In performance there is a bodily involvement of 
the viewer in a specific action while the viewer contributes to the “event” going on 
between the work and the him or herself as participant.  On the other hand in his article 
‘Performativity and Minimalism in recent American art’21  Maurice Berger states that:  
  
performative encompasses the broader range of human enactments and interactions 
-the performances of our everyday lives, the things we do to survive, to communicate, 
 to thrive, to manipulate, to procreate, to love; it charts the direct and seemingly  
ordinary interaction between the individual and society and culture at large.(Berger:1997, 
15) 
 
                                                           
20 Morris, Robert, ‘Notes on Sculpture Part I’, Minimal Art, ed. Gregory Battcock, London: University of 
California Press, 1968.  
21 Berger, Maurice, Minimal Politics, Baltimore: Maryland, 1997.   
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Berger gives an account of the relationship between performance and performativity as the 
“infiltration of performance into the social and cultural sphere.” (Berger: 1997, 15) In this 
sense Berger’s argument encourages us to consider the notion of theatricality in minimal 
art as a kind of reductionist account of behaviour limiting it to a relationship between the 
audience and stage that is based on a specific event planned by its author. Rather, Berger 
prefers to consider the aspect of performance in minimal art as that which is more close to 
everyday life. However, his emphasis on performativity does not refer to the unconscious, 
unconditioned or inborn act. He states that the sense of infiltration does not have an aspect 
“less than meaningful” nor “less than ideological”. (Berger: 1997, 15) Instead, 
performativity is in life and as part of life such that it goes parallel with the concerns of the 
period in which Minimal art emerged. Berger  states that:  
 
Not surprisingly, then, minimalist performativity, embodied by a temporal,  
experiential and spectator driven style directly influenced by the anti-establishment,  
pro-individual, and liberatory ideologies  of its age, has meshed with the interests  
of those artists whohave wished to explore or contest the social relationships  
of identity, power, and selfhood. (Berger: 1997, 15) 
  
Judith Butler’s argument about performativity is somewhat different from Berger’s. In 
Gender Trouble22 Butler is concerned with the issue of gender and sexuality in giving an 
account of performativity. According to Butler, gender roles are dependent on 
performative acts. In her use of “performativity”, there is a criticism of logocentric and 
phallogocentric society, in which patriarchal authority functions according to the 
privileged condition of binaries. She argues that gender and sex cannot be binaries that are 
totally separate from each other. However, together they form the representative part of the 
person. And she also says that “gender is neither the causal result of sex nor as seemingly 
fixed as sex.” (Butler:1990, 6)  These terms are not binaries and there is no wall between 
gender and sex, though they constitute different aspects of sex as something both  
biologically and culturally defined. She states that these terms become free floating 
artifices that are the part of a performative faculty as representation. (Butler:1990, 6) 
Therefore, Butler’s argument of performativity does not indicate a distinction between 
representation and presentation, sexuality and gender. Contrary to Berger’s emphasis on 
performativity, which requires social recognition by the other person, Butler gives an 
account of performativity, which does not provoke a relationship between the fixed 
identities. In this sense, a person might reveal performative traits to him or herself. Butler’s 
account of performativity announces rather a less conscious position than Berger’s 
emphasis on self. It might be the relationship between the minimal object and its viewer 
calls for opening of the unconscious rather than a self-conscious state on the side of the 
viewer. In this sense, the aspect of performativity in Minimalism may rather be said to be a 
non-event compared to performance. 
  The concern with the non-event in Minimalism also challenges Fried’s notion of 
theatricality in art. Fried seems to be anxious about  “theatricalisation of space” which he 
regards as the end of modern art or the end in the way in which art should be. Minimal 
objects also do not emphasise a state of consciousness on the side of the viewer while they 
are on the border of art and non-art. The notion that they could be regarded as non-art is 
again the parameter of a conventional approach to art. In this sense, minimal art contradicts 
Fried’s concern of how art should be presupposing the ethical aspects.  
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Contrary to ethical concerns, the performative aspect of Minimalism interrupts all 
the notions concerning what art should be or should not be. The hierarchical structure of 
composition and the relationship between the museum space and the work of art are 
important factors. These are the conditions of the discourses about how and where a work 
of art should be, already specifying its place as the modern art museum. One of the 
criticisms has been towards the notion of work enclosed in the museum or gallery space. 
The dominant tendency in the relationship between the gallery space and the work of art 
was to consider painting as something to be hung on the wall or sculpture to be stood on a 
pedestal in the gallery. In this sense, the position of the work of art would be limited in 
gallery space. “Minimalists” have been critical of such “silent” spaces and tried to make 
sense of the spaces, not as “void” but as substance that would communicate between the 
“participant” and the work. In this sense, not only the “story” inside a painting or that has 
been figured by a sculpture but also what Morris stated as “space, light and the viewer’s 
field of vision” have become important elements contributing to “performativity.” It seems 
as if such contributions go beyond being a part of a process that is only concerned with the 
production of the work. The process of the reception of the work also becomes an element 
of activity. In addition to this, light, space, perception, scale gains a different character than 
they do in modernist works. As Judd also argued in ‘Specific Objects’, the rectangle gains 
importance not as the support but as the shape itself, all of these elements  – light, space, 
perception, scale - themselves become the work. Dan Flavin is one of the artists who 
manipulated light as the subject of his work. His use of fluorescent tubes can be said to 
have connotations of industrial and mass- produced materials. In this sense, not only light 
but also the source of light gains importance, while light functions as more than just 
illumination around.  
Most of the artists included in minimal art were interested in the work and its 
relationship with the gallery space. There is an emphasis of the work and the bodily 
involvement in the work that is a matter of process. The interest in bodily involvement as 
well as mind led to a concern with phenomenology while perception was claimed 
privileged in the experience. The work calls for the bodily involvement and there is an 
emphasis on process which contributes to the process of the making of the work that makes 
it continuous in another dimension.  
 
In Robert Smithson’s Non-Site23 (1968) we are introduced to the concern of space, 
site and the limits of site. Accordingly, there is an interest in the limitations coming out of 
the notion of space as a function of a specific site and place. In Non-Site (1968) Smithson 
ends up with the impossibility of a conception of limitlessness or a specific site enclosed in 
itself. He is concerned with the limits of gallery space, which functions as a criticism of 
gallery as an institution in identifying spaces. Non-Site (1968) consists of two works, 
Gypsum and Double Non-Site. In Gypsum  (gypsum, steel, photograph) Smithson has 
gathered three different elements referring to a location in Benton, California. On the floor 
is a steel container filled with gypsum specimens; on the wall is a photograph 
superimposed on a map of this location. Double Non-Site consists of steel, obsidian and 
lava from California and Nevada. 24  
 
 Nick Kaye in Site-specific art25 describes Smithson’s work:  
 
                                                           
23 See fig, 1&2.  
24 Meyer, James, ed., Minimalism, (London: Phaidon, 2000) 155.  
25 Kaye, Nick, Site-Specific art, London and New York : Routledge, 2000.  
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Robert Smithson’s series of Non-Site present materials, which have been collected  
from designated outdoor sites, deposited in bins whose construction echoes simple,  
clean, minimalist aesthetic, and set in the gallery beside information tracing out  
the geographical or geological characteristics of the area from which they have 
 been removed. (Kaye: 2000, 92)  
  
 Non-Site (1968), Kay argues draws an interest in site and “site-specificity” while 
these materials have been displaced and taken from the territories they belonged to. There 
is a shift from one site to another, while the displacement of the materials evokes a sense of 
detachment that interrupts a notion of identity and belonging. The inability to locate these 
pieces in a specific site also prevents conveying a notion of site in Non-Site (1968) that is 
specified in the limits of gallery. Kaye states that Non-Site (1968) reproduces the gallery’s 
contradictory attempt to recollect, and so limit the “de-differentiated” site. Then the motive 
of site achieves being present as a dialectics of site, where the absence of –a reference to- 
site becomes a limit of the present site as a gallery space. Unspecified in none of the sites, 
the site is not “available as an object for it is not static,” says Kaye. Kaye refers to 
Smithson’s notion of site as “mobile” and that is “always in a process of appearance and 
disappearance.” Kaye seems to bring a kind of limit to the conception of site while 
considering it as an outcome of a matter of appearance or disappearance and his account 
then becomes that which is thought according to a thought of presence. On the contrary, 
what Smithson refers to that which could be regarded as a process in this work, is the 
mobility of site. It is not a continuum supported through loss of reference and return of 
reference. As Kaye also seems to state truly in the following lines the “mobility of site, its 
capacity to elude resolution into a static object, is discovered even in the most literal” 
addressing Non-Site (1968) as an index of site.  
 Rather than an issue of appearance or disappearance, a conception of site appears as 
a means of a fragmented one, which is the nomadic character of site itself. Smithson also 
sees it as an impossibility of a notion of destination in Non-Site (1968). The rigid and 
spatial time is replaced by discontinuity of a temporal flow. In this sense, Non-Site (1968) 
does not let the viewer identify with a place through associations or referring to other 
similar sites that “map” the space. The way the work is installed in the gallery space forms 
a relation with the space as well as referring to the indefinite sites these materials once 
“belonged to”. Only information about the places is the indication that they are taken from 
Benton, California and Nevada addressing several unpredictable futures and pasts. The 
gallery space then remains insufficient to define a new space or give a sense of belonging 
for these materials and this work. It may be because of that the ‘definition’ by a map of the 
territory these materials belonged to and indication of the ‘housing’ of these materials blur 
the sense of identification with space or with some place. This work in a sense mirrors a 
kind of presence fragmented into many presences, which might not be reduced to a single 
specific fact. The encounter with the work in Non-Site (1968) tends to suggest an 
experience of a travel in continuous shifting temporalities. Such an experience mirrors 
one’s perception of the work in a sense of discontinuous memories of one’s own together 
with a kind of anticipation. The opaque surface of gypsum doesn’t give a sense of decay. It 
is as if the gypsum is “structured” inside industrial construction of boxes and seems to call 
for a detachment from the context these materials once had. Thus, there is an ambiguity 
both in the contextual sense and also in defining a territory for these materials. Gypsum is 
placed into a container, which consists of a structure of repetitive combination of 
rectangles and Double Non-Site made up of five separate pieces symmetrically installed to 
form a square. Through installing these earth pieces into industrial and rigid boxes, time 
seems to be halted inside the gallery. The specification of site both gives a sense of 
sterilisation of the materials, a kind of isolation, and also dislocates the notion of site itself 
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at the same time. These materials neither ‘belong’ to the gallery space nor to the geography 
they were taken from.   
 
Two years before Non-Site (1968), Smithson writes an article called ‘Entropy and 
the New Monuments’.26 In this article, he describes his views of the condition of 
Minimalism that has emerged out of the changes which the second half of the twentieth 
century has gone through. Smithson gives an account of how things have changed during 
the second half of the twentieth century while he refers to “entropy” as that which leaves a 
mark on this era. Addressing some facts from cinema, art and post-war architecture he 
states that entropy is a term definitive of the fragmentations in time, space, being, society 
and culture. Smithson mentions the loss of architectural value in the new age, which is 
replaced by a sense of monumentality. He indicates that such architectural structure is 
close to the aspect of monumentality in Minimalism. Smithson states that “instead of 
causing us to remember the past like the old monuments, the new monuments seem to 
cause us to forget the future” for “they are built against ages.” Smithson refers to artists 
such as Judd, Lewitt, Flavin whose works addresses a kind of “inactive history” which is 
seen in their use of inorganic, cold, industrial and artificial materials that resist tracing a 
passage of time through the ages. In these works, the dullness and emptiness of materials 
without a sense of change in the materials is a part of this entropy while time is constituted 
as the lack of motion. Smithson formulates this as “time = place-motion”  
Smithson’s formulation of time, which does not indicate a motion in space, is a 
characteristic of the relation of materials in spaces that resist historicisation. Such an 
approach might be said to be a general attitude of these artists. Artists such as Donald Judd, 
Morris, Smithson, Flavin had most of their works made in factories or used industrial, 
mass-produced materials, - ready-mades - such as Flavin’s use of fluorescent tubes. In this 
sense, these works leave nothing traceable about the process of their making, the time 
passed in this process as well as a reference to galleries that remakes a time for the 
materials inside the produced spaces of galleries. Only possible time seems to be that 
which is away from linearity while a sense of past becomes present and the future at the 
same time and this “same time” also goes beyond perception. There is no evolution in 
these materials that are only able to mirror an interval, a pause which does not get into 
movement as dialectics but allows a passage of time in that pause without a kind of 
historicisation.  
Robert Morris’s Mirrored Cubes27 (1965) consist of four cubes installed on the 
wooden floor of Green Gallery reflecting the wooden floor and the white walls of the 
gallery. The conception of the work demands a journey around the mirror. The outcome of 
this experience is the reflection of the space and the viewer while the gallery space 
occupies the biggest part in the reflection of the mirror. What moves and changes in the 
mirror is one’s reflection in the gallery space looking at the mirror reflecting the gallery. In 
this sense while the gaze always has the chance to see other places in the gallery, it might 
sometimes cause one to forget one’s self in the mirror. The fact that the surface is a mirror 
that does not indicate a sign of its author referring to the process of its making allows a 
process in which the work is visualised. As the cubes are shorter than a level of eye-sight 
(each side 21 cm high from the floor) the viewer has to move in order to see more than 
what appears in the mirror. In a way, the viewer moves and activates his or her own vision 
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2000) 223-26.  
 
27 See fig 3.  
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in the mirror rather than staring directly at the mirror. The work becomes an outcome of 
what and from which direction the mirror reflects and how the viewer sees the work. One 
does not always see one’s self in the mirror but also other people and the material surface 
of the floor and the walls as well. The work both refers to the mirrors, which are shaped as 
cubes and the cubes indicating a mirroring effect which reveal the space of the gallery and 
other materials in that space other than itself. The mirror also mirrors itself in its cubic 
formation. The mirror is not a flat surface hung on the wall but has a cubic shape and 
disturbs the fixation of the eye. It requires a kind of travel around the cube while the edges 
interrupt a continuity of the appearance in the mirror and direct the appearance to another 
side of gallery space. The cubes become a part of a process which is unfinished and 
fragmented into incomprehensible pieces of time. Such time and interval, is between the 
virtual and the actual causing a missing identification with the object since there is not a 
single object.  
 Contrary to Fried’s notion of theatricalisation of space, it is rather a time passing 
between the work and the viewer. There is a process but it does not indicate a kind of stage 
performance. However, theatre is not the correct term for such encounter, since it is a 
matter of the virtual as well as the actual. Time is not linear but embodies a fragmented 
setting for this play; there is not a stage, not an end of nor a suspension of disbelief 
activated in this space. Time and space are ambiguous and floating. This is similar to what 
Derrida calls ‘becoming-time of space’ and ‘becoming-space of time’ in a continuum while 
self-consciousness is always deferred in leaving the traces of moments behind and drawing 
them to future. The place as an outcome of such experience is ‘any place’ in its nomadic 
and virtual mode. Fried has made a remark about a kind of anthropomorphism of minimal 
objects; this is not only the object, which is anthropomorphic but also the viewer who 
leaves a notion of self-consciousness in the delay of movement. Space is multiple and it 
goes beyond a notion of ‘inside’. It is nobody’s space and everybody’s, not only personal 
space but the material surface included in this space.  
Robert Smithson is critical of fragmented and indefinite spaces in science fiction 
films and also the contemporary architectural constructions, where there is no value of 
quality of space. Smithson gives an account of space, which does not embody any sense of 
identity since these spaces are not static and are groundless. The objects of minimal art 
bear a sense of groundless and unidentified space, which is close to Smithson’s definition 
of entropy. Entropy, which is marked by a non-sense of destination, does not indicate an 
end of fragmentation. Referring to the loss of spatial values, which construct homogeneity 
of time, entropy stands on the other side of the argument. The mirroring effect of the 
mirrored cubes also gives a sense of blankness that is marked in the surface of the mirrors. 
On the other hand, the notion of outside and inside is also broken in the mirrors. Smithson 
states that the temporal mode such objects reveal is that which “makes a hole in one’s 
self”28. Mirrored Cubes (1965) might also be said to simulate the space and time around 
themselves. This simulation is not a part belonging to another story but constitutes a story 
of its time that develops during the encounter with the work.  
 
 
Delay and Recentness of Mise en scene 
 
                                                           
28 In the same article Smithson writes about the experience of movie in a movie house “time is compressed in 
a movie house, to spend time in a movie house is like making hole in one’s self” says Smithson.  
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In the latest issue of Oxford Art Journal the theme was ‘Installation.’ Briony Fer 
and Alex Potts in their articles29 concerning installation since the sixties have discussed the 
areas which installation art has been concerned with and the condition of installation art 
today. Unlike the conventional belief that considers the experience of minimal art as 
theatrical in Fried’s terms, Fer’s and Potts’ article both compare installation and the 
experience of cinema. 
Alex Potts writes about the experience of installation, which is not only close to 
theatre but is also similar to cinematic experience. However, Potts is concerned with a 
specific part of installation that has a narrative aspect. According to him installations tell a 
kind of story to the viewer as well as pulling the viewer inside this story which he calls 
“intimate engulfment”. He argues that Antonio Canova’s sculpture Cupid and Psyche 
(1787-93) which is a neoclassical sculpture, made for a Baroque sculpture gallery, 
necessitates moving around the three dimensional object in a way which is not different 
than the experience of installation. He states that the close and bodily relationship between 
the viewer and the work is not specifically an aspect new to installation art. In this sense 
Potts says “the shift from the classical display of sculpture to recent installation is not 
entirely clear-cut” what matters is “not a structural break but a change in the modes of 
display.” As Potts points out, this is not a small change despite its similarity to the 
sculptural experience during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The change in the 
mode of display is the shift from a notion of self-sufficient sculptural object to the work 
that is open to a sense of development in a process of encounter with the viewer. Another 
important point is the contribution of empty space not as void but as that which “has its 
own materiality and definition.” (Potts: 2002, 15) Potts’ argument about the installation 
and sculptural experience might also be related to the experience of painting. However, it 
does not mean that we should regard a same medium for these ways of representation. 
Rather Potts gives an account of art that has crossed the boundaries of discourses specific 
to an art historical period. Potts states that “the element of staging and theatricality are 
integral to almost any three-dimensional work.” The encounter with an installation work is 
a process, which Richard Serra argues it as not only being an outcome of looking “but 
looking and walking, walking through it and not just around it.” (Potts: 2002, 20)   
Briony Fer’s article is also an argument for a sense of the similarity between 
installation and cinematic experience. In ‘The Somnambulist’s Story: Installation and the 
Tableau’ she gives an account of installation that is enclosed in one’s personal realm as the 
specific space of the viewer. She argues that installation experience is close to cinematic 
experience because there is an aspect of tableau effect in both. Fer’s argument is similar to 
Potts’ articulation of installation experience in the way that cinematic space takes the 
viewer inside its realm. Fer argues that installation evokes a kind of tableau effect as if it is 
a “cinematic cut” and she sees installation functioning to entrap the viewer. The “cinematic 
cuts” take the viewer inside the narrative space of installation and back to the physical 
space which one is in. Fer’s statement that installation experience is close to cinematic 
experience in the sense that both reveal a sense of mise en scene and tableau is a limited 
articulation of such experience. Rather installation reveals a different relation with space 
than cinema since it pulls one inside a story through opening a window and letting one 
fictionalise the story inside the installation space. While, installation space calls for a 
bodily involvement in the narrative space, the cinematic space creates a physical distance 
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between the spectacle and the spectator as a consequence of its architectural structure. In 
this sense, cinematic spectacle is in the imaginary space of story looking through where 
one sits and directing attention to the spectacle. The temporal mode of classical narrative 
films might have an aspect of linear narrative structure in which the action develops in a 
sequential order. On the other hand, it is hard to situate such a temporal mode for 
installation. Since installation introduces both an imaginary space and the physical space at 
the same time, the temporality this space reveals becomes a disjoint one.  
At one point Fer refers to Robert Smithson and states that Smithson sees 
installation as mise en scene but the one “with an empty place for the protagonist.” This 
may be a legible account of installation while it is not limited to that. Smithson’s 
articulation of entropy is similar to cinematic experience and he states that cinematic 
experience  “opens a hole in one’s self” since time is compressed in such an experience. 
Rather, installation space deepens that hole through activating the physical space as well as 
the imaginary.  
In Cinema 2: The time-image Deleuze is concerned with the time-image, which 
breaks with sensory motor links. It also addresses a break with a linear narrative system, 
while space is introduced as fragmented and mobile. In this sense, a fragmented 
temporality emerges replacing a coherent movement and action. However, the relationship 
between installation and cinema again are distinguished from each other since the 
installation takes the viewer not only inside the story but also to the physical space of the 
elements of story. An experience of installation becomes a matter of making one’s self 
believe in the reality of this simulated atmosphere of story that is between the virtual and 
the actual -no matter what the object is.  Fer’s statement about the  “unclarity of the object 
of attention” is similar to the statements made by Smithson and Deleuze. According to 
these arguments, the viewer is not the one who looks but is also the part of this game in 
which the subject and object are not clear. What is constituted between the work and the 
viewer is a kind of delay of enunciation the author of which is not defined.  
Time becomes not an instrument of passage that brings decay as it unfolds towards 
the future. Rather there is a lack of futural development of things in time as well as a 
detachment from a particular and proper space. This is the experience of Alice in 
Wonderland, the girl in a story opening other stories within its time, either it is digging a 
hole in her reality or making her reality bigger than a mind can grasp. Looking for a static 
and structured place for an articulation of minimal art is as empty as asking a question to 
Alice as to which part her reality belonged. This is rather a matter of the reality of the 
virtuality that goes beyond perception.  
 
  
 
Fragment(ation)s 
 
  In ‘Cultural logic of the late capitalist museum’30, Rosalind Krauss writes about 
one of her visits a museum in 1990 in Paris. There she comes across Dan Flavin’s works 
but she describes this visit differently from her early encounters with the same works. This 
time the “museum becomes the object” while the “international style columns” of the 
museum enter her point of view. The architecture of gallery interrupts vision and 
perception of the works. Krauss’ concern about the “cultural logic” of capitalism is the 
notion of collectors of art and the collections, which in a way bring a sense of reinstallation 
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to minimalist objects. Museums and collectors such as Count Panza finds the way to 
“keep” the works for themselves in making an agreement with the artists to reproduce their 
works, legitimising it with a certificate. Some of the artists such as Donald Judd and Carl 
Andre resist it.   
  Krauss addresses to Tony Smith’s description of his car ride on the New Jersey 
Turnpike, which Smith described as an unfinished experience concerned with bodily 
involvement in the action. Such experience is regarded as the basis of self-perception as 
well as an announcement of the end of the function of museums. On the contrary, 
“minimalists” had not claimed an end to the museums, but they helped conventional notion 
of museum shift to reveal a different kind of spatial and temporal relation with the viewer.  
They were critical of the preserving and keeping aspect of museums. “Minimalists” 
considered artwork as a means of seriality, non-gesture, non-originality, which are the 
aspects of mass-produced industrial materials. These were the characteristics of mass 
production and the consumption, which controlled the society. Minimalists were critical of 
these aspects. “Minimalists” used the mass-produced materials and the mentality of mass-
production in making their works. Minimalist ‘revolt’ might be that they attacked the idea 
that mass-production brought a sense of distraction and detachment. In this sense, they 
achieved to make sense out of non-sense. However, they did not consider a sense of 
totality in their works. This is the condition of minimal art and the artist who creates 
utopian relations between the subject and object of Minimalism that goes beyond a 
homogenous and a total relation. In this sense, the future of Minimalism becomes not a 
constitution of a fragmented object of the capitalist mode of production but also the subject 
that is fragmented and reprogrammed. Thus, Minimalism announces its break with an art 
historical consciousness of the past. The sense of presence, past and future are in a 
continuous affection which interrupts an isolation of these times in themselves. Then, 
experience of “Minimalist” objects in the museums thirty years after the sixties not only 
distort the logic of the sixties but also the notion of perception and bodily involvement of 
the works.  
 Although “Minimalists” denied having a notion of aura in the works, it could be 
said that the “Minimalist” work reveals a kind of ritualistic experience in which one’s 
perception is emphasised evoking a sense of aura of such experience. The notion of  “aura” 
in the “work of art” which Walter Benjamin conceptualised is existence of aura as a 
condition of originality.  On the other hand it seems the notion of aura seems to have 
shifted from the notion of originality of an object into the originality of experience specific 
to its viewer. What could interrupt the auratic experience of “Minimalist” objects, if there 
was any, becomes the reinstallation of the work in another place, which leaves no chance 
for the conception of reality of perception. This remark suggests that making one believe in 
the reality of perception was the utopia of the sixties.  
There are some different aspects of installations or minimalist objects, which have 
the chance to give a different relation to the environment of the work. Some of the works 
might create a sense of closure of experience, which is specific to the space of installation. 
In ‘The Body, the Image and the Space in Between: Video Installation Art’31 Margaret 
Morse gives an account of two different relationship of installations which the video 
installation communicates with its viewer. One type of video installation is a closed circuit 
one, which records and displays “the actions and sounds of the visitors in charged positions 
in installation space to one or more monitors.” These works, Morse states, manipulate 
“presence” and “explore the fit between images and the built environment and the process 
of mediating identity and power”. Another kind of video installation is the “recorded 
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video-art installation that can be compared to the spectator wandering about on a stage, in a 
bodily experience of conceptual proportions and imaginary worlds of memory and 
anticipation.”  
 Although these two conceptions of video installations refer to a kind of bodily 
involvement in the experience of the work, since the video screen has a sculptural aspect as 
well as constituting a relation with what appears on the screen, the body reacts differently 
in these different kinds of works. In the former, the body functions in two ways both by 
looking at the object and being a part of the object looked at. The two kinds of video 
installations also lead to different temporal experiences of the work. In the former the body 
functions in two ways both by looking at the object and being a part of the object looked 
at. In the former the temporal relation with the viewer is activated more than it is in the 
latter. Thus, time is more indeterminate and subordinate to change.  
I will be considering Bruce Nauman’s closed-circuit video installation, which is 
known as Live/Taped Video Corridor32, by means of the emergence of the temporal modes 
interacting with its viewer. According to Morse’s definition of video installation, 
Nauman’s installation is in the first group. The fact that this installation is a closed circuit 
one and meets the viewer in a closed space isolated from the gallery space makes it 
different from the experience of an installation of minimalist objects. We can say that 
minimalist objects activate and are activated by the space of installation. On the contrary, 
closed-circuit video installation cut the relationship with the environment of installation.  
Such a closure also effects interruption of the architecture of the museum. 
 
 
Scattered: Inside the Corridor 
 
A series of walls dividing the space into six passages, only three of which were 
passable. Three live video cameras were mounted at the top of the walls, and  
corresponding monitors offered images of empty corridors as well as of any visitors  
who might enter always seen from behind. Feeling of “dread” and “invisibility” as well as  
the very notion of being under the video surveillance causing “the back of your neck to  
prickle slightly as if someone was watching.”33 
 
 
 
In one of the corridors, entering in and walking towards the screen at the end of the 
corridor, one is supposed to see oneself approaching the screen. There are two monitors at 
the end of the corridor one of which is placed on top of the other. One of the monitors 
display the corridor empty and the other displays one’s self getting further away, while one 
is approaching towards the monitor. Such an experience is different from one may expect 
to see on the screen. The screen has a role of false mirror since it displays one getting 
further away when one walks towards the screen. There is a reverse way of representation 
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of one’s self in the screen that causes one to see one’s self smaller instead of getting bigger 
as one comes near the screen. A mirror is supposed to reflect the position from where one 
looks at it. In a sense, what the mirror often is supposed to reflect is the inclusion of the act 
of looking in the mirror. Such a relation set between the mirror and screen is the way in 
which the interaction between one’s self and the one’s reflection in the mirror is regarded 
as a means of identification in psychoanalysis. It is the Lacanian notion of the mirror stage, 
which addresses to the relationship between the gaze and the formation of the subject and 
object.  
 
Contemporary of Lacan, Foucault introduced the concept of gaze as the manifestation of 
bodily power. The beholder of the gaze is the authority as the seeing-knowing body over 
the weak. The gaze, the look and the politics of the gaze are described as the signs of 
power mechanisms, which are embodied in the subject. Foucault referred to the history 
of the gaze and the shifting power mechanisms in the course of history, by giving the 
example of the “panopticon” architectural plan for a prison, which was structured by 
Bentham. In ‘Panopticism’34 Foucault carried this model into social sphere. He asserted 
that panopticon was not only an architectural model, but was also a disciplinary project. 
“The major effect of ‘Panopticon’ is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.” (Foucault: 1995, 
201) He states that this is the emergence of a “real subjection” which is “born 
mechanically from a fictitious relation.”  (Foucault: 1995, 202)  
 Foucauldian understanding of discipline is that of the internalised discipline. The 
individual is regarded as the object of the gaze by the authoritative agents, and is under 
the control of this invisible gaze that is made visible in one’s body. In the panopticon 
model of prison the inmate is not conscious of when he is seen or when not. So the 
inmate produces an inner discipline. In this sense, he would always be controlling 
himself rather than an outer agent of physical control. The panopticon model was an 
example for the lack of communication between the one who was watching from the top 
of the tower, and who was being watched. The inmate becomes his own communicating 
agent while he is aware of the other(s) watching him. Out of this structure, Foucault 
states, there emerges a system where power is internalised inside one’s own body. It is 
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no longer a physical power exerted by the other. Thus it results in bringing an ever-
present self-control of one’s own behaviours. Out of this conception of self-control, the 
gaze shifts from being regarded as having a relation within the field of the other, into an 
internalised invisible one. While the gaze is considered to function as an apparatus 
between the subject and the object in Lacan, Foucault does not consider an apparatus, a 
machine that is situated outside the body. In this sense, gaze is not physically detached 
from the body.  
The consideration that one internalises power in one’s self brings a conception of 
subject inseparable from the object. There is not employment in different spatial 
positioning of the gaze directed towards a specific object. Martin Jay states that Deleuze 
regarded Foucault’s notion of the gaze as dependent on Roussel’s account of “the fold of 
vision”. Accordingly, ‘Panopticism’ introduces a phenomenological subject through the 
privileging of an embodied vision. What Deleuze found in Foucault is a conception of an 
“ontological Visibility, forever twisting itself into a “self-seeing” entity, on to a different 
dimension from that of the gaze or its object.” (Jay: 1994, 398) Detaching itself from an 
external object, the gaze both becomes its own object and subject, which is attributed a 
transcendental character. Although the panoptic device as the modality of self-discipline 
brings a conception of self-evidence, ironically there is not an object of evidence. An 
anchorage of vision to a spatial point does not seem possible in such an articulation.  
Foucault seems to free the notion of subject and object theorised according to spatial 
formulations such as a notion of distance, perspective etc. In this sense, the gaze 
becomes that which is fragmented between the object and the subject and is no longer a 
property of the subject. On the other hand, such fragmentation finds its totality in one’s 
own body which suggests a relationship between the virtual and the actual when 
conceived according to Deleuze’s notion of difference in kind. However, while Deleuze 
takes difference in kind away from a consideration of hierarchical foundations, there is a 
remark of disciplining principle and the virtuality of the gaze being situated at the top of 
the hierarchy of visibilities in Foucault. In this sense, Foucault seems to bring a 
conception of the invisible Other as virtual and this Other manipulates the actions of the 
actual. It looks as if there is a way out of this hierarchical distribution of power 
mechanisms, which is realised between the self and the other. Rather the multiplication 
the gaze might cause a fragmentation of the subject and the object of the gaze, which 
would not be identifiable as “the gaze.” There is a shift in the sequence of display since 
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the camera is placed in the way that it does not follow one’s movement towards the 
corridor. The camera records one from the back and displays it in the direction of 
walking to the end of the corridor. Considering one’s look associated with the gaze, 
there emerges two things to sort out; one is the impossibility of controlling the other, or 
having a sense of control with the other when gaze is associated with the camera 
apparatus. This is when the gaze lacks the object to look at and also lacks the control on 
the object. It is because what is shown on the screen is the one who gazes but is unable 
to meet his or herself as an image. Secondly, the inability of having a control over one’s 
representation on the screen may be associated with Foucault’s notion of panopticon. In 
this sense, the seer as the power mechanism has lost a physical power over the inmate, 
and the power is internalised by the inmate. In the application of this theory to the social 
disciplines, Foucault has argued that the disciplined self is not left under the physical 
exercise of power of another body. Then, there is a possibility that one becomes the 
object of the gaze as well as the one who looks. In a way, such a situation evokes a 
sense of anxiety since the gaze can no longer orient itself in relation to what Lacan calls 
“the field of the other” where the subject should constitute itself.35 
According to the psychoanalytic conception of the subject, the source of anxiety is regarded as that which 
is caused by the fear of castration and gaze is associated with the symbolisation of the phallus. Lacan 
argues that “the gaze is presented to us only in the form of a strange contingency, symbolic of what we 
find on the horizon, as the thrust of our experience, namely the lack that constitutes castration anxiety.” 
(Lacan: 1973, 208) In this sense, anxiety emerges when the gaze is no longer the property of the subject.  
However, in the corridors, there emerges a duality and the multiplication of the gaze, as it is doubled on 
both sides. It is not in a Lacanian sense “I see myself seeing myself” but in the sense that the gaze 
threatens the field of the subject. The relationship with the object through the temporal disorder and delay 
are caused by the way in which camera and monitor are situated in relation to the participant. One does 
not see oneself seeing oneself, but a part of one’s body, which one might not realise as one’s own.  
 Nauman has stated that  “he liked to control the space one is in”.36 It is questionable 
whether he is the one who controls the space, while the space itself is no longer stable and 
it controls the movement of the body through the separation and dissociation of the gaze. 
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There emerges a sense of paranoia. At the same time, among the six corridors, only three 
of them are broad enough to enter in and walk towards the end of the corridor. Nauman is 
the author of the construction of the corridors, but the – missed - encounter with one’s 
representation on the screen is caused by the temporal non-control.  
 What he does is not the direct control of one’s movement and perception in the 
corridor space, rather this is a way in which participant is left to deal with a shift in 
temporality, memory and a delay of anticipation. Memory becomes that which is not left in 
the past and emerging in the present in a different way. Rather it takes the present to the 
past of the experience of walking inside the corridor as well as locating past in the present. 
The futural expectations are delayed in a way that makes future impossible to grasp. There 
are various remarks to make about Live/Taped Video Corridor (1968) in terms of what lies 
as the motive for this shift: anxiety, uncanniness, alienation, which are the outcomes of 
shift in temporal and spatial phenomenon inside the corridors.  
In considering the aspect of interaction between the viewer and the work inside the 
corridors, Lacan’s notion of the subject and formation of the self operates as that which 
helps an understanding of this ambiguity. Lacan’s subject is formed out of “discontinuity” 
as “the essential form in which unconsciousness first appears to us as a phenomenon.” 
(Lacan: 1973, 25) Lacan’s account of discontinuity is not a conception of a detachment 
from the real but seems to be an articulation of another spatial dimension. 
What Lacan tends to miss and Freud totally rejects is that discontinuity is also 
another kind of continuity, the motive of which might not be the lack of continuity. Rather, 
there can be a conception of discontinuity as a heterogenous and multiple temporalities, 
which indicate a sense of in-betweenness. Such a notion of in between-ness does not 
convey a sense of destination in the unconscious.  
On the other hand, contrary to the notion that regards the unconscious as a timeless 
process enclosed in itself, the temporality of consciousness is not sudden. Rather it starts to 
continue, to divide and differ in the unconscious. Then the temporal mode of 
consciousness does not depend on the future of the past memories but the repetition of the 
memories in the unconscious, which are to be actualised in consciousness. Deleuze’s 
notion of the virtual and the actual functions as that which gives an account of a 
transcendental subject in relation to the object. On the other hand, Freud sees the 
unconscious as passive, and as the “storehouse of memory”, Lacan regards the unconscious 
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as active and changeable in the formation of psyche. Nevertheless the unconscious is still 
not articulated as fully activated, rather it is what Lacan calls “in limbo”, which is 
“unrealised and vacillates between the subject and object.” It is “neither being, nor non-
being.” Unlike Freud’s description of the unconscious as timeless, vitality of the 
unconscious comes from its contribution to time, rather than the “timelessness” of it. The 
notion of time, regarded as the property of consciousness, is the trace of a temporal 
becoming in unconsciousness, which does not follow topographies of the subject. 
Contrary to what Freud says about the unconscious as “unreal” and Lacan regards 
as “unrealised”, the unconscious does not need its subject to be realised, neither it is the 
subject to realise. Realisation is not a matter of reality. Realness of things depends on their 
ability to unfold in time differing and changing in themselves. It is unclear that 
psychoanalysis could give a satisfactory explanation for how the unconscious stands in 
relation to the real. Unlike Freud, whom Lacan situates in “traditional psychoanalysis”, 
Lacan allows the unconscious to be activated and transformed in the consciousness. 
However, he still makes this division from the quantitative factors regarding its other as an 
illusion starting from the mirror stage. In this sense, Lacan seems to propose a notion of 
other whose otherness is realised in an act of spatial differentiation. In Lacan, the subject is 
oriented according to where the subject stands in relation to the object.  
 
 
Eye/sight  
 
Lacan argues that subject is firstly formed in the unconscious which is realised by 
the subjects seeing himself in the mirror. This mirror is that which creates the virtual space 
of the subject through contemplating the other’s space. He adds that the image of the 
subject in the mirror stage is realised as the real “I” rather than the image, then this subject 
is “misrecognised” and it is illusion. The mirror stage is regarded as the step to the social 
being and introduction of language as well as an articulation of representation of the 
subject to itself in the linguistic field of language as “I”.  In this case, the issue of language 
is emphasised in the emergence of the virtual subject. Lacan regards the formation of the 
subject in the mirror stage as fictional. It has two aspects, when thought with reference to 
Deleuze’s notion of the virtual, which then would clarify how Deleuze’s notion of  ‘the 
real’ differs from a psychoanalytic approach to the unconscious. Deleuze’s conception of 
the virtual is the term, which depends on the qualitative aspect of difference. In this sense, 
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virtual is not localised in the place of the unreal. What differentiates the virtual from the 
actual is not the hypocrisy of the virtual as the unreal. Rather, the virtual is that which is 
not objectified in the domain of the subject. Unlike Lacan, who follows the traces of 
psyche towards the real, Deleuze’s real is not rooted in the imaginary and then passing to 
the symbolic. Having regarded language as the building block of the unconscious, Lacan 
produces a notion of the realisation of the subject, which is depends on representation. The 
subject is articulated as neither being nor non-being, but as a ‘concept’ of being. Such 
conceptualisation of being itself proves to be an illusionary apprehension of a theory of the 
subject. 
“In the scopic relation” says Lacan “the object on which depends the fantasy from 
which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the gaze.” The subject’s need 
occurs as a consequence of the split between the demand and then desire for the other. 
Lacan separates the realisation of subject into stages and regards the realisation of self in 
the mirror stage as identification, declaring such identification is “specular.”37 During this 
stage, the “ideal ego” develops as the reflection of the self in the mirror. However, what 
the subject realises is regarded as unreal. This real is the virtual, which, Deleuze says, “has 
not been actualised” because there is no conception of the object. Contrary to Deleuze who 
does not separate the virtual from the actual, Lacan announces the coming of a subsequent 
stage, where the subject becomes conscious of a notion of self, which leads to an operation 
of the ego. During this stage mimicry develops as the result of identification with the 
mirror image. Lacan says then, “ the function of the mirror stage is to establish a relation 
between the organism and its reality.” (Lacan: 1970, 4) The importance of mirror stage as a 
means of articulation of temporality is that this phase is regarded as a first step of 
“formation of the individual into history”, which addresses a kind of individual 
historicisation. The mode of identification is “spatial”, which is with the image in the 
mirror. This is the “succession of phantasies that extend from a fragmented body-image to 
a form of its totality.” (Lacan: 1970, 4) This is also the first step in alienation.   
Lacan writes about his following observations in mirror stage and the identification with 
the image of the counterpart and the drama of primordial jealousy. (Lacan: 1970, 5) Desire for the 
other, the object of desire, also leaves its marks during the mirror-stage, where jealousy occurs as a 
consequence of a dependence on the other’s desire. The formation of ideal ego in the mirror as self, 
is the first stage of narcissism or “primary narcissism.” Narcissism is the first step of identification 
of the subject with the object of its desire. This is the case where “libidinal investment 
characteristics” start to function. “I” is alienated from the whole of being, and is in relation with 
the “narcissistic libido”. This stage is also cited as an emergence of autoeroticism. There is a sense 
of identification with the other as the object of desire. However, the subject is in question in its 
relationship to ego formation. Freud considers autoerotism before narcissism, where the object of 
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desire is internalised in the subject’s organism. So, the part of the body is made a fetish object, with 
reference to the sexual object choice, where the body becomes a representation in relation to the 
desire for the other.  
Fragmentation is both the fear of castration and also the motive to live. Fragmentation 
causes dislocation together with castration anxiety. After the mirror-stage, if one sees his replica 
facing himself - this time not the image in the mirror, but the separated other - this results in 
anxiety. Anxiety is caused by the return to the mirror stage, which is not possible after the mirror 
stage, because “I” has its other on the other side, as the object. The subject is anxious because the 
object threats the position of the subject. The implications of narcissism seem to be dependent on 
the spatial formations where “the imagery of the ego develops”. (Lacan: 1970, 27)  
Primary narcissism is also  “the state of unity with the environment, in which internal and 
external are not distinguished.” 38 Lacan also regards the subject prior to the mirror stage still in 
the “state of nature” where the baby still feels union with environment. Alan Bass in his book 
Difference and Disavowal brings the Freudian “pleasure principle” into question. Quoting from 
Freud he says that  “unconscious mental processes are in themselves timeless and time does not 
change them in any way, and idea of time can’t be applied to them.” He does not accept such an 
articulation of time: consciousness of time is a defence against the tension of unconscious time. 
(Bass: 2000, 84) If this is the case, then the unconscious cannot be timeless. If there is not a break 
considered between the unconscious and consciousness by means of separating them in different 
parts of psyche, the unconscious does not have to be isolated with the unpleasant and repressed 
memories of psyche.  
In considering the experience in the corridor according to Lacan’s notion of subject 
formation and Freud’s articulation of the unconscious as the never changing structure, what 
happens in the corridor would become a traumatic experience. One of the reasons is the corridor’s 
alienating effect on the participant, which is caused by the interruption of one’s appearance on the 
screen while walking in the corridor. There is a “disparity between what was seen on the video 
monitors and what was actually experienced in the corridor.” There emerges two separate entities 
identification of which are not possible. What is displayed on the screen while one walks towards 
the screen is divided into two different sights at the same time. One’s movements are simulated on 
the screen in a reverse way, while vision is multiplied. Accordingly, there emerges a relation of 
indifference between the one who is walking towards the end of the corridor and seeing one’s self 
walking back - on the screen. The placements of the cameras both challenge a kind of possibility of 
meeting the self on the screen while a notion of meeting the ideal-ego remains halted.  
The unexpected, rather than the expected, controls the direction of the 
gaze that turns back on the subject in an unidentifiable way. The 
Lacanian conception of the realisation of self in the operation of the 
scopic field does not work here because of the delayed interruption of 
temporality in the work. According to the connection between desire 
and its object, the monitors control the space and the sight, thus 
controlling the variety of possible encounters on the side of the 
subject.  
The activation of the virtual would not remind us to regard this situation as an 
interruption between the unconscious and the conscious. Perception is not a privileged 
aspect of being. Deleuze’s argumentation of the virtual is the notion that subject is also 
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an image among other images. Mind is also an image as it functions through the 
“recollection images”. The virtual and the actual gain a relation of becoming in a 
continuum that does not happen in a linear time for the actual does not refer to a sense 
of an isolated presence. Rather the actual takes it actuality from the virtual while 
constituting a relationship of difference in kind. Such understanding does not situate 
time into a linear pastness, presence and future, but allows things to unfold. Deleuze 
defines this as a “succession of duration” rather than space. Similarly one of the screens 
in the corridor displays one from the reverse side while the other displays an empty 
corridor. It looks as if such an experience cannot make one’s self feel present in the 
corridor. Introducing an uncanny experience, the installation introduces another sense of 
exclusion, which is achieved by the presence and walk of someone in the corridor. In 
this sense, space does not mark one’s existence as a consequence of presence in space. 
Therefore, there emerges a fragmentation of a spatial and temporal unity, which 
interrupts the notion of presence as well as past and future. Seeing the back on the 
screen while walking towards the corridor brings a sense of pastness in the present and a 
notion of future that depends on past again. A conception of “now” becomes impossible 
untied from the past. Perception becomes that which could only claim to catch the 
immediate and the instantaneous. Nevertheless, this is an illusion since perception itself 
is not immediate.  
Alan Bass, in Difference and Disavowal, states that Freudian understanding of time 
is also Kantian time who sees time as the formation of “necessary forms of thought”. He 
adds that temporal modes are not only attributed to consciousness as a form of thought. 
The implication of the bounding of time as if it were a function of thought is the 
understanding of time that depends on the significance of presence. Such notion of 
presence is considered to be a sign of reality. Alan Bass also calls it Newtonian time as the 
“objective time of the infinite series of now points objective space coordinating with 
it.”(Bass: 2000, 85) This is firstly because Freud tries to eliminate the continuous delaying 
aspect of time. “Freud’s time” does not consider an alteration of temporal flow, yet it is 
linear and is based on the “scenes” that are taken out from the reality of a temporal flow.  
There is a stable and sticky consciousness working only through perception that 
resists the forces of the unconscious. Freud accepts a notion of difference in the 
development of subject, but he seems to leave difference in different places divided 
between the unconscious and consciousness. His conception of delay and difference is 
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regarded to have quantitative aspects, which creates a system of differences and stabilises 
it. The  participant meets his or her  previous step towards the corridor, instead of the 
present step, which is reflected on the screen as one is getting away instead of getting 
closer. Nauman’s work breaks with linear time and space. There is not a negation of time 
or space, but a displacement of these notions. Since time is not a thing and is not a fixed 
being which reveals a kind of truth, there is not a false time that contradicts a truth of time. 
Time is not the fact but it shakes the ground of proper facts.  
This work conveys an encounter with the participant himself or herself, at the same 
time, changes the notion of encounter. This time, encounter is not a matter of facing one’s 
image like one’s other or self. Rather, there is an undefinable representation of the self. 
While the work cuts the notion of perception with a sense of delay, it reflects the 
characteristics of time as continuum, by reminding the participant of his step from the 
back. Accordingly, the time lapse, which is supposed to have been left behind, is seen in its 
delayed recurrence.  
The encounter with the reverse image from the back is the result of the placement 
of cameras and the image relayed through the cameras. Seeing the self from the back 
reveals an opening of the action in its delayed sense rather than creating an illusion of 
instantaneous perception. There are two aspects of this installation in this sense, because of 
the possibility of an already delayed aspect of delay and also doubling of this case with the 
implication of it, as the control of time in the corridors. If the participant sees himself 
getting closer to the screen as he is walking towards the screen, the encounter would again 
be missed because of the different rhythms. The temporal flow does not follow a linear 
order. Time manifests itself as  becoming and  as the things themselves, and time is not 
excluded from the temporality of beings.  
To situate something in a realm of an immediacy of perception is an isolating 
attempt which is cut from a notion of  pastness and futurality. The experience of the 
temporal mobility in Nauman’s corridor is caught in a notion of encounter which misses its 
object. Hence it does not formulate a ground for the viewer where one can focus on the 
object of perception. This work also gives a sense of the impossibility of a pure instance 
isolated from the past and the past from the present. Screening from the reverse side offers 
two possible times the primacy of which is ambiguous. Is the real time represented as the 
one going further away from the screen, or the one coming close to screen? The gaze is 
regarded as separate from the subject. Distance from the object is the illusion created on 
the side of the subject so that the subject would separate itself from the object. The 
cinematic gaze is associated with the scopophilic instinct where the eye becomes the 
symbol for incorporation. As incorporation is a sense of uniting with the other, then 
psychoanalysis is already concerned with a distance in the beginning. On the other hand, 
the corridor does not let this imaginary distance to take place between the subject and 
object. What the gaze catches or misses is one’s self. It can be said that one’s 
representation in the screen takes the place of one’s position in the gaze.  
  Another play with time is realised on another screen, which shows the corridor 
empty. The camera is again controlling the temporal and spatial experience in the corridor 
space. The empty screen showing noone while there is someone inside displaces the 
subject  and object positions by leaving the experience outside the marked space in the 
corridors. As a consequence what is displayed on the screen does not correspond to a 
reflection of one’s own image but brings a kind of anxiety while interrupting the operation 
of linear spatial dynamics. It is not a direct impression of past as past or present as present. 
 xliv
In this sense, there is also an interruption according to Margaret Morse’s argument about 
such video works suggests, which record and reflect a viewer’s action revealing a sense of 
presence.  
Parveen Adams ‘Bruce Nauman and the object of anxiety’ writes of the anxiety 
which Nauman’s works evoke in the participants. Referring to Lacan she argues that 
Nauman’s works are the mediums for object of anxiety and alienation: 
 
The object of anxiety that is outside me nonetheless bears the most intimate relation to 
me… 
  But why do I speak of objects of anxiety? It is quite simple--when the object approaches 
me  
(and that is what the uncanny is, the approach of the object), I am threatened in my status 
as  
subject. Anxiety describes a relation of overpowering proximity to the object, within which 
the object is still curiously ill defined. It is certain that it is too close to me, that it is sitting 
on my chest, that it is gripping my insides. What is not certain is what it is--to the point that 
I can say that the effect it is having on me is a function of not knowing what it is. In 
anxiety, I am threatened with extinction; I do not have sufficient space to breathe. In 
uncanny situations, then, the object devours my space as subject. (Adams: 1998, 109)  
 
In these works, as Adams emphasises, the “dislocation of gaze” has the power to 
create an object of anxiety. The temporal  as well as the spatial shifts have  important 
effects on the loss of a sense of space. The reverse image of the participant on the screen 
follows the traces in the corridor, while representing one’s trace within the following step. 
The step forward is that which loses its trace as ‘present’ as soon as it steps. In this sense, 
there is not a present step that could be considered in the immediacy of the action. The 
influence of the space represented on the screen interrupts a sense of ‘here’ introducing a 
halted experience of forward or backward movement in the corridor. There is not a 
relevant “way” indicating direction towards something. This is because that there is a sense 
of temporality functioning for the alteration of perception that dislocates space as the 
foundation for time. In this sense, the following step forward hesitates to be a new one that 
leads to the other new one leading to the end of the corridor. It is also not only an 
interruption of the represented space on the screen. The sense of hesistation is there in the 
obscure realm between two spaces. There is an interaction between what is displayed and 
what is physically experienced, which introduces what is displayed in the screen as 
something beyond the representation of the same space. Rather the screen displays what a 
step forward is supposed to miss beyond what it catches.  
The Freudian thesis about unconscious time in Alan Bass’ terms is a “quasi-
traumatic internal stimulus”. In the conception of this corridor installation, the is actualised 
in consciousness and one may result in feeling that one is “kicked out of time” as well as 
“kicked out of space”. Time is the continuum not in an Husserlian method as “continuum 
of nows” but in a flow of duration.What causes ambiguity in the corridors are the different 
rhythms, which cause anxiety that brings confusion in considering whether the rhythm 
belongs to one’s own temporality or the others.  
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The strong interruption of the video space in the physical experience of space 
divides the subject and object in themselves as well as causes the emergence of the 
multiple sites at the same time. There is also not a sense of rhythm that catches and is 
caught by anything in the doubling of the spaces and the bodies. The time lapse in the 
corridors is neither lost nor found as the rhythm of differentiation allows it to be. On the 
other hand, temporal flow becomes neither the representation of another static time in the 
unconscious, nor the original in its experience.  
 
 
 
Installation/Space 
 
This closed circuit installation space is  a space  which one participates and 
becomes a part of performance. Despite its being placed in a gallery, the communication 
between a person in the corridor and the gallery is cut. Therefore, memory and perception 
of a sense of space work differently than they do in installations, which come to be known 
with the architecture of the places. On the one hand, an installation space is regarded as a 
sited space and it introduces a kind of experience, which looks as if it is for the one in that 
story. On the other hand, an installation space is multiplied and takes the viewer into 
another realm between fiction and non-fiction. One goes beyond the position of the 
observer of something represented as art. Rather one is involved in the process in which 
one loses any sense of space of belonging and a time of that proper space. In this sense 
consideration of perception as a medium for an experience of installation misses all these 
spaceless experiences of space and timeless experiences of time. The notion of encounter is 
always that which is missed as soon as one faces the other.  Perception is that which is 
delayed in its constitution through which the body is only able to involve the trace of itself 
and the object of perception as trace.  According to such a conception of a perception, the 
video installation is both a closed-circuit and a closed space in the corridors. It takes one 
out of a conception of an alert state of consciousness of a gallery space when one is inside 
the corridor. The corridor introduces a conception of delay rather than a sense of a change 
in constant spaces. In addition to this, it contradicts with a notion of involvement, which is 
described as the aspect of minimal works, that privileges perception and a state of 
consciousness about a gallery space.  
 Robert Morris’ Mirrored Cubes (1965) give a sense of oscillation between the 
physical and the non-physical. The Mirrored Cubes (1965) achieve it by connecting the 
physical space to another spatial and temporal dimension in the mirrored space. There is 
one thing that makes the corridor distinct from the installations that emphasise the gallery 
space as the plots of the story installations tell us. The corridor space, which takes one 
inside itself, cuts the relation to the gallery space in its construction. The construction of 
gallery space and the architecture of the gallery as part of this work have the minimum 
effect in setting a relation with the viewer. At the same time, it becomes difficult to 
consider such installation similar to a cinematic experience or a theatrical one. Although 
the corridor has a physical presence in the gallery space, it does not make the same sense 
when it is seen from outside without entering. On the other hand, the fact that the corridor 
is installed in a gallery space does not mean that such a work denies having an impact on 
the experience of someone inside the corridor. The limits of the corridor addresses not only 
to inside but also to the outside of the construction. The corridor has a visual and material 
presence as something that occupies a space in the gallery. It also addresses a gallery 
experience by which the corridor installation makes sense in the gallery space. One is not 
able to meet one’s image as something included in the experience of a work of art in the 
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gallery space through which the corridor installations makes sense in the gallery space. As 
a consequence of delay, one meets one’s appearance on the screen as soon as one misses it 
and as soon as the image is dislocated and one becomes the image. There is nothing to look 
since what is looked at is not a thing. The other is not something that one makes absent and 
present through looking and not looking at.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                 CHAPTER II  
 
                                        TEMPORALITIES OF NON-MOVEMENT  
 
 
In his article ‘Mortality of the Image’, Bill Viola mentions that the term “moving 
image” is misleading. He states that it is not the images moving but “the art of cinema lies 
more in the combination of image sequences in time (montage)  than it does in making the 
images move” 39 Viola’s argument makes some correct  points in considering time as the 
medium for “moving images”,  while such an articulation refers only to the power of the 
technique, which manipulates time as the tool for the representational means of cinema. 
Viola argues that late twentieth century art has gone through a break with the dramatic 
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narrative structure “based on Aristotle’s theories.” Such a break with narrative is actually 
the outcome of the conception of reality and is critical about the notions of presence, 
perception and the linear perspective. This is an argument concerning mimetic means of 
representation. The changing worldview through the ages, which affected the way “the 
real” is conceived, made its impact on art and cinema in the twentieth century. The moving 
aspect of the “moving image” comes out of the technical apparatus, where the ability to 
control the image belongs to the artist but also to the limit that the camera allows. The 
“moving image” misses one point; in its being an ‘image’, when understood in a Platonic 
sense, it is unable to free itself from only being the re-production of the real substance out 
“there”. The problem with representation is the consideration that an image is the 
resemblance of the real thing. Image is considered as an outer effect of reality. The shift 
from such notion of representation to the “presentational arts” has freed the work of art 
from its reference to the pre-conditioned notion of representation. Then, the artwork is 
considered as itself, without a necessity to be identified with an object outside itself. Such 
a shift from representation to presentation takes place towards the middle of the twentieth 
century, which derives from the changes in the beginning of the twentieth century. It is 
necessary to make a remark about the two World Wars, which introduced the possibility 
that there is not a single stable truth. The notion of grasping reality and truth by scientific 
observation and a fixed status of reality proved impossible.  
 
As can be seen in Viola’s argumentation of the moving image and the conception 
of reality in art reality is no longer valued through the representational quality and the 
proximity of the representation to the real. Rather, the work of art starts to take its 
reference from itself. The change from such notion of representation to the presentation is 
also a shift from the question of “what” to “how”. It does not also seem possible to say that 
all of these changes in philosophical and social means are sudden and they emerged out of 
nothing. The altered perceptions also are important in breaking the boundaries between the 
fictional and the real. The urge to grasp the ideal thing in the work of art in relation to the 
real, brings the question of “what”, which is directed to the object. Instead, “how” is an 
open question. “How” is the tendency to experience the process rather than to understand 
the teleology of things.  
In considering cinematography and the issue of representation, there emerges a 
question whether cinematography creates an image the reality of which is outside the 
frame and it creates its own reality unbound with the object. Cinematography, says Maya 
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Deren, is the “creative use of reality”40. This reality is not an issue concerning a value of 
quantity in comparing cinematographic reality with other things. Referring to photography, 
Maya Deren argues that photograph must be differentiated from the real object as it has a 
different order than the real object and it manifests itself as a form of reality. Therefore, 
such an argument also shows that trying to find a truth and meaning of resemblance within 
an artwork with reference to the “real object” is a meaningless effort on the side of the 
spectator. In this sense, a conception of a real thing as if it were an image of something is a 
reference to its other outside itself. Accordingly, a conception of reality outside reduces the 
work of art to the field of resemblances and idealities. It is not only for the moving image 
or cinematography but art in a general sense, which is dominated by the modernist 
tendency to distance art from the real life. In this sense, the attitude of distancing the real 
from the unreal becomes a metaphor of reality. Such an attitude introduces a conception of 
metaphysics in art that also brings dualities between the space and time, which becomes an 
effect of a narrative discourse that is based on fiction.  
Through the manipulation of reality and various ways of shooting, cinematic 
experience may not be considered as the site where the spectator is made to believe in the 
unreal for a time being. Such concern with the real and the unreal is an argument whether 
there is a direct contradiction between these two notions. Are they closed terms or are there 
any quantitative difference between these two? In fact, this opens a broad range of interests 
where reality of the unconscious or consciousness, the virtual and the actual are concerned.  
Deleuze’s argumentation concerning the virtual and the actual eliminates the 
quantitative difference between the real and the unreal. None of them is considered 
privileged over the other. Rather, Deleuze suggests that the relation between the virtual and 
the actual have qualitative differences.  The conception of the virtual and the actual is the 
development in the process of what Deleuze calls “different/ciation”. Similar to Derrida’s 
notion of difference as “différance”, different/ciation does not refer to an understandable or 
conceivable term about difference. Therefore, such an attitude avoids the notion of 
representation of the real, which happens in the virtual. Even différance differentiates and 
thus separates itself from the associations, which depend on a comparison with the other in 
considering difference as the manifestation of truth. Different/ciation is a sense of 
difference, which is irreducible to difference between two things. It is the difference 
between the virtual and the actual. It does not consider a beginning before difference itself, 
for it is that which different/ciates in itself. An elimination of a beginning and ending 
questions a conception of authenticity before difference.  
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In ‘Ontology of the Virtual’41 Constantin Boundas argues that Deleuze’s notion of 
the virtual depends on tendencies, which are not “thought according to the spatial terms 
nor can they be represented.” “Tendencies”, says Boundas, have the reality of the virtual, 
which exist in order to be actualised. In addition to their being virtual and real, tendencies 
are not possibilities. Possibilities have to do with resemblances and representations of the 
real. In considering the virtual as real, the possible as the resemblance, Boundas means that 
the possible has a futural aspect, which announces the reality to come but does not have a 
trace of it in the virtual. On the other hand, Boundas accepts Deleuze’s notion of tendency, 
which has an aspect of reality but not actualised. The Virtual, which is real but not a thing, 
may also be that which is not objectified by a subject concerning outside and inside. It is 
that which different/ciates through unfolding and it becomes actualised.  
The problem with time in the moving images is the problematic of the 
philosophical arguments about time in general. It questions the notion of perception, 
persona, being, existence.  The cinematic operation of time considers the temporal 
becoming as a means of the apparatus, which introduces the idea of the screen and the 
entity behind the screen. It is necessary to see how “difference” and “differences” are taken 
in the temporal order in and outside the moving images. Time is an aspect of trace of 
temporality by means of which Derrida calls “différance”.  
 Deleuze’s studies about the notion of time in cinema assists in the sense that he is 
concerned with the relation of movement and image. Deleuze differentiates between two 
kinds of images in cinema, which he calls the movement-image and the time-image. He is 
interested in the Bergsonian notion of duration, which he regards as the originary point in 
his arguments. It is also the criticism of representation of image in spatio-temporal 
understanding. In this sense, Deleuze makes a division between the time-image and the 
movement-image which considers Deleuzian notion of differentiation, that is in kind.   
 
 
Time, Movement, Image- Space  
  
The term “moving image” can be helpful in getting a conception about the 
implication of the factors of movement in cinematography. Such a concern is the 
movement-time relationship, where the spatial relationships are questioned. In this sense, 
there appear two questions about the image in cinema. Is time an object of movement or is 
movement an  outcome of temporal differentiation?  
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The most important difference between the movement-image and the time-image is the notion of indirect representation of 
time in the former.  In ‘Image Movement and its Three Varieties’42 Deleuze mentions the ways in which psychoanalysis is concerned 
with the conception of image. Deleuze is critical of psychoanalytic understanding of image since psychoanalytic reality “consisted of 
placing the images in consciousness and movements in space.” Such a division causes the articulation of consciousness as the field of 
“qualitative, unextended images”, whereas space offers the operation of “extended, quantitative movements.” (Deleuze: 1986, 3)  
Deleuze’s is critical of the historicism of “being” according to western metaphysics. The historical being has brought dualism between 
the image and matter, as well as the “confrontation between idealism and materialism.” Such an opposition refers to the “duality of 
image and movement, of the conscious and the thing.” Deleuze sees an elimination of such dualism in Husserl’s approach to 
phenomenology. Husserl brings the conception of consciousness and being together and regards consciousness as the consciousness of 
something. This is a way to close the gap between the matter and mind. Nevertheless, Husserl still puts consciousness as an agent 
between matter and mind. Rather, Deleuze follows Bergson who regards “all consciousness” as “something.” In this sense, Deleuze 
seems to close the gap between the virtual and the actual as well as matter and mind. In the conception of Husserl’s methodology of 
“internal time consciousness” the privilege is given to the “self” as the agent of the perception of time. If Husserl is concerned with the 
notion of  “internal”, then he is concerned with the external as the limit of time. The privilege given to the self is the privilege of a fixed 
being and presence where the locations are introduced other than “trace” or flux. Derrida is critical of Husserl because of his concerns 
about self-presence and consciousness of time, that is the foundation for phenomenological being. Such an approach to phenomenology 
has an emphases on identity, which privileges “natural perception” that brings a “ground” for the notion of the “perceiving subject”, 
which demands its object of perception.  
Deleuze is critical about the operation of natural perception, because he is sceptical about the notion of self and subject, 
which phenomenology regards as the basis of perception. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze sees the articulation of “ground” that is 
concerned with “determination” and “logos”, which are the highest references to the dualism of mind and body. 43 Similarly, Derrida is 
critical of natural perception because it introduces self-consciousness, which reinforces “the knowing subject” and he deconstructs the 
ideal self-presence and temporal presentness and a notion of “internalisation.” 44 Deleuze says that the notion of “image equal to 
movement” depends on the virtual where “my body is an image, thus an aggregate of actions and reactions.” (Deleuze:1986, 5)  At this 
point, the conception of the knowing subject is no longer there as the outcome of dualities. In Deleuze’s sense, “matter is not something, 
which would be hidden behind the image, but on the contrary, the absolute identity of image and of movement.” (Deleuze:1986, 5)  
 
There are differences and similarities between the movement-image and the time-
image. In the former there is a dialectical representation of time and in the latter there is a 
direct representation of time. The movement-image is in an indirect relationship with time, 
which depends on the compression of images to give a sense of dialectical end points 
inside the narrative. Technically, such narrative structure is achieved by the use of cut and 
montage to represent images as part of a composition. Then, composed scenes lead to a 
detachment from reality, which become entangled in tableau and mise en scene. The 
temporal mode of the movement-image is determined according to the movement of the 
camera, which shoots a sequence of combination of spaces. In addition to that, the duration 
of such  films depend on the narrative structure of plot. Contrary to the movement-image, 
which considers time as a tool of space,  Deleuze says  “time is no longer a measure of 
movement but movement is the perspective of time.” The time-image is where time is not 
deployed as movement of something; rather movement occurs in time and through the flow 
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of duration in time. Therefore, spatial determinants become inefficient to give a sense of 
temporality. What such an image brings is the “recollection image”, which has its past, 
present, and future within itself. It does not constitute itself in an instant. In the time-
image, montage does not operate to represent dialectical ends of the image in a causal 
relationship. For example, the time-image does not constitute itself as the beginning or end 
points in the composition of the narrative. The time-image does not also convey a 
hierarchical foundation for the setting of the plot. Talking about a single dimension of 
duration would be a failure, since what emerges is the multiplicity of different 
temporalities. Such a sense of time brings a notion of spatialisation since space brings 
forms to things, while the time-image does not have a form. In this sense, time does not 
refer to a sense of belonging or non-belonging. Derrida describes such time as that which is 
not obliged to have a priority over things; it is not a matter of having or not having.45 
Derrida often emphasises the significance of trace as temporisation, which differentiates in 
itself. Rather than “differ” or “differentiate” Derrida uses the word “defer” which means 
delay. According to such a conception of time, time becomes what it is not. In this sense, it 
is not possible for it to be considered as an object of perception.  Rather, a conception of 
time unbound to the subjective or objective reserves is possible unless it represents a 
spatial quality. Time is that which is not stable and sudden, but in a flow of becoming. If 
we consider the conception of time as a property of consciousness, then we have to accept 
it as a reified substance of space. Correspondingly, as time is not a thing, it is defined as 
the undefinable, which is paradoxical. The concern with the time-image leads to a similar 
trap of definition, but provides a conception of time in its conditions independent from a 
plot of the story or an inscribed meaning. Then, what happens in the time-image does not 
remain complete, which is not a prerequisite of a truth of interpretation. Rather temporality 
replaces a particular conception of time, and it  does not demonstrate a sense of wholeness 
but is considered as a  state of  heterogenous alteration. The time-image does not allow a 
space for interpretation. Deleuze explains the difference between two different 
understandings of the time-image and the movement-image.  He states that “the 
movement-image occurs in the gap between received and the executed movement” and 
“recollection image fills the gap”, it goes to perception, “not to generic movement”.46 In 
this sense, to see the image as if it is an outcome of the gaps is to constitute an illusionary 
sense of reality. The time-image is able to shift this illusion into reality since it does not 
consider gaps because it does not consider unity at all.  
Warhol’s early films such as Empire(1965), Eat(1963)and Sleep (1963) can be 
examples to see Deleuze’s conception of the time-image since there is an emphasis of 
process and duration which has broken with the narrative structure. Warhol refuses to use 
montage technique in a dialectical sense, which often introduces mise en scene. Deleuze 
refers to the political and social implications of the time-image and the movement-image. 
The emergence of the time-image is also considered as a criticism of contemporary art and 
culture beginning with neo-realism of fifties in cinema. It is important to note that, 
although Deleuze seems to historicise the time-image as the aspect of post-war films, a 
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consideration of the movement-image as also the time-image introduces an altered sense of 
history, which deterritorialises a sense of time.  
The time-image does not often refer to a meaning that could coincide with a unity 
of action, space and time. It is motion based and it depends on the representative qualities 
of the dialectical notion of scenes. In this sense, the rejection of these notions introduce 
another articulation of meaning where the void is not reduced to emptiness and 
meaninglessness but is present as much as the visible and overloaded images of movement. 
This may not also be the means of finding a “new” reality in the void, but taking the 
already existent “meaning” into the locus of what can be counted as the material for art. 
For instance, Empire (1965) is a film that does not seem to be concerned with a sense of 
coherence of plot. Empire (1965) allows the development of questions rather than 
solutions. Empire (1965) is a film, the duration of which lasts eight hours of shooting of 
the Empire State Building from a single angle. Nothing depicts a sense of movement 
except the movement of the sun and the shades. The movement is in the temporal flow and 
the film that continuously shoots. There is not an event or a plot depicted in Empire (1965). 
While showing the repetitive scenes from one angle position for hours, does Warhol try to 
bore us or does he say something else rather than cinema, which prevents a sense of 
anticipation on the side of the spectator? Both as the content of the film and the mode of 
experience of the film on the side of the spectator, does not conform to what a “normal” 
process of feature films offer to the spectator. The blankness of the image seems to resist 
the actualisation of the virtual. It is against what consciousness would situate on a 
meaningful basis. Empire (1965) calls the spectator for a mode of contemplation and 
alteration without giving any resolution in the story. It also does not demand a sense of 
perceptual realisation. Rather it says that this time this film is not a matter of looking at and 
understanding. It is an event, which does not face its spectator. The film becomes the idea 
that haunts the privileging of experience as that which reveals a sense of encounter. 
 
 
Changing times, changing temporalities  
 
The motive for the art of the sixties was to consider art as part of everyday life. In 
this sense, artists during the period were critical of institutional structures, which specified 
the ways in which art had to be. In his article ‘Raiding the Icebox’ Peter Wollen writes 
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about the atmosphere of the sixties. It is the time when Warhol’s art and his films were 
made. Wollen argues that mass culture, the roots of which depends on the Fordist mass 
production, has lead to the emergence of the “production of images”. Pop art of the sixties 
refers primarily to this intense use of images.47 Warhol and other Pop artists were critical 
about the images brought by mass society. Wollen states that during the sixties art had 
political as well as aesthetic concerns. He talks about John Cage’s fascination with silence, 
“which posited duration with a special intensity” rejecting the “traditional appeal of music 
as melody”. Wollen is concerned with the emergence of the importance of the unheard – as 
the musical notation - in the space of the music experience. Wollen states that art according 
to Cage should be brought back into relationship with everyday life. (Wollen: 1989, 14) 
Most art done during the sixties was against the conventional and accepted notions of mass 
society. However, pop art in which Warhol was interested, is an ambiguous situation since 
pop artists were making the art of the images of popular culture. Warhol’s attitude about 
the images both had a conforming and critical aspect of mass society. In his art, he used 
everything mass-produced, from Coke to Campbell soup cans, celebrities, Brillo boxes and 
many more commodity materials. Warhol did not detach himself from the culture he was 
living in. In his works and his life, it looks as if he has a tendency to become the part of the 
images of popular culture. Such a tendency of his seems to have two sides: on the one 
hand, he was part of the images, which were not unique and distinguished from each other 
everything being an outcome of a machine product. On the other hand, he had a particular 
approach to the multiplicities around him. His films, as well as other works have such an 
attitude in which he used the existing material in an unexpected way. Warhol’s use of 
camera and his approach towards filmmaking had such an aspect. Being the man behind 
the camera, he is critical of the common way of film production and the Hollywood star 
system. In this sense, he chose unconventional subjects even non-subjects, which do not 
have specific plots as he did in Empire (1965), Eat (1963) and Sleep (1963). There is an 
ironic situation since these “unconventional subjects” stand out being indifferent to the 
narrative aspects of cinema. He does not offer a possibility of getting lost in the story ‘out 
there.’ The stories and the people shown in his films are the stories of themselves. Eat 
(1963) is an example for that, since in this film there is an actor, Robert Indiana, who eats 
one mushroom for about half an hour. However, his experience of eating a mushroom is 
not a matter of making the spectator believe in the fact that he eats it. The film is between 
                                                           
47 Wollen, Peter, ‘Raiding the Icebox’, Andy Warhol: film factory, ed. Michael O’Pray, (London: British Film 
Institute, 1989), (14-28) 14.  
 liv
fictional and non-fictional space since Indiana’s experience exceeds being a part of a 
narrative and a sense of acting. The act of eating turns into one that gets out of an 
experience of eating and is not obliged to a sense of eating something, but eating itself.  
 
There is also not editing or any other sound effect added on the meaning of the 
eating scene. In Sleep (1963), John Giorno does not act as if he was sleeping, but he says 
he sleeps throughout the film that lasts six hours. Warhol places the camera in the corner of 
the room and does not make any focus change and he does not edit the film. Warhol 
changes the direction of the camera in every three hours but he decides about the 
placement of the camera randomly.48 What Peter Wollen sees in Warhol’s films different 
from the commodity films is his  “reluctance to edit” his films, his rejection of plot or 
narrative and choice on the side of the “situation” and “incident”. (Battcock: 1989, 43) 
That Warhol does not control the actions according to a plot allows the scene to develop in 
a temporality, which follows the duration of the performance – of eating, of sleeping. The 
time-image is appropriate in considering Warhol’s attitude towards filmmaking since 
duration in these films do not depend on the narrative space of action. There is an interest 
in a notion of incident, which allows an alteration of image by differing in itself. The 
filming of Empire (1965) takes eight hours, which is concerned with the duration that is 
marked by a passage from day to night time. Gregory Battcock argues that the purpose of 
Empire (1965) is to present the essential character of film as a medium.49 In the article 
“Four Films by Andy Warhol” Battock refers to the editing process as the “distortion 
through compression.” In Empire (1965), there is a different kind of distortion, which is on 
the side of the image. In this sense “the cinematic narration of time is distorted.” (Battcock: 
1986, 44)  In the films Eat (1963) and Sleep(1963) there can be references to distortion of 
the “narration of time” in Warhol, not only because of the long shots without editing but 
also because of the introduction of intervals through slow motion. For example, 
displacement from the 24 frame to 16 frames per second during the shot can be regarded as 
one of the ways in which Warhol interrupts duration and the movement of substances. It 
also rejects a sense of time that dependent on an emergence of a narrative structure. The 
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movement of the substance is represented without being manipulated by montage after the 
time of shooting.  
Warhol’s films are similar to Cage’s music. Both of the artists do not apply the 
“formal” techniques to their creation. Rather they change the medium of creation. Cage 
brings “silence” to music as part of a notation and Warhol is concerned with films, which 
have no plot, the images are in a way “silent” in Warhol. However, such silence becomes 
louder than sound. The images are muted in Warhol, frozen, which reveal a non-movement 
rather than movement. Such an attempt marks the flow of duration and emphasise the 
interval rather than a dialectical understanding of scenes in a sequence that have the aim of 
a resultant meaning.  Jonas Mekas writes that he finds the secret of Warhol’s scenes in 
duration. According to Mekas “there are certain ideas and feelings, certain contents, which 
are structured in time” and Warhol’s films are the examples for that temporal formation.” 
He finds “the real meaning,” which goes beyond “literal meaning” and that “can be caught 
only through structuring in time.” Such an attitude “applies equally to feelings and 
thoughts”: 
 
                 One of the essential misunderstandings about art and thought has been belied that 
                 thought is opposed to aesthetic activity, to art. And particularly thought has no place 
                 in cinema….The structure of thought and art is similar; that is, both occur by pace,  
                 rhythm and duration: duration and repetitions of thoughts and feelings and actions.50  
 
Mekas’ statement about the importance of thought in the operation of cinematic image 
comes close to Deleuzian notion of  “the thought image.”  The thought-image does not 
consider a separation between thought and image. There is no need for an external 
reference to another image to get a sense of image. Rather the image occurs between action 
and reaction. If we say that the thing is same with the perception of the thing, we are in 
Bergson’s direct implication of perception as something. In addition to that, while such a 
statement addresses a becoming and alteration, it preconditions an emergence of another 
aspect of replacement. Such a notion of replacement is the direct relationship between the 
thing and the perception of the thing. Rather, in the time-image, there are intervals, which 
are not marked by perception. He says,  “interval is not only defined by the specialisation 
of the two side limits” which are “perception and action.” (Deleuze: 1986, 6) “Affectivity”, 
then is the notion that provides the activation of  “between–the-two without filling it or 
completing it”.  
In his article, Michael O’Pray distinguishes between the cinema where montage 
takes place as the major element of the narrative and realist cinema, which is concerned 
with direct image. He states that Eisensteinian montage technique - which works according 
to the dialectical sequence of the frames in the narration of the story - on the one hand, and 
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the Bazinian realism on the other. Warhol, according to O’Pray, is a realist since he uses 
the “fixed camera, unedited reels and the non-staged events”. 51 Eisenstein’s cinema is the 
first example of the successful operation of montage for the outcome of a meaning that 
needs interpretation on the side of the spectator. In this sense, Eisenstein’s understanding 
of cinema fails to be regarded as the time-image, as it privileges an importance of time and 
space that are the parts of compositional structure.  
In the time-image, there is not a distinction between the real and the unreal and it does not oblige one to 
“understand” and get a meaning out of the logical sequence of images. Rather, it is the time of becoming 
and meaning is not a production of something outside itself.  
Warhol’s early films, in this sense, function according to a sense of the time-image, which 
is not preoccupied by the privileging of a narrative structure, depended on the manipulation 
of images. In Sleep (1963) 100 foot rolls of film were used. Warhol used different angles 
for each of the rolls. The rolls were permutated at very great length, projected at a slower 
speed than the original speed of photography and finally reduced to freeze-frames. 
(O’Pray: 1989, 173) The scene of sleeping might evoke a sense that nothing happens or 
might make someone think the film was paused. Rather, there is a temporal flow, which 
does not mark the passage of time and make it visible in the representation of the events. In 
Eat 1963), Warhol shoots Robert Indiana eating a mushroom for 25 minutes. The notion of 
eating makes sense because something tastes good, because one is hungry. Therefore, 
eating becomes an agent for the satisfaction, which indicates a direction for an end, while 
Eat (1963) emphasises the process of eating rather than an end. In this sense, The eating 
scene makes one think about the contribution of the whole body in the act of eating. Eat 
(1963) is similar to Bergson’s notion of process mentioned in the example of sugar 
dissolving in water. He states that “ I must wait until the sugar dissolves.” Bergson’s 
formulation is that “My own duration serves to reveal other durations that beat to other 
rhythms, that differ in kind from mine.” (Deleuze: 1988, 32)  In this sense, not only the 
result of seeing the sugar dissolved but also the process of dissolving becomes important. 
One waits and experiences the change in the state of sugar as the succession of two 
different bodies enduring in time.  
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Counter-Encounter 
  
The time- image represents a  shift from an understanding of being to becoming, 
from time to duration, from reason to intuition, from a fixed notion of “perceptual 
identity”52 to that which gains a nomadic character. Therefore, identity is not considered as 
the register for things that are grounded in space. Deleuze’s notion of difference is 
important in considering the time-image free from binary oppositions. The time-image is 
concerned with the notion of differentiation in the image that is between the virtual and the 
actual. According to Deleuze’s account of image, which considers differentiation and non-
differentiation, the time-image becomes released from the arbitrary relationship of 
difference between the thought and image, real and the unreal. The main shift, in 
Deleuzian sense, is the questioning of reality in the factors of differentiation between the 
virtual and the actual. At this point, Deleuze leaves no place for the consideration of the 
virtual as the unreal and the actual as the real. The relation of the virtual to duration is the 
relationship of duration to pure memory. Duration introduces “the passive memory as 
recollection, virtual and inactive” as well as a temporal move from the virtual memory into 
memory images in the course of becoming actual. 53 Memory is able to coexist in the 
actualisation of perception. The move from the virtual to actual has the notion of 
“translation, contradiction, rotation and orientation.” (Deleuze: 1988, 64) Translation is not 
an outcome of something new that replaces the old. Dorothe Olkowski considers such 
mobility as a notion of Deleuzian virtual memory:  
 
The problem is not space since space is a representation, a mental diagram; the problem is 
 creating a conception of duration that recognises its multiple rhythms, the many virtual 
 memories, each of which reflects the whole, each of which when actualised in a perception 
 has greater tension or relaxation.(Olkowski: 1999, 166)  
 
In this sense, perception is not constituted as original to consciousness, since it has roots in 
the unactualised virtual memories. Space contributes to the actualisation of the virtual. 
Such an attitude refers to Deleuze’s criticism of ground, the principle of which would be 
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the representational space. Deleuze rejects the notion of temporality, which has become the 
means of space. Modern art can be said to provoke dualities within space, where the thing 
itself is sacrificed for the sake of “meaning”, while art after modernist tradition is not for 
homogeneity and specific meaning. Contrary to search of such a meaning, Warhol’s films 
introduce slow motion, which makes a passage possible between the virtual and the actual. 
It is even closer to the virtual since it refers more to the psychic states of temporality, 
which addresses to past and delays present to some other “time”. Duration has to do more 
with the intervals then the specification of time to perception. Interval introduces a 
conception of temporality that is concerned with duration, which is irreducible to spatial 
formations. In its irreducibility to any state of consciousness, duration is the imperceptible, 
the location of which is impossible. Warhol’s films go beyond the limits of empirical 
solutions, while believing “the true function of film as not to produce and maintain a new 
art form, but to provide a super-investigation of mere physical reality”. 54  Neither the 
moving image, which does not display a visible action, nor the spectator is passive during 
the course of becoming. Parker Tyler calls such a time “psychedelic time”. Tyler regards 
Empire (1965) as an endurance test for the spectator, while the sun is allowed to take all of 
eight hours to go down and come up. (Tyler: 1989, 98)  The condition that images are still 
captured in the apparatus, obviously leads to a different kind of encounter no matter how 
much it seems close to the real or beyond the real. Perception is not enough to get a sense 
of encounter, while the spectator does not meet a constant object. In the course of 
becoming, a sense of grasp of the thing and thinking about an ending, which refers to a 
tense such as “has become” may not be a concern for the encounter with the image.  
 
 
The Problem with the presence and the present  
  
Derrida is critical about self-consciousness.  He objects to the knowing subject  and 
deconstructs the ideal self-presence and temporal presentness. Self presence is a reference 
to “stability, fixity and the eternal now as the godly attitude”. (Genevieve: 1993, 4) 
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Derrida’s important remark about consciousness is that he ragards consciousness as the 
property of noone. (Genevieve:1993, 4) Having rejected that consciousness is the condition 
for perception, a notion of self-perception also proves impossible. The notion of Freudian 
“perceptual identity” becomes an illusion when one tries to understand with reference to 
perception, which is the outcome of consciousness. The problem seems to be both on the 
side of “perception” and “identity” as long as they are conceived as the fixed paradigms of 
the subject. According to such a notion, self -preserved identity, and the conception of the 
self and the other are guaranteed by the separate beings on different sides. Such a 
conception suggests that the difference is regarded as the outcome of the separation of a 
unique being which is separated into object and subject.  
Perception does not grasp the thing as it is, because of the notion of 
“different/ciation” according to Deleuze, and because of “différance” according to Derrida. 
There is a notion of différance, which is at work in perception that breaks the unity and 
immediacy of perception. Perception is not an object and does not objectify things in its 
immediacy. At this point, Deleuze argues that “Perception is not the object plus something 
but the object minus something, minus everything that does not interest us.” (Deleuze: 
1988, 25) Although Deleuze’s notion of the subject is the perceiving subject, he says that 
we do not add something to that, but we perceive less than the thing. No matter how much 
the body is close to the object of perception, there is always something left as the not 
present. This is through the constitution of time unbound to a sense of immediacy. 
However, the imperceptible does not consider a sense of loss. The sense of delay does not 
constitute a notion of ending to the perception of object. It is that which is already in delay. 
Such an articulation of perception is beyond the perceptual identity, since it does not 
address to phenomenological relationship as that which is between the subject and object.  
According to the phenomenologist conception of perception and the relation to the 
other, there is a necessity for the operation of identity for absolute consciousness. In this 
sense, Jeffrey A. Bell in his article ‘Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, and the Cinema of 
Time’ refers to the Husserlian method of perception where “the other is understood in 
terms of a fundamental identity”.55 Bell is critical of Husserl since Husserl’s guiding is 
conditioned to the emergence of identity. Identity is an articulation of a notion of a subject, 
which privileges self-consciousness. Accordingly, such a conception connection between 
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the real subject and the ideal truth ends up in the discovery of a pure transcendental ego. 
(Bell, 2)  Contrary to Husserl and Ponty, Deleuze’s criticism of presence and his notion of 
difference are free from the foundation of identity. Deleuze’s difference is based on 
differentiation itself of which Bell claims “there is from the start difference and 
incommensurability, where difference is not between already identified entities.”(Bell, 7) 
Since Deleuze rejects difference in relation to identity, difference gets a nomadic character 
which is not situated inside space while considering space as “any space wherever”. It 
contradicts a method of perception, where “the other is understood in terms of a 
fundamental identity”, which reduces difference to identity.  
 Deleuze’s conception of the time-image introduces a relation between image and 
thought that is based on the notion of differentiation. D.N. Rodowick states that Deleuze is 
concerned with the categories of movement and temporality in relation to visualisation or 
imaging. Accordingly, Deleuze is critical of the notion of identity which “thought is 
considered to possess”, which is based on “logical representations.”56. Deleuze is critical of 
a notion of representation that has the implications of outside and inside. Rather he brings 
into consideration the “fluid ordering of representational elements.” (Rodowick: 1997, 3)  
The notion of fluidity here refers to difference in kind, which the object is in so far as it 
changes in the flow of duration. Rodowick’s statement that the transformation from the 
movement-image to the time-image is also the transformation in the nature of signs and 
images referring to a change in the “cultural image of thought.” (Rodowick: 1997, 3)  
Warhol’s conception of image does not seem to be concerned with ideology. Rather 
the image and culture relationship in Warhol is the way in which images have been 
effective in culture and cultural changes have influenced images. Therefore, we can 
assume culture as part of an image producing mechanism, also culture as an image taking 
its place in other images. How does such a reflective thought effect the temporal motives 
of things? At this point, time becomes a culturally produced issue while language is the 
basis of it. On the other hand, there is the time-image, which is considered in the Deleuzian 
sense of the virtual and the actual and then the thought-image, which also deals with the 
notion of  “difference in kind”. The main aspect of difference in kind is the “presence” 
which is replaced by a  “tendency to develop”.  Deleuze says that “tendency is not 
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primarily related to object, but it is in relation to the causes of these products in time.” 57 
Separating itself from an anchorage both on the side of the object and subject, tendency is 
the difference in kind which occurs as the interval. In his critique of difference in degree, 
Deleuze’s argument is similar to Bergsonian theories since both of them objects to the 
privilege of perception considering it is a determination.  Determinate being is 
comprehended as the outcome of resemblances that is replaced by difference in the 
conception of difference in kind. Deleuze suggests in Bergsonism, difference in kind is not 
between two tendencies since ‘tendency’ is an aspect of the virtual as the only condition 
for different/ciation to function as a process of actualisation. The time-image is the virtual 
image but it is also the “direct representation of time” as Rodowick argues referring to 
Deleuze’s Cinema2 : The time-image. Warhol’s films may be an example of an 
achievement of this directness because there is no need for another agency to interrupt a 
sense of continuity or discontinuity other than what the image represents.  
 
 
 
Duration and Rhythm   
 
Duration’s relation to time and a conception of duration do not seem to give a sense 
of belonging, which marks a specification inside the proper bodies of subjects. Rather it is 
that which emerges in affection with the other. Thus the otherness of the other is realised 
and rhythm might be considered as a way of making sense of duration in its actualisation. 
In such an articulation of the rhythm-duration relationship, neither of the rhythms follows 
the other to unite with the other’s duration. Rather there is a third rhythm emerging from 
the communication of two rhythms, belonging to none of the sides. Movement in relation 
to rhythm does not place itself on the side of the real object. There is again a notion of the 
virtual, which considers the relationship between movement and rhythm as a matter of 
affection. In this sense, such relationship becomes independent from a measured time by 
virtue of its difference in kind. It presupposes the existence of rhythm as the foundation of 
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becoming. Rhythm is also that which has virtual characteristics, which does require a 
realisation by the other.  
Paul Douglass says that Bergson is for the “indivisibility of motion” and he sees it 
as the illusion of cinema.58 Bergson’s argument about cinematic image is the criticism of 
this illusion, which is also the illusion in the search for an ideal ‘being’. Movement is also 
idealised by being conceptualised for a teleological end. Bergson establishes a notion of 
facts on tendencies and intuitions behind the real and material facts. In cinema, according 
to Bergson, tendency functions for understanding the framed images which have gaps 
between them. Through tendency the images would be perceived as flowing, continuing 
and changing. Bergson is critical about an analytical approach to cinema because of its 
tendency to line up the images in a “linear past, present and future” as the result of “single 
perception.” (Douglass: 1999, 213) Having accepted the criticism of linearity in Bergson, 
Douglass does not agree with Bergson’s attitude towards cinema for he constitutes the 
cinematic image with reference to gap. In addition to Douglass’s argument about the ‘gap’ 
it might be the ‘interval’ which could replace the notion of gaps. In another way, the notion 
of gap should not be conceived as the absent and lost space, which breaks the reality of the 
image. This is also Bergson himself, who has stated the importance of the interval, which 
is seen Deleuze’s articulation of Bergson’s philosophy. (Olkowski: 1999, 166)   
A conception of interval in a cinematic image functions in both sides: on the side of 
the film apparatus and on the side of the spectator. However, this is not the destruction of 
reality, rather a tolerance given to the difference in kind. It also introduces the possibility 
of trace in Derrida’s attitude towards time. In its ability to vitalise the interval and 
difference, cinema remains a useful example for the conception of duration and the kind of 
encounter between the spectator and the moving image. It is also because of the operation 
of the time-image, which is supportive for the consideration of cinema as having its own 
reality.  
Deleuze does not seem to regard any possible articulation for a clear distinction 
between the real and the unreal. Since the image and thought are not distinct from 
themselves in quantitative methods, the image-thought relation is also considered as the 
thought-image. Such an opening to the third being, which is self-referential, is the way in 
which Deleuze understands the perception and memory relationship. In this sense, there is 
again a different articulation of perception and consciousness. Similarly, Douglass says 
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that Bergson’s conception of the self is in a sense, perfectly reflected in the cinema’s 
floating consciousness and quotes from Bergson’s Creative Evolution who says that  
 
You may say that my body is matter, or that it is an image: the word is of 
  no importance…Itself an image, the body can’t store up images, since it forms  
a part of the images. (quoted in Douglass: 1999, 202)  
 
Deleuze asks a similar question in Cinema 1 concerning his articulation of body and image 
relationship, “how could my brain contain images since it is one image among others?” In 
this sense, images may not be referred to the unreal and considered as non-images. 
However, the differentiation between the image and the non-image is a change between the 
images of a kind. The time-image, is a notion in cinema, no matter how much it relates to 
“direct representation of reality.” Then, it is real as long as the cinematic representation is 
considered to have and create its own reality free from having been signified by and 
signify something outside itself. The time-image achieves it not by being unrelated to 
things outside cinema but letting things develop in their tendency to endure rather than 
being captured by the time of a plot.  
In Warhol’s films, temporal flow introduces a possibility of an emergence of a 
fourth dimension, which is not a part of time-space-action closure. Accordingly, such a 
temporal flow conveys the possibility of affection between the spectator and the spectacle. 
Walter Benjamin has mentioned that cinematic experience enforces alienation and 
distraction.59 However, Warhol’s films go beyond a conception of a cinematic experience, 
which constitutes itself by being distant to the spectator by telling us the story of the 
others. Benjamin’s concern about alienation and distraction is focused on the consideration 
that film is an outcome of a “mechanical reproduction”. On the contrary, Warhol’s films 
stand out by being on the border of fiction and non-fiction. These films do not agree with a 
narrative aspect of cinematic representation. An opening of a conception of temporality to 
the unconscious introduces a different understanding of film. The emphasis on duration 
rather than spatial relationships allows the spectator to experience these films as part of 
one’s duration rather than creating an experience indifferent to the subjective time. In Eat 
(1963), the action of eating the mushroom is motivated by the passage of time rather than 
trying to make sense of eating as a dialectical action. An emphasis on the process of eating 
becomes more important than means and ends of eating. What operates here is temporal 
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flow free from being an object for the other. Rather it can only be actualised as long as the 
otherness of the other is considered. That is why patience is needed, since the other is not 
just a position but it is in affection with temporality of different substances. In this sense, 
none of the parts can be said to take the other’s place and be the other’s point of reference, 
where duration is left uncited. In such an articulation of the encounter with the other, there 
is not a means of a central mechanism and the concern for an activity or passivity of the 
mediums. 
             
             Rhythms of Encounter  
  
 Warhol and Nauman’s approaches to temporality are close to each other. Both of 
them oppose the cinematic narration in their works, and there is a tendency to present 
rather than represent in their use of slow motion. What differentiates them is that their 
works refer to different media; Warhol’s to film, Nauman’s to video and installations. Both 
of them use the material of film as the limit as the characteristics of their works. These 
works also give different sense of temporalities. In a way, duration contributes these films 
as the subject of the films. Warhol and Nauman make films in a similar way but the works 
invoke different kind of participation because of the different spatial formations. The fact 
that Nauman uses camera but he is not concerned with making film and Warhol’s films are 
not considered as video installation brings the conception of different temporalities. 
 In ‘The Time of the King’ Derrida is critical about a material conception of time,  
which is conceived as a thing. Impossible as a thing, time can neither be given nor taken. 
The first lines of ‘The time of the king’ where Madame de Maintenon says “The King 
takes all my time; I give the rest to Saint-Cyr, to whom I would like to give all” 
demonstrates a state  of giving and taking about which Derrida is critical. In this sense, 
Derrida states that the implication of taking and giving indicates that Madame de 
Maintenon is talking about a time that belongs to her and Derrida asks “how can a time 
belong?”. Such a thing is not possible, because contrary to the matter of giving and taking, 
time is not a thing, then it does not belong and not be given and taken. Derrida’s notion of 
time is similar to the problematic of the gift and the economy of giving and taking. Both 
time and the gift “give nothing to see” which declares the impossibility of any sense of 
visibility of time.  Derrida seems to indicate that time is invisible because it is not a being 
in itself. Then, such an articulation brings the emergence of time in its non-being, when 
time emerges in its forgottenness as a gift. “Forgetting and gift would therefore be each in 
the condition of the other.” (Derrida: 1992, 18) To “give time”, Derrida says  “something 
other than time but something other than that is measured by time as by its element.” 
(Derrida: 1992, 29) “The time of the king” then can be said to constitute a time that is not 
possible of a self-sufficient temporality that belongs to time itself.  
 Accordingly, it does not seem possible to give an articulation of time as a being. 
Then it is also not possible to get a sense of comprehension of time itself. When Derrida 
says that time is not a thing, he means time is not an object but is objectified. It does not 
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exist as a being, while it can be seen as the trace of things and becoming. However, the 
relationship between time and things appears as a matter of economy of time, which is 
reduced to exchange matter. On the other hand, this relation is not exterior to time as that 
which declares space as a condition for space. The time-image rejects  existing as a 
condition of narrative space, which Deleuze calls such image “direct-representation of 
time”. Becoming is regarded as existing in time and is the mode of things unfolding in 
time, in a flow of duration without space interrupting time as if the space is an external 
reality.  
  In Warhol’s early films and Nauman’s video performances it can be said that there 
is an attempt to allow time to become and things unfold in time which are not marked by a 
sense of teleology. Despite the control of time through the apparatus and space, both of the 
artists have introduced the moving image operating in a non-narrative sequence. In this 
sense, the unified structure of a narrative is broken, since a unity of time, space and action 
is broken. There are not fictional characters represented in the ideal space and time, rather 
the films represent what the things are outside the frame of the camera. The events can be 
said to be left in their becoming.  
In Playing a Note on the Violin While I Walk Around the Studio, a video 
performance of 1968, the duration of the film is not predetermined according to a plot. In 
this sense there are a lot of things contributing to duration. The duration of the film is 
determined as the outcome of multiple continuities. The choice of the violin as an 
instrument, the act of playing that instrument, which Nauman does not know how to play 
before the performance is recorded, spatial aspects of the gallery, sound and the duration of 
the film stock are the factors that determine the duration of the film. The film ends when 
Nauman can no longer play the violin, while he does not play out of a notation or a specific 
song and he has not exercised with this instrument before.60 Coosje Van Bruggen quotes 
from an interview with Nauman and says that his original intention   
 
was to play two notes very close together so that you could hear the beats  
in the harmonics…The camera was set up near the centre of the studio facing one wall,  
but I walked all around the studio, so often there was no one in the picture, just the studio 
wall and the sound of the footsteps and the violin.(Bruggen: 1988, 230)  
 
Bruggen brings this sense of appearing and disappearing close to what Cage refers to the 
impossibility of empty space and time in which there is always something to see.(Bruggen: 
1988, 230) In this sight is not limited to the existence of the object remaining in the 
spectator’s point of view. What Cage suggests by means of seeing seems to constitute a 
temporal and spatial field within which the things and actions do not have to be manifest 
by means of their visibility. Bruggen states that Nauman’s video performance are the 
breaking of “the involvement of the spectator with the performance”, but he seems to bind 
the relation and the encounter with the event only to the capacity of sense. If there is a kind 
of break mentioned in this encounter, it can be related to the break with the sensory motor 
links. Deleuze states that the time-image is a break with the sensory motor links. Such a 
break may bring a temporal shift from an anticipation of a presence of a motion in the film, 
to spectator leaving himself to the flow of duration.  
In another work, Bouncing Two Balls Between the Floor and Ceiling with 
Changing Rhythms Nauman tries to get a rhythm going with the balls, bouncing one off the 
floor and ceiling and then catching it, or bouncing it twice off the floor and once off the 
ceiling.(Bruggen: 1988, 230)  In an interview with Nauman with Willoughby Sharp, which 
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Bruggen quotes in his book, Nauman says that in the Bouncing Two Balls Between the 
Floor and Ceiling with Changing Rhythms:  
  
Finally I lost the track of both…I was trying to keep the rhythm going to have the balls 
bounce on the floor and once on the ceiling then catch them… There was a rhythm going  
on and when I lost it that ended the film.  
 
According to Bruggen, Nauman allows the chance effect to develop the action once he has 
invented certain rules, letting “ chance to come along to change those rules, and when it 
does he allows the unexpected to take over.” (Bruggen: 1988, 231)  Clown Torture (1987) 
has a similar effect in its relation to the filmic object, for the tape stops when the clown, - 
this time the performer is not Nauman - falls. In these works, it does not look as if Nauman 
is controlling the action by means of determination of a beginning or ending but he allows 
action to develop in time. 
Slo-Mo films consists of four silent films, taken with 16 mm. camera, able to take 
from a thousand up to four thousand frames per second. The duration of the film is based 
on the duration of the film reel, which is about ten minutes.(Bruggen: 1988, 233)  One of 
these films is Bouncing Balls where Nauman’s films his testicles in close up and slow 
motion. In Black Balls he puts black make-up on his testicles. In Pulling Mouth (1969) and 
Gauze (1969) he starts out with about five or six yards of gauze in his mouth which he then 
pulls out and let fall on the floor. (Bruggen: 1988, 233)  Bruggen mentions that in 
Bouncing Balls and Black Balls the images move so slowly that they become static images. 
Although there is a movement, the image is between moving and non-moving.  
A sense of pause in the film interrupts a conception of the movement-image. The 
Slo-Mo films are not similar to the narrative films that have a story to tell enclosed in 
fictional space, time and action. What do these films try to say if not meaning anything 
about a story?  They do not evoke a suspension of belief or disbelief and they are not 
documentaries that aim to keep the record of performances. One of the intentions might be 
to manipulate the action by the camera through forcing the limits of action until the images 
look like as if they are not moving.  
In Rhythm: on the work, translation and psychoanalysis Nicolas Abraham gives a 
phenomenological account of rhythm. He argues that rhythm is a matter of realisation on 
the side of the subject. “Rhythmizing consciousness” perceives the rhythm and constitutes 
a “rhythm object”. Therefore, rhythm is takes its place by being present as the object of 
perception. Abraham says that “ the perception of a rhythm object is in a sense, possession, 
but to possess also means to be possessed by that object and there is an emergence of an 
“intentional pole.”61 The notion of an “intentional pole” is that which has the danger of 
limiting a conception of rhythm by making it exist in a state of consciousness. However, 
such conception of rhythm neglects the unconscious. How does rhythm operate without 
being situated in the locales of mind?   
 Deleuze regards rhythm as having a sense of duration. Given that  duration is 
virtual, then rhythm would be that which is not actualised but not unreal, it can only be that 
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which has not been considered as thing, as an aspect of duration. In Bergsonism Deleuze’s 
conception of duration as virtual takes duration away from a necessity of consciousness. 
(Deleuze: 1988, 64)  Rhythm is possible to be considered as that which neither has to be 
distinguishable and possessed by beings nor is itself a being: through constituting a 
continuity which does not have to be embodied in things. Rhythm has a nomadic 
characteristic while space and the objects of rhythm are the tools for recurrence of rhythm.  
Freud’s articulation of the fort/da game may be conceptualised as that which gives 
an aspect of rhythmizing-consciousness that causes an emergence of rhythm-object. 
Freud’s statement about the game of fort/da is based on the location of the object, and the 
tension raising aspect of the object’s having gone and being “there.” Isn’t it also the way 
Freud seems to conceive rhythm as such, a kind of oscillation that comes to the same place, 
which evokes the same sense of loss and each time articulates a sense of the recurrence of 
the same. In this sense, Freud sees the repeating object as that which evokes an anxiety in 
its loss which is based on the pleasure/unpleasure principle together with the constitution 
of a sense of “compulsion to repeat.” The problem does not seem to be in the act of 
repetition but in the ways repetition is taken as a motive for habit formation. Concerning 
this Dorothe Olkowski writes:  
 
To fall into the trap laid by habits is to find ourselves in an endless repetition in which  
each new situation forgoes its novelty and is merely repeated on the model of a previous  
habit. (Olkowski: 1999, 151)  
 
In this sense, Olkowski gives an account of repetition which is a synthesis of passive and 
active synthesis; her account of the passive and active seems to differ from Freud since he 
takes these issues as the succession of consciousness over the memories left and actions 
repressed in the unconscious. Unlike Freud, Olkowski writes that Deleuze’s argument of 
passive and active synthesis as the true object of the repetition of the game would be to 
raise the passive synthesis to a qualification of the mind.(Olkowski: 1999, 152) Olkowski, 
referring to Deleuze states that the concern is not an end to repetition but a notion of 
repetition that has to continue to repeat rather than stopping the repetition, which situates 
repetition before the law. Thus, Olkowski states that Deleuze rejects a notion of repetition 
that is understood as that which has a relation to the notion of repression and a teleological 
formation. Rather, Deleuze’s notion of pleasure and unpleasure is not based on a principle 
but the operation of the relation of the virtual memory to duration that is not concerned 
with the real as object or the object as real.  
Changing of time and the continuation of flow of duration does not let things come 
to the same place, the sameness of which is  property of space. In Nauman’s work 
Bouncing Two Balls Between the Floor and Ceiling with Changing Rhythms, the changing 
rhythm Nauman says, causes the “loss of track”, but there was not a track in the beginning. 
The balls, which lose the track and go to different directions, destroy a certain repetitive 
action. Then it becomes difficult to hold a rhythm. In this sense, does the movement of the 
balls cause destruction of a constant rhythm, or does it something else that destroys the 
rhythm?  
If the sequence of rhythm hangs on to a conception of external element such as 
self-consciousness, the issue of rhythm gains a teleological aspect. In a teleological 
conception of the rhythm, the means of oscillation is expected to stop. In this sense, rhythm 
is taken for granted as a step to a sense of unity and a stable being. In ‘Freud and the scene 
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of writing’ Derrida states that Freud understands fort/da game as an external teleology. In 
this Derrida says Freud is not concerned with the means of the game, but the result of the 
game. As a consequence Freud reaches a synthesis separating the physical and the 
psychical. Psychical emerges out of the physical. The game is not described within itself, 
but as if it were a symbol, which represents a psychic realm.   
 Freud’s account of pleasure principle is based on the loss of the object and the 
absence that creates anxiety, which eases when the object comes to “its place.” On the 
other hand, the virtual characteristic of rhythm does not give a chance to consider rhythm 
inside an object as if it was an object of perception. In its reality, which is the virtual but 
not an object, consciousness of rhythm in the embodied sides of communication is an 
illusion of presence.  
Nauman generally choses to display his films in loops. In this sense, the repetitive 
display of the films do not allow the spectator to get a sense of beginning and ending or 
ending which marks an experience of watching. In addition to this, the film does not 
remain unchanged since it contributes to the flow of duration. Although in some of the 
films or video performances of Nauman, there are not unified meaning and action, the loop 
provides a sense of continuity, which also does not propose an end. The spectator may see 
the film when the previous film has not finished and the following has not started. In this 
sense, it becomes impossible to get a notion of duration specific to the film time. Rather it 
depends on spectator’s duration as long as he or she stays and watches the film.  
Referring to Warhol’s films, Nauman says that since they have no “beginning or 
end, you can walk in any time, leave and come back again and the figure was a still asleep. 
You don’t have to make a story.” (Walker Art Centre: 1994, 45)  In the repetitive 
characteristics of the image in a continuous shot in such films like Empire (1965), it does 
not seem possible to talk about a sudden impact or shock effect. Rather the experience of 
watching a film seems most likely to turn into an act of performance where the spectator 
participates in the rhythm of a film. It is not a matter of considering Empire (1965) as a 
“movie” experience since the duration of the Empire (1965) exceeds the duration of a 
normal feature film. In this sense, these films may be considered to introduce a different 
kind of encounter and film experience on the side of the spectator. In its destruction of the 
characteristics of a feature film, which has a linear narrative structure, these films might 
not give a sense of a beginning, climax and a resolution. In the movement-image, the 
spectator has to focus his or her attention in the film not to miss a scene in the story. 
Therefore, the film constitutes a pacifying and limiting effect on the spectator. In Warhol’s 
films, the characteristics of duration change. The spectator is no longer the passive one 
responsible for paying all his attention to the film. For example, Empire (1965) is not a 
film for sitting and understanding the scenes. Its participation to the overall duration is not 
a matter of attention one should keep throughout the film. These films also change the 
temporal mode of the film experience; one does not have to remember the previous scenes 
and get a synthesis through the development of the film. There is nothing to conclude 
about the film.  
 The psychic aspect of rhythm is not the cause of the physical. The physical is also 
not something that could help explain the psychical. Rather, rhythm is the activation of the 
psychical in the physical without considering the disappearance of the psychical. Such a 
notion of being both addresses to the impossibility of being and conveys ‘becoming’ for 
the sake of creation and progression of duration. Nothing is identified or indicated by the 
other, rather the relationship with the self and the other is the relation to what is not. It is 
not a notion of reproduction, representation but a differentiation. This is the point where 
the cinematic image becomes one of the kinds of other images. It also addresses to the 
economy of the virtual and the actual. As mentioned before, the virtual is not the lesser 
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sense of the actual, rather the virtual can be said to be constituted in having been 
different/ciated from the actual, which Deleuze regards as difference in kind. In this sense, 
the degree of reality is not something to be compared with its “original.”  
In Bergsonism, Deleuze addresses the importance of the question. The problematic 
of the question is more important than the answer. Therefore, Deleuze says that the 
problem always gets solution it deserves in terms of the way in which it is stated. (Deleuze: 
1988, 16)  The problematic of solution lies in the way in which the problem is stated. He 
mentions the danger of false problematisation. An important type of the false problem is 
that “the more is mistaken for the less” where “negation is not added to what it denies but 
also indicates a weakness in the person who denies.” (Deleuze: 1988, 19) Such an 
approach does not follow the condition of consciousness and perception since perception is 
not only connected to what something is, but also what is not. Such an articulation of 
problematisation does not indicate a direction from the questioner and the questioned. 
Rejection of such hierarchies between the subject of question and the object of question, 
becomes the matter of “how” rather than “who”. Deleuze is concerned with the emergence 
of false problematisation. Deleuze is critical of the question, which causes the emergence 
of the knowing subject and self-consciousness. Similarly, Derrida has been critical about 
the ways in which problems are taken and questions are asked. It looks as if the 
problematisation of being begins by means of the questions asked which are indicative of 
the knowing subject. Derrida also states the question of “who” as erroneous for it might 
centralise the subject. In ‘Eating Well’ Derrida is critical of the liquidation of the knowing 
subject and the notion of self-consciousness. The notion of liquidation of the subject deals 
with the idea of decentring. He is critical of Lacan, Freud, Foucault and Heiddeger who 
problematised liquidation as if it were “from the position of the law” since such an 
approach causes the “re-interpretation” of the subject.62  This is also the problematic of 
language, which designates law and situates the subjective formation in the domain of 
language. The question of “who” is relevant as long as it leads to another “who” which 
stands in relation to the untranslatable, and that which goes beyond language. It has no 
relation to law. Derrida deconstructs the question itself, the who and the subject through 
the “transcendental idealism” where the question does not have a relation with what 
Derrida calls “egological subjectivity.” A considering of the alter-ego in the ego releases 
the question from being subject centred. “The ego is marked, without being able to have 
the originary and presentative experience of it, by the non-ego and the alter ego.” (Derrida: 
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1981, 256) Therefore, ‘Eating Well’ is a criticism of the ways in which the subject is 
constituted in the emergence of the ego out of nothing, having no trace and difference in its 
relation to itself and to the others. Rather, what Derrida suggests is the subject with its 
object. It is also an articulation of trace and difference concerning perception and it goes 
beyond a dialectical conception of sending and reception. Derrida states that:  
 
The aim is not to reconstruct a discourse around a subject that would no longer be  
pre-deconstructive, around a subject that would no longer include the figure of 
mastery 
  of self, of adequation to self, center and origin of the world, but which would define 
  the subject rather as the finite experience of non-identity to self, as the underivable  
interpellation in as much as it comes from the other, from the trace of the other,  
which is being before the law. (Derrida: 1981, 266)  
 
Thus, a singular becomes that which is divided into multiplicities in 
itself. Derrida explains  “the singularity of the who”, which is not “ 
identity” but “a singularity that dislocates and divides itself in 
gathering itself together to an answer to the other.” (Derrida: 1981, 
266)  
The relation of the “question” with time is a significant issue of the relation 
between duration and memory. Memory has to be decentralised in the operation of time, 
which means the rejection of the consideration of memory’s place as the unconscious. This 
is where Derrida and Deleuze-Bergson are critical about psychoanalysis, which Freud has 
built his psychoanalytic theories on the conception of “reserves and stockings”63 and he 
gives an articulation of specific places to id, ego and superego. Rhythm, while differing 
from itself, and having a temporal characteristic does not refer to the innovation of 
something in its repetitive aspect. Rhythm is not that which is reducible to the reproduction 
of an original rhythm before itself. Rather, rhythm declares its place as uncited and 
unspecified.  
Among these arguments about space and time, Derrida brings the notion of trace. 
Trace is not determined according to spatial reserve, and it does not refer to conscious state 
and perception to occur. What Derrida rejects is the perceptive mechanism of conscious 
and consciousness itself as the manifestation of being. Then, trace becomes the major 
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factor in the constitution of temporality, while it does not refer to or produce time as a 
matter of consciousness.  
 There is a way in which time and space relationship may not be considered 
according to binary oppositions. Space becomes that which does not have a tyranny over 
time and cannot be thought as isolated and totally separated from the temporal.  
Nevertheless, there is a possibility for images to be saved from the spatial ties, which are 
representation bound. Then, such a conception would allow for an ongoing creation, an 
origin or an ending of which is not the issue, but their development and flux in temporal 
flux. Deleuze states that perception is things minus, then it is not something added to 
beings while a sense of rhythmising consciousness seems like an external effect added on 
to the rhythm. Then, why one would need an articulation of perception as if perception is 
coming out of nothing but consciousness?  
Deleuzian articulation of time and moving image does not only seem to be an 
articulation of an image but has a reference to the experience in some specific places like 
galleries, cinema, which addresses to the architectonics of experience.  
Through their concerns with duration, or references to duration, Nauman’s and 
Warhol’s works address the operation of time as time. Time is not an element of fictional 
space. This is also not the only way to get a sense of the moving image. Rather, different 
substances can have different characteristics of duration, and contribute to temporality 
without being demonstrated by the temporality of fiction. Rather, the contribution of body 
or bodies (living or non-living) to the action creates an open field for time to develop 
through the interaction of the elements in space. It is important to note that neither these 
elements are marked by space nor they are marked without it since space is not void, but 
something that gives a sense of duration.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
    WITH ME  
 
A woman is lying on a bed. Her double is stretched out next to her and she 
slowly turns to caress it, to kiss and lick it before the two cuddle up to                 
each other and the scene darkens…               
Isabella Reicher 64 
 
With Me is a film by Austrian artist Kerstin Cmelka. In the International Short 
Film Festival in İstanbul (2002) Cmelka held a workshop on experimental short films. 
There she showed her 16 mm. films. Smoke and drink tea (1998), Johannes (1998), 
Neurodermitis (1998), Portrait (1999), Monolog (1999), With Me (2000), I am also in 
Arcadia (2000) and Camera (2000).  
 Her films are distinctive in the sense that they do not follow a linear plot and they 
are shot from a single angle, like Warhol’s, without moving the camera or making pans 
and close ups. In this sense, it can be said that she does not allow the camera to be a 
“wandering eye” travelling from one space to another. The films also do not have a 
beginning or ending. She says that these films could give a different understanding of 
picture and may even be called moving pictures rather than film. There is not a movement 
from one picture plane to another. It might be said there is a temporal movement that 
breaks an understanding of a single space. In some of her films  - Et In Arcadia Ego 
(2000), With Me (2000) - she shoots twice on the same film stock. This attitude changes 
the characteristics of space, which gives space a temporal dimension. She does not move 
the camera in the second take on the same film stock. What seems to appear in these films 
is the division of space into different temporalities, which are displayed at the same time. 
In addition to this, she is the one who performs in these films. Because of the double 
exposure on the same film stock in With Me, it appears that two women are copulating 
with eachother. Cmelka has performed one woman lying in her bed making love in one of 
the takes and the other woman as if she is the partner of this woman making love in the 
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same bed in the other take. The scene of copulation is between two women whose 
appearance is the same. The film is titled With Me.         
Why is the subject who is identified and indicated “me”?  Could it have been 
someone else or “us”? If there is the person who is copulating with her double, is it “me” 
who is making love with me? There are two women, the appearance of whom is same as 
the other.  In this sense, it may be said that there appears to be a homosexual relationship 
between these two women. However, this scene is not even performed between two 
women. This is an outcome of one woman being in different positions at different times, 
and displayed as if it is one scene which is taken at the same time. The film does not follow 
a linear narrative. In this sense, unlike conventional feature films which most of the film 
theory is concerned with, With Me introduces a different notion of “identification”. In 
relation to With Me, the Lacanian “mirror image” which is regarded as resulting in the 
emergence of the “specular” subject can be rethought in relation to narcissism and the 
relationship with the other. In addition to this, we can talk about a homosexual relationship 
between these two women. However, it is ambiguous and more close to give a sense of 
autoeroticism since we can also identify this as two of the same women. With Me is an 
introduction of subject that passes beyond the conception of ego, and object that passes 
through the emergence of a subject in itself. Out of the double exposure, the second scene 
made on the second film is seen as less clear than the first exposure. Thus, one of the 
bodies appears translucent and ghost-like. In this sense, there emerges two representations 
of the same person one of which can be seen more clearly than the other can. The scene of 
copulation with a translucent being gives a sense of dream-state.  
Lacan’s conception of mirror phase is based on vision and recognition of the self on 
the condition that one sees oneself in the mirror. However, With Me goes beyond being a 
matter of seeing or not seeing that operates as the formation of the self.  There is also not 
indication of an anchorage of vision in the domain of the other. It is not a constitution of an 
identity, which is dealing with a matter of doubling of the image as conceived in the mirror 
stage. Lacan articulates the realisation of “I” in the mirror as an illusion of a desire to 
incorporate the other. On the other hand, With Me is not concerned with a sense of 
recognition since it is not clear who recognises who or what is recognised. What is 
recognition? Is it a work of cogito functioning for the realisation of what once has been 
perceived? In another way, is it a reproduction of mind that replaces reality with unreality?  
In With Me the difficulty of situating the subject leads to decontruction of the 
positions of the subject and the object. Out of it emerges the phantasmatic object. In this 
sense, I will argue that fantasy can be seen as the succession of becoming over being. The 
conception of desire is considered as a matter of fantasy that shifts from its location in the 
domain of the other and is no longer concerned with a causal relationship with drive. In 
this sense there is a problematic of identification concerning multiple kinds of 
identification such as:  
  -The spectator’s identification with the filmic apparatus. Movement of the camera 
indicates a destination towards the object and displays what it selects to frame. This is a 
way in which the spectator takes the position of the authority relevant to the theory of gaze.  
 -The spectator’s identification with the screen as the outcome of identification with 
the other, and screen conceived as the other.  
-Spectator’s identification with the characters in the film, where identification is 
with the character traits. Accordingly there is a depiction of two women, character(s) in a 
narcissistic relationship between woman and a woman, which lays a questionable relation 
with the other in With Me.  
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Topographies of Desire 
 
Laplanche gives an account of narcissism that is inseparable from a concept of 
identification. Laplanche introduces a Kleinian conception of the “projective 
identification” that is with the traits of the other, rather than the position of the other. He is 
critical about Freud’s conception of narcissism, which is built upon the notion of ego and 
regarded as the property of the subject. Freud’s conception of narcissism is criticised also 
for its being based on the notion of lack. There is a demonstration of the loss of the object 
of desire disavowed by the objects of substitution in Freud. In ‘The Ego and Narcissism’65 
Laplanche argues that ego is able to pass through the subject and object. Laplanche’s 
conception of ego is not built upon the subject as a desiring body. Freud has announced 
ego not as a total subject, since he has separated desire and drive according to different 
states of being such as the unconscious and consciousness. On the other hand Laplanche 
announces ego as “neither the subject of perception and consciousness, nor the subject of 
wishing and desire.” It is regarded as “an internal object cathected by the energy of the 
apparatus.” This internal object says Laplanche “is capable of action entering into conflicts 
as a participant by virtue of its double function”. In this sense in the articulation of ego not 
as a subject Laplanche states that: 
 
   No sooner have we presented the thesis that the ego is not a subject than we have  
to withdraw it: the ego is indeed an object, but a kind of relay object capable of passing  
itself off, in a more or less deceptive and usurpatory  manner, as a desiring and  
wishing subject. (Laplanche: 1976, 66) 
 
Laplanche’s notions of subject and object are of that which is able to pass through a 
distanced and spatialised notion of subject and object. Derrida’s notion of trace and 
différance as well as the Deleuzian virtual also constitute beings that are able to pass 
through the notion of subject and object. Deleuze and Derrida argue similarly in the sense 
that they consider the self as that which is constituted in a continuous differentiation. Such 
a notion of differentiation is not conditioned on a notion of the other separated in the other 
place and distanced from the subject. Rather, Deleuze considers separation in a continuous 
division, which is not based on a notion of lack. The notion of split in psychoanalysis is 
concerned with the ‘idea’ of  loss of a sense of unity, which is ‘there’ in the beginning and 
is lost. On the other hand, in a continuous division, there is not a concern of original whole 
that loses its unity. In psychoanalysis the loss of the wholeness is disavowed by a choice of 
an object that would take the place of this loss. On the other hand, Derrida does not regard 
this split as that which has a beginning in that which is not split. In this sense in 
psychoanalysis a ‘split’ is dependent on a sense of loss of a part of a body and the 
replacement of this loss by another object that is fetishised. Such a notion of replacement is 
an act of differentiation, which divides between the real and the unreal. Alan Bass argues 
that the “primary split” in psychoanalysis is caused by a sense of “concreteness in 
general”. (Bass: 2000, 32) He states that the split in psychoanalysis both concerns the split 
between perception and memory and the split that causes the emergence of sexual 
difference. On the other hand, there is always a defence against this differentiation. In the 
former, this occurs as “the elimination between perception and memory through negative 
hallucination”, in the latter there is an emergence of a fetish object that “eliminates sexual 
difference through fantasy of phallic monism.” (Bass: 2000, 32) Defence against the 
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unconscious memories brings the theory of repression that keeps psyche away from the 
‘unpleasant’ memories of childhood. There is always a tension raising mechanism of the 
unconscious and the function of perception in the conscious. Bass regards this situation 
also as an operation of temporality between the unconscious and the conscious, which 
indicates “process” as an essential character. “In the last discussion of disavowal, Freud 
began to discuss ‘the splitting of the ego in a process of defence’”  
 
As a defence, concreteness makes it clear that there is no such possible relief 
from the tension of differentiation. Every new moment renews the threat for the  
simple reason that time itself implies possible change.  Thus, the fetishist for  
and the concrete patient in general lead one to think about the process of defence 
 directed against what can be called the processive aspect of reality. (Bass: 2000, 34) 
 
The temporal relation between the tension raising mechanism of the unconscious and 
defensive part of conscious emerges in an immediacy of perception, which replaces 
memories. It can be said that the immediate and the sense of replacement functions not 
only for the fetishisation of sexuality but also regards time as the fetish object of 
perception since time is made a concrete object of perception. The psychic differentiation 
sorted out by psychoanalysis results in the spatialisation of sexual difference in the objects 
and in the topographies of psyche. Accordingly, the relation with the other is asserted as 
that which fulfils a sense of loss, which is not there in the beginning. The originary split is 
not regarded as a split that splits and differentiates in itself. Rather there is a ‘before’ of a 
split that is ‘constituted’ and imagined as the complete being.  
 Contrary to a conception of an originary being complete from the beginning, 
Derrida and Deleuze are against a beginning that is external to split. In this sense, there is 
nothing to replace that would take the place of the ‘lost part’. In addition to this, the subject 
and object are not constituted as the separate objects located in different places. Melanie 
Klein’s psychoanalytic theories which have the traits of “self destruction” that lies at the 
base of the ego formation gives a sense of this continuous differentiation in the subject. 
Such conceptions of ego, self and subject do not require a formation of subject that is 
destined to have an identity. Identity is a matter of recognition but there is also nothing to 
be recognised in this process of self-division. In Alan Bass’ reading of Klein, there is a 
closeness to deconstructionist theories of subject. One of the reasons for that is the 
conception of a self-destructive subject in the sense that Klein seems to suggest a 
different/ciation or “différance” in the subjective formation while considering destruction 
as “one’s own sadism.”  
The sense of self-destruction seems to turn into deconstruction in Derrida’s and 
Deleuze’s accounts, which is based on a motivation of a temporal change rather than a 
spatial substantiality. Klein’s conception of the relation of the partial object to the whole 
object gives a sense of a temporal passage in Alan Bass’ account of Kleinian self-
destruction. He states that in Klein, “the move from part to whole object is the move from 
fantasy to reality”. (Bass: 2000, 174) In this sense, the difference of fantasy from reality is 
a matter of temporal differentiation since the differentiation between the part and the whole 
object is not a spatial one. Rather there is a temporal move passing from a part object into 
whole object.  
Derrida opposes Freud’s psychoanalytic conception of psyche as considered within 
the terms of the real and the unreal. Similarly, Deleuze’s conception of the virtual and the 
actual denies a conception of reality as an element that causes such differentiation. In this 
sense, these concepts are non-localisable and introduce a psychic realm, which is mobile 
and fuses with the physical. In this sense, these terms are neither matters nor forms of 
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being but fluid mechanisms that both have the aspect of the virtual and the actual. 
Considering that they gain mobile characteristics, which activates the temporal field as 
well as the spatial, there is an impossibility of things emerging in a fixed notion of 
presence.  
Derrida says “desire is the desire for presence.” It is not because he rejects desire, 
but he is critical of the way desire is seen as the outcome of a loss. Derrida is critical about 
the articulation of desire in a causal relationship with drive. Laplanche explains desire as a 
correlation of drive-source relationship. In this sense, both Derrida and Laplanche have a 
similar attitude and they do not regard one of them as the cause of the other.  
In ‘The Order of Life’, Laplanche states that Freud has two types of drives in mind, 
which sexuality is related to one of them as the biological drive. Instinct as “the pair of 
drive” is the “performed behavioural pattern, it is determined hereditarily and is repeated 
according to modalities relatively adapted to a certain kind of object.” (Laplanche: 1976, 
10) Such an obsession with drive is depended on a specific model that emphasises the 
significance of essence in everything. Freud sees the essence of drives in their “ability to 
exercise pressure.” The emergence of conscious acts as behaviours is regarded as the 
outcome of the repression of the unconscious drives. Drive is defined as the “amount of the 
measure of the demand.” (Laplanche: 1976, 10) In this sense, Freud privileges quantities 
over qualities in considering the relationship between drive and desire. According to 
Laplanche, it is ambiguous whether the source and drives are also the source of desires. In 
this sense, it is unclear whether biological being or psychological being is the impetus for 
drives. Thus, the contrary would introduce cyclical relationship between drive and desire, 
which denies a teleological aim. Laplanche asks why is something specific in itself, and 
represents a final aim? The detachment from a sense of teleology introduces a difference 
that is based on a temporal flow which is unmarked by a beginning or end. The separation 
of physical and the psychical is concerned with the lack of the real thing in the psychical 
and leads to substitution of this lack through the physical. The mother’s breast is taken in 
this way both on the level of symbolic and the real which are directed to different aims that 
will be explained in the following passages. 
 
 
With a Little Love From the Phantasmatic  
 
With Me introduces Laplanche’s conception of the other in a relationship with the 
enigma of the other as the phantasmatic object. Laplanche states that the phantasmatic 
object goes beyond the identification with the object of desire as it is understood in a 
Freudian sense. The phantasmatic object is neither an object nor a subject by itself. It is 
between the virtual and the actual. In this sense there is not a clear-cut definition if one 
tries to distinguish the object or the fantasy from each other. On the other hand, fantasy is 
not subordinate to end up in organ pleasure and such a characteristisation carries fantasy 
beyond an anchorage in an object or subject.   
Laplanche is concerned with the “enigmatic signifier” as discussed by John 
Fletcher in the ‘Introduction’ to Essays on Otherness. Fletcher refers to Laplanche’s 
definition of the enigmatic signifier in New Foundations as that which is based on  “the 
possibility that the signifier may be de-signified, or lose what it signifies, without thereby 
losing its power to signify to.” In this sense, Laplanche is critical of Freud’s differentiation 
of fantasy into two scenes of different realities of the unconscious as the “primal” and 
“original” cores of being. In ‘Time and the Other’ Laplanche gives an account of enigma, 
which has a relation to his conception of “enigmatic signifier”. He states that “the enigma 
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leads back to the otherness of the other, and the otherness of the other is his response to 
unconsciousness, that is to say his otherness to himself.”66 
Thus Laplanche argues that Freud sees the other divided between “der Andere” 
which is the other as “the other person”; “das Andere”, the other in the psychic formation 
as “the other thing.” Laplanche’s argument is that Freud regards “the other thing” as the 
unconscious, which is structured upon all kinds of negations. It can be said the relationship 
between  consciousness and unconsciousness introduces a quantitative account of negation 
and a theory of repression of unconscious events by the reality of the consciousness. 
Denying the reality of the unconscious, consciousness also denies a conception of time in 
the unconscious. Consciousness then, is focused on the ‘facts’, which are kept by the 
perceiving subject. On the other hand, according to the conception of the enigma of the 
other as the otherness of the other, there is a temporal formation rather than focalisation on 
the external and the internal objects. The unconscious is seen as “the loss of referentiality”, 
or the de-signification of the signifier. In the unconscious there is also not a ‘fact’ to be 
sorted out as the subject or the object. In addition to this, the relationship with the other is 
not a matter of consciousness. The other as the enigma of the other introduces a loss of 
referentiality, so there is not an implication of the subject and object division in the 
physical ground.  
In With Me the copulation scene, which is performed by a woman whose image is 
doubled, both refers to ‘loss of referentiality’ as well as an introduction of ambiguity by 
means of recognition. There is not a specific signifier to signify something; there is nothing 
to be recognised by the other in the sense that the signifier becomes the signified. Then the 
difference between the two bodies and two images becomes a matter of temporal 
differentiation that also oscillates between the subject and object. Then the relationship 
with the enigma of the other is nothing else but delay, in its act of temporalising the 
possibility of which is not dependent on the “original desire”.  
Freud has been criticised mostly because of that his theories of psychoanalysis are 
based on a theory of repression. The unconsciousness is regarded as that which is the 
storehouse of memories of childhood, which Freud associates with “the scenes” of 
childhood. The childhood scenes are regarded as the bad parts of memory, which should be 
replaced by the operation of perception conscious system. In this sense, as Alan Bass states 
Freud regards time as only operating in the consciousness as the desire for present and 
presentness. Time is regarded as an object that raises the tension of the childhood 
memories in the unconscious and represses them from the conscious.  
There is an aspect of delay which “is replaced by the temporal immediacy of the 
dream-state in consciousness” functioning as “defence against the tension of unconscious 
time”. Alan Bass in Difference and Disavowal describes Freud’s conception of time as 
described in relation to the pleasure principle. As discussed in previous chapters above, 
Freud’s notion of the unconscious sees the unconscious as a mental process, which is 
timeless. Time then is seen as a work of perception-conscious system the condition of 
which is thought. Bass states that this is a conception of time, which Kant also shares with 
Freud, regarding time as “the necessary form of thought.” Bass argues such conception as 
nothing but the “Newtonian time as the objective time of the infinite series of now points 
as well as objective space coordinating with it.” (Bass: 2000, 85) Considering the 
unconscious as timeless and conscious time as the proper time is seen as the  “autoerotic 
decontextualisation of unconscious time.” In this sense, Bass gives an account of Freudian 
time that has become the fetish object, which is constituted upon points as now. This is 
also the way in which time is structured as a thing. The notion of  “now” refers to the 
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plurality of events as scenes while the traumas of childhood are replaced by the 
“immediacy of wish fulfilment.” With Me introduces a contrary example to a Freudian 
conception of the unconscious as timeless. Considered according to the narrative temporal 
structure of With Me, there is no sense of time that is destined to be a part of a whole 
narrative. The film does not begin with a specific event and end with a resolution. On the 
other hand, With Me can be considered as a scene itself, as a cut out from life, but not part 
of a plot. So there is nothing left of anticipation directed towards a future event. On the 
other hand, time is multiplied in that scene, which opens other scenes and other times at the 
same time that do not follow a spatial time in a horizontal line. The copulation scene that is 
the outcome of bringing together of two scenes that are not taken at the same time but 
displayed in another time. This time is neither the object of a specific space of any of these 
two scenes nor it is totally detached from any of these scenes. This time is the emergence 
of an interval that is between the virtual and the actual, between the subject and the object. 
Accordingly the copulation scene is also deprived of any object or subject specified in the 
bodies. The two women appear to be copulating with the appearance of each other, which 
is the image of themselves at the same time. However, this image is not reducible to the 
unreal since it is not possible to indicate an original of the image outside itself. Rather, it 
might be considered as that which oscillates between the reality of a dream state and the 
reality of a physical experience. It is also not possible to consider this scene as an 
autoerotic one. Autoeroticism is regarded as emerging in the primary narcissism as an 
introjective identification with one’s body. The autoerotic object of desire is internalised in 
one’s own body parts but is still regarded as differentiated from the self. On the other hand, 
in With Me the other is not an object in a definite sense as opposed to the self. There are 
not  “sex roles” defined in relation to the other and the other is not objectified as the 
fulfilment of erotic fantasy. Rather the ambiguity of keeping a spatial point and a centre for 
the self leads to the sense of breaking up with a hierarchical distribution of roles in  sexual 
intercourse. Bodies are introduced as if they are fragmented while there is not an origin of 
this fragmentation.  In this sense With Me represents a phantasmatic relation that goes 
beyond a sense of incorporation between two sexes, as well as two bodies differentiated as 
the subject and the object. The impossibility of situating the object and subject eliminates a 
spatial distance between these bodies. It is not possible to have a relation between the other 
or at least the otherness is not determined according to spatial coordination such as “there” 
and “here.” The intercourse in With Me appears in a temporal differentiation rather than a 
differentiation of things in space so the relation with the other is not only the relation with 
the unconscious understood as the affection between temporal and atemporal.  
In With Me there is a delay, which operates in two ways: one of the aspect of delay 
is introduced in the film apparatus that succeeds in providing the viewer with seeing the 
doubling of the bodies. Another aspect of delay detaches the “position” of the copulating 
bodies and interrupts a notion of object and subject but provides a sense of difference as 
well. In this sense delay and differentiation operate as a means of representation of the 
copulation of two bodies as the subject of film. In addition to this, delay functions as that 
which enables the viewer to get these two images at the same time as the outcome of two 
exposures on the same film stock. In this sense, the truth of the ‘same time’ is the ‘truth’ 
lying in the operation of delay.  
Delay introduces translation free from the theory of repression, which does not 
keep a reserve for memory in the unconscious. In this sense, delay becomes that which 
operates as a relationship with the otherness of the other in the self. The film not only 
destroys a sense of autoerotic relationship but any conception of intercourse, which is seen 
as a relationship with the other in ‘me’. The ‘me’ is not a presence in space but is that 
which has been delayed. The relationship between this delayed notion of identity - the 
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recognition of which is not possible - and the other is that of an unrecognised and unstable 
relationship with the enigma of the other. It also prevents a relationship in which the 
subject is motivated through an object of desire, which the other has. Rather it is différance 
that is delayed in itself as the otherness of the other.  
 
Desire and Language  
  
Before any experience, before any individual deduction, even before those 
collective experiences that may be related only to social needs are inscribed 
init,something organises this field, inscribes its initial lines of 
force.(Lacan:1973,20)  
  
Lacan states that the unconscious is structured like a language.(Lacan: 1973, 20)  
He argues that the place of language is before the formation of the subject. Language has a 
structure, which is dependent on the closure of the chain of signification by the articulation 
of the signifier. In this sense Lacan declares that the unconscious in the symbolic law of 
language is an operation of signs and symbols that have taken the place of the real. 
According to him subject is split between the linguistic and the visible. The linguistic and 
the visible are divided between themselves in according to spatial dichotomies such as here 
and there. In her article ‘The subject’67, Kaja Silverman asserts that Lacanian theory of the 
subject is like a classical narrative. As it happens in a classical narrative, subject develops 
in a linear order of time. Subject is formed through the mirror stage, access to language and 
the Oedipus complex.  The last two of these events belong to the symbolic order, and they 
mark the subject’s coming of age within culture. (Silverman:1983, 135) Silverman argues 
that desire is formed in the symbolic level through the “loss of the real” while language 
isolates the subject from the real through the introduction of the symbolic. This is also the 
phase in which the subject gains a sexual identity. Lacanian notion of identity is formed in 
a zone, which is constituted by a neverending loss of the real that is replaced by the 
symbolic signifiers such as phallus signifying penis. After the symbolic, the real father is 
not able to “conform to the epic proportions of the symbolic father.” (Silverman: 1983, 
135) Silverman states that Lacan insists upon the idea that the penis is not the phallus, but 
“the male subject ‘pays’ for his symbolic privileges with a currency not available to the 
female.”  
Silverman’s argument about the Lacanian subject is an account of the formation of 
desire within the realm of the symbolic. The realisation of the subject in the symbolic is 
regarded as an outcome of fiction since the symbolic realm is unreal. On the other hand, 
the conception of the enigma of the other may be understood as the motive for desire rather 
than being under the rubric of the laws in the symbolic. A conception of a relationship with 
the other as the enigma of the other would neither be in the symbolic nor in the real. In this 
sense, desire does not have to be directed to the position of the other. The consideration 
that desire is not bound with the “law” frees desire from being fixed to the object of the 
other. In this sense, there is not an object of desire that belongs to the other. Fantasy could 
be the word that stands out of the order of an object. Both the object and the subject of 
fantasy are introduced in the virtual that is also out of the order of law of language. It is 
that which has not been actualised and has never belonged to a conception of an object. It 
is also not less than real, but differs from the actual reality from its not having been 
objectified.  
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In With Me the copulation scene evokes a sense of fantasy while neither of the 
characters can be attributed a notion of subject or object. However it is difficult to make a 
statement about to which side this fantasy belongs to. Whose fantasy it is? Is what we see 
two women emerging out of one’s division into two or the doubling of the same? The 
consideration of  “double” as the multiplication would refer to a sense of fixation of the 
object on the level of sight, which desires its other as the object. This object is regarded as 
homogenous for the look to fix itself. Rodowick states that in Lyotard’s distinction 
between the figural and the discourse, discourse is usually bound by representation in the 
spatial dynamics constituting it in the domain of language.68 On the contrary, the figural is 
nonlinguistic. Lyotard argues that discourse has its space, which gives its object as image 
also having a sense of space and is introduced in the domain of language. Thus, the figural 
is that which is non-linguistic but it can be found in the linguistic space of discourse. 
Accordingly, Rodowick states, referring to Lyotard, that “discourse is crossed by, and 
crosses between, two spaces or dimensions”, and these dimensions are “subject and the 
system.” (Rodowick: 2001, 9) The figural brings differences to the order of language. 
Rodowick in this sense gives Lyotard’s account of this difference, which makes language 
non-linguistic and that displaces the chain of signification in representation. Then subject 
is constituted away from the realm of language. Lyotard explains the notion of “spacing or 
separation” not as “the two terms placed on the same plane”. It is “rather the relation of 
two heterogenous “states” that are, however, juxtaposed in an irreversible anachrony.” 
When subject is not in the discursive field of representation which is characterised in 
language, the figural subject, which can also be the virtual and heterogenous, gains a 
temporal characteristic. So the relation between the figural and discourse allows the figural 
to unfold towards the discourse without a sequential order that dislocates the figural. The 
kind of doubling in With Me seems to be that of a figural notion similar to Rodowick’s 
articulation of difference between two heterogenous bodies. According to him, desire 
operates in the figural “in its relation to primal fantasy and the unconscious desire.” 
(Rodowick: 2001, 9) Accordingly, there is nothing primary about the primal fantasy.  In 
this sense, the figural is not reduced to a conception of simple difference or indifference in 
its relation to discourse.  
The bodies in With Me could not only be seen as the objects of fantasy of a subject 
indicating the dream of a person. The copulation scene looks as if it is a dream of someone, 
but it is not clear who is dreaming about whom. There is a relationship with the desire of 
the other. However, this desire does not have its cause, which is embodied in someone’s 
body. It floats between the object and the subject that are both embodied in themselves and 
also is revealed outside as the  ‘loss of the referentiality’ in the chain of signification. In 
this sense, there is not a clear indication of the dreaming subject and its dream.  
The sense of doubling of the same body in the film is not constituted as a 
representation of the body that is made identical to an original. Instead two of these bodies 
have been originated from themselves, and differ from and between each other as if they 
represent a coexistence of the virtual and the actual. It is still not defined which one is the 
virtual and which one is the actual. Nevertheless, it seems possible to differentiate these 
two bodies by referring to their opaqueness and translucency. The second exposure on the 
same film stock causes the body to appear translucent while in the first take the body 
appears opaque. In this sense, if we were to consider the translucent body as less real than 
the opaque one, and associate the translucent with the virtual, then we would have to 
accept the cyclical relationship between the virtual and the actual. That is to say, the virtual 
appears not as a simulation of the actual but is as real as the actual body is. There is also 
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not a linear order that would situate one before or after the other. However, such an 
articulation is valid unless we take the time of production as the law of our understanding 
of the work. In this sense, there appears a delay, which both introduces a passage of time 
between these two bodies and enables these two bodies to coexist in one scene.  
It is also an ambiguous question for the spectator whether to consider the scene of 
copulation as really performed or not. Such ambiguity could be resolved by thinking that 
one body performs two different roles at two different times. In this sense, we can talk 
about a performance of these roles in the non-presence of the other. However, what 
appears in the film is neither the absence nor the presence of two bodies at the same time. 
One of the reasons for that is the appearance of the same as doubled which represents a 
scene of copulation. Another reason is the oscillation between the phantasmatic and the 
real since there emerges two bodies. One of the bodies appears more opaque than the other 
while and the other is translucent. In this sense, the doubling of the bodies cause two 
separate identities while it is not possible to consider these two identities as conveying a 
sense of self identity. 
In ‘Gender is Burning’69 Judith Butler argues that, according to Althusser identity 
is based on recognition by the other. She refers to Althusser’s “notion of interpellation” in 
his example of the “socially reconstituted subject.” Butler argues that Althusser’s example 
of the formation of the subject is dependent on the recognition by the other as “the law”. In 
Althusser’s example “there is the policeman, the one who not only represents the law but 
whose address “Hey you!” has the effect of binding the law to the one who is hailed.” 
(Butler: 1998, 448)  Butler addresses the Lacanian formation of the subject under the law, 
which is dependent on the naming of language. “The use of language is obedient to name 
and it is situated within discourse.” (Butler: 1998, 448) The condition of the formation of 
“I” is the production through “the accumulation of calls” by an exterior power. Butler 
argues that the condition of the subject according to Althusser, who follows the Lacanian 
notion of subject formation, “the ‘me’ cannot be an object opposed to me, which is not me, 
but only what others have made of me.” (Butler: 1998, 449) Butler does not argue against a 
formation of subject in the condition of opposition, but she is against an external agency of 
power, which makes the subject realise its subjecthood. Such an operation is based on the 
formation of the subject under the law, and this law is patriarchal law that constitutes the 
subject according to the symbolic law determined by the “phallus.” What is the 
relationship between the phallus and the subject formation? In the Lacanian mirror stage, 
the ego is produced in a fictional direction and this notion of “directionality is arrested and 
immobilised through the emergence of a symbolic order that legitimates sexually 
differentiated fictions as ‘positions.’” (Butler: 1998, 460) Language is significant in the 
notion of the fixation of  “positions” in the sense that it enounces the mirror stage as the 
domain of “signifiable and the intelligible” since the fixation of the – sexed - positions 
depends on the fixity of the symbolic domain itself. The phallus also is the representation 
of keeping the notion of differentiation according to the fixation of the symbolic positions. 
Phallus becomes the agent of signifier, which is subjected to the “Law of the Father” 
introducing the differentiation between the sexes according to “having” and “being.” 
Butler argues against such an articulation of subject formation in Lacan, since the ego is 
constituted in the subject according to the fixation and stabilisation in the symbolic level. 
Language in this sense introduces the subject as long as the subject is realised by the other 
who signifies the sexual and social position of the subject. 
Lacan’s articulation of the subject is constituted on the level of identification with 
the sexual position of the other, which is dictated by the phallus. However, such an 
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argument introduces the subject on the condition of an adoption of a heterosexual matrix. 
In this sense, one is subjected as long as one desires one what “does not have” and the 
other has. Accordingly, this is always the woman who is associated with the one who 
“does not have” since the lack is the lack of what man has. As women do not have an 
access to phallus, they do not have an access to language either. If the subject has to have a 
formation of language to be subjectified, then women are constrained to have the desire for 
language and the phallus which they can never have all through their lives. Hence, they can 
never have ego and self-identity since they are not able to go beyond the symbolic and the 
imaginary, which means they are not able to be real.  
Lacan gives a limited account of the subject in the sense that he binds formation of 
the subject on “the law”, the phallus, the positions as well as dictating the ‘place’ of these 
as the imaginary position of man as phallus. The differentiation of sexual positions is 
localised in the phallus as the signifier.  Instead of all these formulations, the breaking up 
with the heterosexual matrix goes beyond the rules of fixation according to “the law”. Law 
introduces a formal constitution of the subject. Rather a conception of identification free 
from a sexual differentiation, which is dependent on a desire for the “position” of the other, 
introduces other possibilities of identification. In this sense, the desire is not anchored to 
the desire of the other “there” to make it “here”. With Me enables us to get a sense of other 
possible conceptions of the subject other than an identification with and for a single, fixed 
position. Considering that With Me represents a scene of copulation between the same 
sexes, the film destabilises the ground or position for identification to emerge.  
There are various ways in which identification is noticed in film theory. Camera 
movements, shooting techniques, montage, the kind of narrative, sound are some of the 
factors that establish different aspect of identification in motion. However, there is one 
thing which film theory is especially concerned in the conception of identification and that 
is the gaze and its relation to the cinematic apparatus. Film theory deals with the gaze 
which psychoanalysis regards as perverted and sexualised.  
Paul Willemen in ‘Voyeurism, the look, and Dwoskin’70 refers to Laura Mulvey’s 
article ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ which divides “the look” into three parts 
giving three principles of identification. One of them is the “camera’s look that records the 
pro-filmic event”, the other is the look of the audience at the image, and the last one is “the 
look of the character’ exchange with the diegesis.” Willemen says “the look cast by the 
spectator has two types one of which refers to the scopophilic contact with and object of 
desire and the other is viewer’s possession of the object of desire through identifying with 
the ideal ego and this bears a narcissistic identification with the spectacle.” (Willemen: 
1995, 212) Willemen states that generally the kind of identification film theory introduces 
is on the side of the spectator who identifies with the female character as the object of 
desire. The gaze towards the spectacle is considered to evoke scopophilic instincts. This is 
the perverted gaze, which is associated with autoerotic relation with one’s body. In this 
sense, following Mulvey’s account of scopophilia, Willemen argues, this is the notion of 
identification in autoeroticism, which is with the sexually like. The scopophilic gaze in 
cinema is declared in two ways that coexist together. The gaze is both separate from the 
subject and objectifies the subject and also that which belongs to the subject. In this sense 
the scopophilic gaze has internalised its object of desire as it happened in autoeroticism. It 
does not look for the other sexually differentiated from the self. Rather it is separated in a 
single body, which is asserted as a “repression of homosexuality.” This is the condition in 
which patriarchy situates the object of the gaze as female. Then the internalised gaze is 
regarded as that which has the tendency to copulate with one’s self.  Whether gaze is 
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regarded as a patriarchal symbol or not, in With Me there is a homosexual relationship 
between two bodies. If there is a sense of desire, it does not have its object as the female 
other. Accordingly, the female is not in the position in which her desire is the others desire.  
Mulvey’s argument seems to consider identification with the apparatus to be valid 
only when it is formulated according to the discourse within which patriarchy is concerned. 
It is because of the consideration that film apparatus is associated with the active male 
subject as the omnipotent subject and the control mechanism. Camera is an omnipotent 
apparatus, what Christian Metz describes as “the all-seeing” subject.  In this sense, the eye, 
having taken the position of camera is regarded as the active part while the object looked at 
is passive. Therefore the gaze is considered as the male gaze. The ‘truth’ of the male gaze 
is that it is associated with the phallic symbol, which is active and has a passivising effect 
on the female. The male gaze is focused on the female body since it desires the body of the 
other. Such relationship is based on the notion of demand and desire. In this sense, the 
physical needs in the childhood turns into psychic activities when one gets mature. For 
instance, the mother’s breast, which is for nourishment in the infant turns into the object of 
male desire. Nevertheless, this is the way Freud conceives desire and drive. There is a 
causal relationship between need and demand, the drive and the desire. On the other hand, 
there is not a proof of any of the activities to be regarded as the cause of the other. In this 
sense, there is not a hierarchical causal structure between the need for nourishment and the 
desire for the mother’s breast. The need does not turn into a desired object in the future, 
which is away from a teleological aim so that the object of desire could emerge. The gaze 
is associated with corporeal organ, which is sexualised in the other’s body. In film theory it 
is hard to situate whether the look symbolises the act of devouring the object or it is 
perverted. The conception of scopopholia is regarded as perversion. Considering the gaze 
as the evidence of perversion in film theory would be a too general articulation of the gaze, 
which is concerned with identification. However identification is not bound by a unique 
conception which regards the audience as male and associates the male gaze with the 
filmic apparatus. There is more to do with the architectonics of space where the film is 
seen and the ways in which the camera, light, sound etc. operate. Considering that the other 
factors are influential in film theory, identification becomes a slippy term in the 
articulation of a relationship between the spectator and the spectacle. The subject and 
object do not have ‘positions’ distanced and spatially determined as the one identifying 
with the object in the mirror. Rather the subject and object positions become 
transcendental, which leaves no room for getting a conclusive meaning on the side of the 
sexuality of the gaze. In With Me the gaze also becomes transient between the spectator 
and the two persons in the film. The gaze in With Me could be said to turn the spectator’s 
gaze back to him or herself without a choice of an object of desire. Unfamiliar, the film 
gives an aspect of a different imagined space not only by means of the setting, but also 
because of the physical impossibility of division while one is able to copulate with oneself. 
There is fantasy at play that is visualised in this film without an object and without a 
subject who fantasises.  
The notion that identification is with the male gaze since it is regarded as ‘active’ 
just as the camera is mobile and travels from one place to another, does not work here in 
With Me. This is because that the position of the camera is unchanged throughout the film 
and there is also not a movement of the focal lens of the camera. The only movement is the 
movement of the copulating bodies. If mobility is necessary for identification, it does not 
always have to be the apparatus that is mobile. Another moving thing that is not a 
‘medium’ of identification is the continuous movement of the frames in the film stock. As 
With Me is shot with a double exposure on the same film stock, the movement is 
introduced as the ability of emergence of a temporal factor, which does not consider the 
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ability of the camera to move from place to place. Rather the film is ‘written’ twice on the 
same space in different times. The film emerges in the coexistence of these two times and 
it does not represent a specific time which totally belongs to any of these shots. The time of 
the film is both and none of these times as well as spaces.  
In ‘A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad’ Freud considers time as the object of 
perception and consciousness. The relation of time with psychoanalysis is through the 
notion of historicisation. The consciousness functions for shifting the childhood memories 
with the reality in the consciousness and does it through repressing memories. In this 
sense, the conscious functions to eliminate the tension raising mechanism of the 
unconscious. ‘The Writing Pad’ is an apparatus, which Freud theorises in the operation of 
time. Mary Ann Doane explains the working of this apparatus below71:  
 
 
The mystic writing pad is a multilevel system, and its three layers are constituted  
by a wax slab, a thin sheet of translucent waxed paper and a transparent piece of  
celluloid. When written on, the wax slab permanently retains the traces of that 
writing, 
  but when two upper sheets are raised, the writing is erased from them and they are 
              free to receive new impressions.(Doane: 1996, 318)  
 
In this sense the upper sheets represent the perception-consciousness system, and 
the wax slab is the unconscious. Freud gives an articulation of how memory works through 
the inscription of trace. However, the memory traces are to be resisted in the perception-
consciousness system since they are regarded as the unpleasant memories of childhood. 
They are kept in the unconscious to be changed by perception in the consciousness. Freud 
in ‘A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad’ gives an account of a topographical apparatus, 
where he locates memory, perception and consciousness in different places. In this sense, 
Freud is said to give the privilege to the present since he regards memory as that which no 
longer recurs in consciousness and which is replaced by the immediacy of perception. On 
the other hand, his theory is ambiguous because he mentions “traces” in psyche as well.  
Derrida’s approach to the unconscious is against excluding the unconscious in an 
isolated, unreachable space. He argues that the unconscious is the “masked consciousness”. 
The time of the unconscious then, is not timeless, but is “a past which has never been 
present and never will be, whose future to come will never be a production or a 
reproduction in the form of presence.” As long as there is movement and alterity there is 
no presence, since there is a “historical and ontological unfolding of being.”72 Relationship 
of trace to presence says Derrida, may be towards a  “simulacrum of presence” which is 
the constitution of “dislocation and displacement” of trace in itself. Nevertheless, presence 
can only be the trace of presence that passes, defers and differentiates from itself. In With 
Me the image which is  ‘written’ on the film stock is there in the second exposure, which 
does not exclude the traces of the former. Rather the film is the combination of both 
exposures. In this sense, this time, the film stock can be said to keep the traces of the 
former, which then makes it possible for the emergence of a representation of copulation of 
two persons. Unlike the denying and erasing mechanism of “the mystic writing pad” where 
no writing is traceable in the other part of the pad, it is possible to trace the image in the 
first exposure after the second is done. Moreover the image in the first exposure is more 
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“visible” than the second one, which is translucent. Jean Louis Baudry has a similar 
argument in which he adopts the temporal mode of the “mystic writing pad” into the 
operation of the film stock.73 According to him, the inscription of the images on the film 
stock introduces two places for the subject according to the principle of the “mystic writing 
pad” which acknowledges one in consciousness and the other in unconsciousness. (Baudry: 
1986, 290) Baudry states that in Freud’s conception of the apparatus, the waxy substance, 
which is associated with the perception consciousness system, prevents the emergence of 
the memories in the unconscious from causing a “historical accident.” On the other hand 
film stock is able to display the traces both in its inscription of the events while a film is 
only able to watch as long as it continues to run through the track. With Me introduces two 
modes of repetition as doubling and trace; one of them is the repetitive sequence of the 
frames and the other is the doubling of the bodies at the same time.  In addition to this, 
there is a manipulation of the speed of the film in a different way than the normal speed, 
which consists of the flow of 24 frames per second.  The action is performed very slowly, 
and the film is shot at hight speed. When it is projected there is a sense of pause between 
the frames as if there was an animated image that cuts the perception of a coherent 
movement. In this sense there is an oscillation between the real and the unreal while the 
film is between the physical and the quasi-physical mode of dream-state. According to 
Melanie Klein the object is separated from itself and is made a “part object”. Laplanche 
calls it “objectality” of the object as the “phantasmatic object.” In With Me there is not an 
object nor there is a subject which is sited in bodies. In this sense, there is something 
beyond a sense of objectification and narcissism based on the love object. Accordingly, the 
notion of satisfaction is in a continuous delay the possibility of which is left for fantasising 
being.  
As a consequence, With Me is realised in the act of delay. The delaying mechanism 
of the apparatus as well as the scene of copulation enabled by delay turn the film into 
fantasy. This is the fantasy in which the subject and object of fantasy are ambiguous in the 
sense that it does not seem possible to argue that one of the couples is ‘recognised’ as the 
‘other’ sex identified through differentiation between these two. An ambiguity of such 
characterisation in the film also creates an ambiguity when the identification is set between 
the spectator and the means of this film. The notion of fantasy also introduces a loss of a 
sensible physical spatial realm in which the plot could be situated. The spectator’s position 
becomes ambiguous in the sense that the identification with the unidentified realm of film 
is problematic. With Me introduces an unstable sense of subject and object in the unstable 
plot and such ambiguity presents a sense of oscillation between the physical and the 
psychical both of which are able to exist in the other. The film is significant in the sense 
that it introduces the difference between the real and the phantasmatic in a temporal 
unfolding rather than a sense of fixation to spatial positions.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis is not about time but is about the possibilities of existence of silent to 
present different temporalities.  I consider that things without failing to communicate 
senses of presence.There is not  a necessity for an observable mobility for change to occur. 
Mobility does not have to have a forward or backward movement. There is a sense of 
movement, which leaves its part in moving. Movement does not have to be from one place 
to another. It is also that which allows an alteration to occur in itself, maybe an 
imperceptible one. When the manifestation of time becomes space, movement has to 
follow one way; that occurs through different places in a single space. That space is 
measured and it becomes a measurement of time. Space is not a burden for time nor is time 
for space. However, a sense of anchoring in a single spatial plane  reifies a sense of 
becoming reducing it to being. The problematic of being is because of a conceptualisation 
of an exclusion of non-being from being, which is its other. The otherness is what becomes 
a parameter for the constitution of a knowing subject. There is more to add to a self and to 
the other. I do not think the problem is in the way things are, but the way things are 
conceptualised according to other things by comparing or rather, by considering a 
hierarchical relationship between the other and the self.   
 The thesis is concerned about some ways of representation in art that do not aim to 
have a place according to a linear art historical basis. However, these works do not have 
their existences and histories; they contribute history by being critical of a sense of 
inclusion to a history that is external to them; that is the history reduced to specific 
historical discourse. In these works, I tried to explain that a sense of denial of art history 
does not make something distinguished from its contemporaries. On the other hand, these 
works are distinguished from some of their contemporaries since they constitute different 
spatial and temporal relationships.  
 As I mentioned a conception of movement is an important element that contributes 
an emergence of multiplication of space. Temporal flow takes the place of a conception of 
a totalising and unifying aspect of space. There is also not a denial of space, but an 
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introduction of a fragmented space. I consider these works to be examples by which we 
can get a sense of temporality, which introduce a sense of difference in sameness. In this 
sense, I take the notion of the subject, the ego, the look, objective and subjective space and 
time, which are possible to communicate when they become heterogenous. A sense of 
heterogeneity does not mean to push the limits of things to a loss of referentiality. I do not 
aim to give a sense of art that is based on a notion of fragmentation since I do not think that 
fragmentation, heterogeneity and multiplication are the concepts specific to visual art and 
objects of visual representation. In this sense, I consider that the examples I chose address 
a sense of art that is not indifferent to what can be considered as non-artistic activity. 
Rather, they introduce the possibility of other emerging in the same. In this sense, these 
works both question a notion of singularity and authenticity, which are considered as the 
implications of spatial formations. These works introduce the possible multiplications of a 
spatial and temporal experience.  
 As I had mentioned in the beginning of this road, time is not a thing. Temporality is 
that which is traceable but not an object of observation. Temporal unfolding does not  
belong to a space that considers time external to it. Rather, temporal unfolding introduces a 
world of discontinuities and multiplicities. Art contributes to this scene not as a distanced 
and enclosed substance in space but as that which makes the fragments stronger that have 
been silenced by spatial differentiation.  
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